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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
The Niger Delta region of Nigeria contributes more than 95 percent of the country’s export 
incomes and generates more than 40 percent of the Nigerian Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
and 85 percent of the nation’s total revenue (Karl and Gray, 2003, p. 26). Although most 
multinational oil companies (MNOCs) have found the Niger Delta      a fertile ground for 
business, the region remains backward, poor and underdeveloped.    The host communities 
have been frustrated by the effects of oil production on the environment, which include oil 
spillages, the reduction of arable land, and the destruction of wild life and fish reserves. As a 
result of the oil bearing communities’ angry sentiments towards the MNOCs and the Nigerian 
Government, incessant conflict, and violent crises have enveloped the region. To mitigate the 
anger, the MNOCs have engaged in some programs and projects intended to benefit the oil- 
bearing communities in the area of corporate social responsibility (CSR). 
 
 
 
This thesis is focused on how the CSR strategies of the MNOCs have contributed to the 
perennial conflict in the Niger Delta     region of Nigeria. The mixed methods descriptive 
design study employed involves the use of survey instruments and content analysis to 
interrogate the conflict situation. Findings indicate that the failure of MNOCs operating in the 
Niger Delta   region to provide concrete and sustainable CSR, and the government’s inability 
to regulate the MNOCs and plough back the taxes paid by the latter to develop the region, has 
led to the current crises. These supported the thesis that the lack of concrete social 
responsibility contributes to conflicts in the Niger Delta.     Building upon the stakeholders’ 
theory, the theory of frustration and aggression, and conflict theory, this study discovered that 
the cause of the conflict in the Niger Delta       is not solely an issue of corporate social 
responsibility  and  revenue  allocation,  but  it  largely  depends  on  the  divergences  of  the 
different stakeholders’ interests. This study, therefore, recommends a revocation of the 60/40 
ownership structure between the government and the oil companies.       Instead, host 
communities should be considered part owners of the oil deposits in their land, which would 
give them a fair percentage in the ownership structure.
1  
CHAPTER  ONE 
 
 
GENERAL  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1       Introduction 
 
The negative consequences of oil abundance in developing countries are similar- weak 
institutions, impoverished states, poor economic performance, authoritarian regimes and 
unbalanced development (Luong and Weinthal, 2010, p. 1). Notably, oil and its elements tend 
to frustrate most developing economies as they perform poorly with the presence of oil. For 
instance, the poverty rate in Nigeria increased from 36 per cent when the economy was based 
on agriculture to over 70 per cent when the economy became oil dependant. This is despite 
the huge amount of revenue accrued from oil resources (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 
2013, p. 3). 
 
 
 
Indeed, petroleum resources have been described as a curse as most oil resource rich 
developing countries are lacking both freedom and peace.  To corroborate this fact, Freedman 
(2006, p. 31) argued that there is either a law or a force behind oil natural resources "whereby 
the price of oil and the  pace of freedom always  move in opposite directions in  oil-rich 
countries". Ostensibly, the Niger Delta    region of Nigeria typically exemplifies one of the 
oil-rich countries experiencing huge oil revenue on the one hand and a lack of freedom on the 
other. This is due to the on-going random kidnapping of its residents and inter and intra- 
community conflicts in the region (Kaldor, Mary, Karl, Terry and Said, 2015). The latter is 
largely caused by the divide and rule strategies employed by the multinational oil companies 
(MNOCs) as elaborated in section 2.4.11 of this study. 
 
Conflict in the Niger Delta, which predates Nigerian colonialism, tends to have been 
exacerbated in the early 1990s when the people of the region became more aware of the 
environmental damage caused by oil exploration activities.  As a result, Ken Saro-wiwa and
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his eight compatriots along with their loyalist supporters carried out a peaceful protest against 
the Nigerian government and the MNOCs. Unfortunately, the then military regime led by 
Major  General  Sani  Abacha  responded  to  the  peoples'  peaceful  protest  with  a  reprisal 
measure, which culminated in the killing of Ken Saro-wiwa and eight others.    The extra 
judicial killing of the "Ogoni nine" on November 10th 1995 (Ken Saro-wiwa and eight others) 
not only attracted international attention to the region’s conflict but was also seen as the 
beginning of the oil resource conflict in the Niger Delta      (Maier, 2001). This is because 
militant groups such as MEND, IYC and NDPVF emanated after the death of Ken Saro-wiwa 
and continued the protest against both the oil companies and the government. Among other 
causes of the protest by the "Ogoni Nine", Naanen (1995) believes that, the conflict which he 
referred to as the "The Ogoni Wars" was primarily the result of poverty, underdevelopment 
and unemployment as a result of environmental degradation brought about by the oil 
multinationals. 
 
Shell-BP as it was known started its oil exploration in Nigeria in 1921. The search for oil 
(Black gold) ended in 1956 when oil was discovered in commercial quantities in Oloibiri, in 
the Brass Division of present day Bayelsa state. The presence of oil in Nigeria attracted more 
MNOCs, including Agip and Chevron.  Residents of the Niger Delta    region perceived the 
presence of the MNOCs as instruments of development. According to Seers (1973), 
development   implies   the   eradication   of   unemployment,   poverty   and   inequalities. 
Paradoxically, the inflow of the MNOCs in the Niger Delta    does not imply development. 
Ironically, the MNOCs in the Niger Delta    have indulged in activities that have resulted in 
environmental degradation due to gas flaring, unemployment, abject poverty and the 
destruction of flora and fauna.     The increase in unemployment has been blamed on the 
destruction of the host communities' farmlands due to seismic exploration and drilling waste, 
thereby increasing poverty even further. It is therefore no wonder that Barnet and Muller
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(1974) believe that the  MNOCs contribute  to the  global exacerbation  of unemployment, 
poverty and inequality in the world today. MNOCs tend to focus on profit making rather than 
offering a solution to its hosts’ social problems. The aforementioned continued conditions of 
poverty and underdevelopment are responsible for youth agitation and the political conflict in 
the Niger Delta. 
 
However, as expanded in chapter two of this study, the Marxists believe that conflict is 
inevitable in society. Apparently, they are of the view that conflict is a necessary condition 
not just for human survival but also for the growth of society. This is in consonance, with 
Otitte’s (2007) postulation that conflict which normally springs from the variance in human 
interest, does not only end-up in negativity but can be helpful in the growth and development 
of society. Owing to human clashes of interest and goals, conflict is unavoidable in the 
human race but can be managed. Furthermore, Collier (2003, p. 5) defined, conflict as a 
situation where identifiable rebel organisations; wage war against the government. In most 
weak states, the rebels' clash of interests with the government often springs from greed or 
grievance as elaborated in chapter two of this study. Coser (1958, p. 8) defined conflict as a 
struggle over natural resources, power or value, thus conflict in this sense can be used to 
settle two opposing interests. Conflict assessment and management strategies can be used to 
determine what each conflict actor wants and how to achieve peace. After a review of the 
foregoing connotations of conflict, this study will adopt Cosers' perception of conflict. The 
justification being that, the Niger Delta conflict is mainly caused by oil natural resource 
abundance and the appropriation of its consequent monetary value. However, in this regard, 
Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) was established as an umbrella 
association for the Ogoni people that organised resistance to the unsustainable exploitation of 
crude  oil.  This  research  therefore  seeks  to  ascertain  the  linkage  between  conflict  and 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) of oil mining companies.
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The CSR concept, which started as a philanthropic activity, dates back to the 1950s.   This 
was a time when corporations made corporate giving to their communities at will and without 
an  agreement  or  contract.  However,  in  recent  times  CSR  has  become  part  of  strategic 
activities of corporations. Kramer (2006) defined CSR as an organisation’s obligation. This 
implies that CSR is no longer philanthropic but an organisation’s legal requirement to be 
socially responsible within their host communities. The on-going momentum of CSR is based 
on the belief that CSR has the capacity of improving an organisation’s profitability and 
performance (Jones  et  al.,  2009).  Idowu  (2009)  opposes  the relatedness  of CSR  and  an 
organisation’s profitability. Despite Idowu's view on the weak correlations between CSR and 
an organisation’s performance, the lack of an organisation’s engagement in concrete CSR can 
be damaging to the organisation’s corporate image. This is allegedly, the reason why MNOCs 
in the Niger Delta have experienced corporate scandals with poor environmental mining best 
practices. 
 
1.2       Defining the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria 
 
The name,  Niger Delta,  was derived from  its position at the mouth  of the River Niger 
(Etekpe, 2009). The Niger Delta region was formed by ‘the River Niger, West Africa’s 
largest river, which flattens out in Nigeria’s south-eastern coast into a tangle of creeks and 
mangrove swamps  suffused with  fresh  and  brackish  water.  It  has  abundant  oil  and  gas 
deposits,  both  onshore and  offshore,  and  includes  those  oil  and  gas  deposits  located  at 
Agbami,  Bonga, Usan  and  Amenam/Kpono  field,  a region  occupied  by over 20  million 
people.   The uniqueness of Nigeria’s Niger Delta region is not only due to its abundant oil 
deposits;  it  is  also  characterized  by  the  existence  of  ‘coastal  low  lands  and  waters  – 
marshland, creeks, tributaries and lagoons (Osaghae et al, 2007, p.6).
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The region, similar to various Delta regions across the world, for example, the Mississippi 
Delta in the United States, and Mekong Delta in China, has a warm humid sub-tropic climate 
with a long dry season and short rainy season. Notably, the region was expanded due to 
General Sani Abacha’s concept of the South-South geopolitical-zone, which made the Niger 
Delta synonymous with oil producing states. For example, Abia, Imo and Ondo states, which, 
though historically outside the area now form part of the Niger Delta, do not possess the 
characteristics  of  a  delta  (Etekpe,  2009).  According  to  Etekpe  (2007,  p.  2)  “there  is  a 
historical distinction between the oil producing states (OPS), the South-South geopolitical 
zone and the Niger Delta  ...  As a result, they should all be referred to as oil producing states, 
and not Niger Delta States.”   Chief Olusegun Obasanjo’s administration further confused the 
region's identity with its creation of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) Act 
in 2000, which redefined the Niger Delta region to be inclusive of the nine oil and gas 
producing states in  Nigeria.  Jaja (2008,  p.140-1),  commenting on  the  lack of unanimity 
among scholars and the indigenous people on the actual boundary of the Niger Delta suggests 
that: 
 
 
 
[t]here are several views about the [Niger Delta]. The most popular 
ones refer to areas comprising the lower parts of the River Niger 
nearer the coastline…. another variant distinguishes the core Niger 
Delta from the new Niger Delta of the Niger Delta Development 
Commission  (NDDC).  The  latter  covers  the  nine  oil  producing 
states,  namely,  Abia,  Akwa  Ibom,  Bayelsa,  Cross  River,  Delta, 
Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers State.
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Furthermore, Mitee (2012, p.3) state that ‘when oil was discovered in commercial quantity in 
the Niger Delta, the region gradually became expressed in terms of an oil producing area of 
the  country,  not  necessarily as  an  area  geographically classified  as  delta’.  According to 
Ukpong and Ikoh (2013, p.36), the region is: 
 
…[p]redominantly coastal and open directly to the sea... This 
geographical location technically accords them the littoral status in 
relation to offshore oil wells and entitles them to lay claim to 
resources in their maritime territory up to 200-meter isobaths. The 
derivation principle on the other hand enables states endowed with 
crude  oil  to  share  13%  of  the  revenue  derived  from  crude  oil 
monthly. All the states in the region therefore depend on oil revenue 
to finance their socio-economic and political development. 
 
 
 
Notwithstanding  the  foregoing  description  of  the  Niger  Delta,  Ako  (2009)  succinctly, 
maintains  that  the  Niger  Delta  can  be  defined  in  three  ways,  thus;  geographically, 
economically and politically. The map in figure 1:1 below demonstrates the geographical 
location of the Niger Delta in Nigeria. Economically, the Niger Delta has been defined in 
terms of its resources, which marked the region as the economic hub of Nigeria in both the 
palm oil and the current crude oil eras. Politically, in consensus with the Niger Delta 
Development Commission Act (2000), the region is expressed as synonymous with oil 
production. The particular Nigerian states in the region include Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, 
Cross-River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers States.
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1.3 Historical background of the conflict in the Niger Delta: The correlation between 
the palm oil and crude oil eras. 
 
 
 
Ukeja (2005, p. 5) argued that the extant studies on the Niger Delta conflicts are mainly 
limited to the period of commercial exploitation of crude oil, which started in 1958. This 
view is limiting because, it fails to consider the historical ingredients of the Niger Delta 
conflict. Thus, the antique British merchants marginalisation of the Niger Delta traditional 
institutions, who were then famous for their trading business with the establishment of the 
Royal Niger Company (RNC) at Akassa in 1895 and the consequent war. It is therefore, 
necessary to examine this historical antecedent to avoid painting a partial picture of both the 
Niger Delta and the region's conflict; this section of the study will highlight the history of the 
Niger Delta so as to establish holistic view of the conflict. The two major economic yet 
conflict prone eras in the Niger Delta included are the palm and crude oil periods. It is 
significant to analyse both eras to amplify the parallels. 
 
Prior to the era of crude oil exploitation the economic system of the Niger Delta region was 
sustained by revenue from oil palm produce. Ako and Okonmah (2009, p.55) noted that the 
palm oil era, which became significant in 1865 recorded annual export of 2500 tonnes of 
palm  oil  accounting for  87  per  cent  of  regional  national  output,  making the  product  as 
significant as oil is to the Nigeria economy today. In addition to the exportation of palm oil, 
the product has both domestic and traditional significance. Domestically, the product was 
used for cooking, to purchase essential items (such as salt, and gun power) and for social and 
traditional obligations (payment of dowry). Tamuno and Edoumiekumo (2012, p.115) added 
that the oil palm trunk was a necessary material for the construction of buildings; the fibre 
was used for fishnets after it had been restructured as a woven material. Brooms were made 
from oil palm veins, whereas, fronds where used for the construction of thatched-roofs and
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buildings. The kernel after being cracked was used for family snacks after which the waste 
from the kernel after being chewed was reused for feeding goats and local fowls. 
 
The oil palm was tapped for domestic and traditional ceremonial wine while the kernel was 
traditionally  cooked  with  earthenware  for  the  production  of  an  all-purpose  therapeutic 
pomade-oil. The fate of the region changed with introduction of the British administration 
and their accompanying palm oil mills and plantation scheme in 1932, which although was 
aimed at improved agricultural production, had negative impact on the people. It should be 
noted  that  for the  Niger  Delta  people  palm  oil  production  was  based  on  local  farming 
implements and the farmers were not interested in the new implements. The British 
administration introduced a mechanised system of plants and harvesting oil palm for the 
purpose of increased productivity and indeed productivity was increased. Crowder (1968) 
contends that the exploitation of the local people’s agricultural products was the topmost 
attraction of the British merchants working in  the Niger Delta.  However, the traditional 
leaders who originally controlled the trade viewed the change in the farming system and the 
control of the region’s trade by the British merchants as an encouragement.    The alleged 
encroachment  degenerated  to  colonialism.  This  refers  to  a  situation  where  an  existing 
economy is overthrown, and controlled by another for the sole purpose of exploiting the 
colonised (Ako and Okomah, 2009, p. 54; Fidelis and Samuel, 2011, p.1). 
 
The traditional institutions in the historical the Niger Delta region such as King Wlliam 
Dappa-Pepple of Bonny kingdom, King Jaja of Opobo and Prince Nana of Itsekiri Kingdom 
fought against colonialism (Etekpe, 2007, p. 1). They realised that when an existing culture is 
colonised there would normally be negative impacts on the newly transformed communities 
(Epelle 2010b, p.14-19). However, Rotimi and Ogen (2008, p.48) argued that the pre-colonial 
heroes of the Niger Delta have been wrongly depicted as proto-nationalists. They note that
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the traditional institutions’ resistance in the Niger Delta region was fought for their selfish 
gain. They believe that the traditional leaders were basically struggling for the protection of 
their personal economic interests, and thus, their narrow pursuit of profit cannot constitute an 
effectual foundation of nationalist ferment in Nigeria. Notwithstanding, the traditional 
institutions’ striking motivation for fighting against the presence of British merchants in the 
region, the subsequent colonialism and its negative impact on the environment is suggestive 
of their determination to protect both the people and probably their positions. Paradoxically, 
Alter (1994, p. 10) argues that nationalism “encompasses two opposing ideas: one seeks to 
liberate a common group from oppression and the other thrives on oppressing the people". 
Ostensibly, the British merchant’s mode of operation may have appeared domineering, 
oppressive and unacceptable by the traditional institutions, this could have prompted their 
determination to fight the perceived encroachment as well as creating a medium of 
consolidating their position that were threatened by the British merchants. 
 
The Niger Delta people were faced with the issue of resource allocation and control during 
the colonial period. They felt that the RNC interfered with their legitimate right to trade and 
fought to re-possess it. Etekpe (2007, p.1) traced the conflict in the region to the Akassa Raid 
of 1895, a protest against British policies and that of the Royal Niger Company (RNC) by the 
Niger Delta traditional institutions. The British/Akassa war in 1895 resulted from the failure 
of diplomacy and the colonial administration’s adoption of punitive measures instituted by 
naval troops (Etekpe, 2007, p. 2). The Niger Delta communities’ resistance to the British 
colonial administration tends to account for the custom-tailored federalism adopted by the 
British administration in Nigeria. This is not different from the present harsh response the 
people experience from the Nigerian government whenever they carry out peaceful protests. 
These colonial developments have been described as ‘booby-traps’ (Etekpe, 2007, p.2; Obi, 
2011), which successive Nigerian administrations, since the country's political independence
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in 1960, would have overcome. However, as Mabogunje (1992, p. 2) suggests, history, in this 
case underpinned by negative policies, has foreclosed the Niger Delta people’s future. 
 
Given the rich resources in the Niger Delta, particularly crude oil, most MNOCs found the 
Niger Delta region a fertile ground for business activities. Today, the regions one of the 
world’s richest  biodiversity centres, attracting scientists and tourists.  It  possesses diverse 
vegetation belts from the largest rain forests in Africa to mangrove swamps, mountains and 
waterfalls with rare animals, including uncommon species (Ojakorotu, 2009; and Enyinla and 
Ukpo, 2006).  In describing the Niger Delta, Moff and Linden (1995) argue that the region is 
undoubtedly the richest part of Nigeria in terms of natural resources. In their view: 
 
 
 
 
[t]he area has large oil and gas deposits, as well as extensive forests, 
good agricultural land and abundant fish resources. Despite the 
tremendous natural and human resources base, the regions potential 
for sustainable development remains unfulfilled and its future is being 
threatened by environmental degradation and deteriorating economic 
conditions which are not being addressed by past and present policies 
and actions. Twenty-five [now over fifty] years of oil development 
has not brought significant benefits to the region (Moff and Linden, 
1995, p. 7-8). 
 
 
 
The exploration of crude oil in Nigeria dates back to 1908. However, the discovery of oil in 
Oloibiri in present day Bayelsa State in commercial quantity in 1956 marked the beginning of 
the Niger Delta crude oil era. However the first oil exploration took place in 1958 when shell 
exported 5100 barrels of crude oil to England (Ako and Okonmah 2009, p.55). Since 1958 
the quantity of exported oil has been on the increase and it’s currently at 2million barrels per
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day   (Tamuno   and   Edoumiekumo,   2012,   p.117);   with   oil   currently,   contributing 
approximately 90% of Nigeria’s gross domestic. 
 
Ownership of oil in Nigeria has been a major course of the on-going conflict in the Niger 
Delta. A major reason for this conflict is that the Land Use Act of 1978 denied the local 
people who were recognized as landowners from the ownership of the oil. Also, by virtue of 
the Nigerian Constitution, the MNOC’s and the Federal Government of Nigeria who have 
control over every resource in the country jointly operate the Nigerian oil industry.   This 
means that the members of the host community that cultivate the land are excluded from 
partaking in petro-business (Ako and Okonmah 2009, p.57). Furthermore, the Act as 
implemented infringed on the communities right not only to participate in oil-business but 
denies the communities the right to compensation with regards to environmental degradation 
(Ako and Coker 2007, p.435). 
 
It is possible that this type of denial contributed to the limited involvement of the host 
communities  in  MNOCs  environmental  unfriendly  activities  that  affects  the  health  and 
standard of living of the Niger Delta people. The host communities who frown at this state of 
affairs  have  protested  to  both  the  government  and  the  oil  companies  in  different  ways 
including petitions, civil demonstration and litigation in courts although yet to be successful 
(Ako and Okonmah, 2009, p.65). After various unsuccessful attempts, the Niger Delta people 
resorted to aggressive measures in the early 1990’s. These aggressive measures included the 
kidnapping  of   MNOC’s   expert   staff   (particularly  foreigners),   pipeline   vandalization, 
disruption of oil installation amongst others. Both the Government and the MNOC’s have 
responded to the regional aggression with punitive measures. This is perceived as the same 
measure  the  British  merchants  employed  in  the  pre-colonial  era  that  culminated  in  the
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“Akassa War” of 1895. Repressive measures employed have only exacerbated the level of the 
regions conflict. 
 
From the foregoing, there exist parallels between the palm oil and crude oil eras.    Both 
products were in high demands although at different times (palm oil 1865 while crude stated 
in 1958).  Palm oil was an essential product during the European industrial revolution.  It was 
used in processing lubricants for the maintenance of industrial machinery and domestically 
used in heating-up the house, production of margarine and soap. On the other hand, crude oil 
as a contemporary developmental component is likewise used domestically and industrially. 
It is used in fuelling individual cars, generators, motorcycles, aeroplane, industrial machines 
and cars. Both eras were characterized by resource conflict involving the local communities 
(traditional institutions), foreign experts and the government (Ako and Okonmah, 2009, p. 
59). They further averred that, the palm oil and crude oil eras’ resource conflict suffered 
unison between the government and the exploiters against the host communities in a bid to 
protect resource revenue generated from the communities’ resources but controlled by the 
central government. The oneness between the government and the alleged foreign resource 
exploiters has been legalised with the 60/40 joint venture relationship between the oil 
companies and the Nigerian government, originally co-signed by the Nigerian government 
and Shell in 1938. 
 
It is possible that the denial of the host communities right in controlling the oil palm trade 
which they were best known for was a major contributor to the Akassa War of 1895, just as 
the  communities  leaders  struggle  today  to  gain  recognition  and  participation  in  the  oil 
business. Okonta (2007) contained that there is a direct link between the host communities’ 
non-participation  and  the  conflict  in  the  Niger  Delta,  which  is  traceable  to  the  regions 
historical underpinnings.  He added that conflict in the region cannot be understood without
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taking into account the historical international economic forces, which the host communities 
have, resisted (Okonta, 2007, p. 3). It is the resistance of superior powers that has attempted 
to deny the local Niger Delta residents means of livelihood that resulted to both the Akassa 
war and the ongoing oil conflict with the government responding with oppressive measures. 
 
Paradoxically, Oyefusi (2007, p. 1) attributed the violence in the Niger Delta to weak 
institutions, a lack of law enforcement and a marriage between the MNOCs and the Nigerian 
state, which stimulate the Nigerian government to deploy repressive measures frequently 
against the local communities in times of crisis between the oil companies and the host. To 
corroborate the palm oil and crude oil parallel nature, Ako and Okonmah (2009, p. 59), 
argued that, the Nigerian state have repeatedly, adopted the repressive means of quelling 
conflict as was the case during the palm oil era that led to the Akassa war. A period when the 
government  controlled  the security forces  to  protect  their economic interest.  In  order to 
ensure a monopoly of the oil palm trade by the RNC, which was the identity of the residents 
of the Niger Delta and they were celebrated for it, the government’s military forces attacked 
and suppressed the residents in 1895. This is no different from the punitive measures that the 
Nigerian government has adopted more recently (in 1993 the oil conflict was exacerbated by 
the Ogoni nine protest that led to their subsequent killing by hanging in 1995) to repress the 
oil host communities in order to protect its economic interest. This study is therefore focused 
on ascertaining the role each actor (the government, communities and the oil companies) of 
the conflict has played in exacerbating the conflict and the possible ways of managing the 
conflict. 
 
1.4       Statement  of the Problem 
 
Recurrent oil conflict has affected the Niger Delta region since the past five decades since the 
commercialisation oil exploration from the Niger Delta in 1958. The region’s conflicts are
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blamed on the negative effects of oil exploration activities, which have impacted negatively 
on the relations amongst MNOCs (Shell, Chevron and Agip), the Nigerian State, and oil 
producing communities. The problem in the Niger Delta stems from the alleged neglect; 
oppression, marginalization and environmental dilapidation occasioned by oil exploration and 
production activities (Ojakorotu, 2009; Olawuyi, 2015).   After a long period of frustration 
over the appalling conditions created by the economic activities of the MNOCs, the 
communities of the region, according to Ibeanu (2000), took up arms against petrol-business 
and its political allies in order to draw attention to their situation. The resulting conflict, 
which has degenerated and defied several measures aimed at its resolution, could inherently 
be related to the failure of the MNOCs CSR projects and policies in the Niger Delta in 
general. 
 
The  contradiction  that  generates  conflict  in  the  Niger  Delta  could  be  traceable  to  the 
haphazard nature and failure of the various multinationals’ corporate social responsibility 
projects  and  policies  (Ako,  2014).  In  spite  of  the  attempt  by  the  trans-nationals  and 
government at various levels to mediate the crisis through interventionist strategies and 
programmes as measures towards managing or addressing the issues, conflict in the region 
has remained unabated. The tension in the Niger Delta continues to pose serious challenges 
for good governance and livelihood for the people in the region. That the militarisation of the 
region has not helped in restoring the much-desired stability in this regard raises a question of 
the government’s conflict management style. Key socio-economic indicators reveal that there 
will  be  further  devastating  consequences  if  the  crisis  is  not  managed  through  inclusive 
policies derived from democratic and participatory processes. Without doubt, restoring peace 
in the region would require political will (Epelle, 2010a, p. 34-5) and determined effort to 
bring about the physical development of the region. The formulation and implementation of 
CSR policies and the establishment of a new and positive culture of social, economic and
16  
democracy  can  support  this.  In  this  regard,  a  multi-stakeholder  joint  problem  solving 
approach is required for timely implementation of CSR. 
 
In spite of the interventionist measures adopted, the aggrieved communities seem not to be 
appeased by the Nigerian oil industry. On the other hand, the MNOCs in a bid to rebrand 
their image with the international community spent millions of dollars investing in the Niger 
Delta  as  part  of  CSR.  Thus,  according  to  Okodudu  (2008),  Shell’s  annual  expenditure 
increased from $25m in 1994 to $60m in 2000. Despite these concerted efforts, Shell has 
continued to be blamed by the host communities with consequences including insecurity and 
public safety breaches. 
 
The MNOCs pattern of investing in the realm of CSR ends up triggering aggression, either by 
the choice of project or the process of CSR delivery within the local communities. Therefore, 
it is not surprising that the new community-based strategies adopted by the MNOCs are 
perceived by the host communities as a mere shift to rebrand their corporate image (Ibeanu, 
2000). Ostensibly, these changes in attitude arose from a re-evaluation of the oil giants’ 
activities in the developing world. This approach was geared towards maintaining a viable 
link with their host environment.   People-oriented public relations, which aim at sustaining 
cordial relations with the communities, are one of the approaches in achieving this crucial 
task. Consequently, in its review in 2009, Shell claimed the disbursement of plethora of funds 
to  the  Nigerian  state  for the  development  of oil-bearing communities.  The joint  venture 
operated by the Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) and the Nigeria National 
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) contributed more than $34 billion within the period 2005- 
2008. Similarly, Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production Company (SNEPCO), which 
manage offshore business in deep water, claimed to have paid nearly $2 billion over the same 
period (Shell Review, 2009). Notwithstanding the corporate giving of the oil company, the
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conflict, which escalated with the criminal hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa and his compatriots 
(Ogoni Nine), rather than managing the  conflict, escalated the CSR  related crisis  in the 
region. Saro-wiwa and his compatriots championed a peaceful protest in the early 1990s 
based on the inadequate CSR implementation by MNOCs, which has remained unabated. 
According to Eze (2014, p. 1): 
 
The people of Nembe Community in Nembe Local Government 
Area  of  Bayelsa  State  rejected  a  goat  and  10  bags  of  rice 
presented to them as Christmas gifts by the management of 
Nigerian Agip Oil Company (NOAC)...Daily Trust gathered that 
the anger of the oil rich Nembe Kingdom which is host to Agip 
stemmed from the fact that the gift items were meant to be shared 
by over 500,000 people led by a one-time Minster of Power and 
the Amananyabo of Nembe Kingdom, King Edmund Dakoru..., 
Chairman of Nembe Oil and Gas Committee, Chief Nengi James 
Orioworio, described the gifts as a corporate embarrassment to 
the   traditional   institution   and   the   good   people   of   Nembe 
Kingdom which the people will never take. 
 
 
 
While Agip has been involved in hundreds of community development projects ranging from 
energy, education, and infrastructure to health and social-economic programmes, the 
communities are unhappy with the projects. This is because either they want to be involved in 
the decision-making or project delivery process or the companies get involved in CSR from 
an  ad-hoc  perspective.  CSR  projects  should  normally  be  planned  and  be  part  of  the 
company's internal process so as to preclude the possibility of the respective community's 
rejection  of  their  corporate  giving.  One  would  therefore  wonder  how  Agip  reached  the
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decision to have over 500,000 members of Nembe community share one goat and 10 bags of 
rice, which generated animosity rather than appreciation. 
 
Chevron,  on  the  other hand,  tends  to  take seriously its  role  in  community engagement; 
therefore, the company is actively involved in many projects that promote health, economic 
development and education. In 2005, for example, Chevron Nigeria Limited (CNL) adopted a 
new approach to community engagement in the Niger Delta by improving local participation 
in determining its needs. According to the Chevron (2013) CSR report, this model, called the 
Global Memorandum of Understanding (GMoU) empowers the communities with the desired 
role of managing their development. A new Regional Development Councils (RDC) was 
created with the objective of bringing peace and stability to the Chevron host communities. 
Consequently, the memoranda has produced approximately 258 projects in more than 400 
communities, villages, and chiefdoms, and benefited some 600,000 people. Projects worth 
more than $83 million have been completed, enhancing the quality of life in these 
communities. The report further provided that in 2011 the company joined the U.S. Agency 
for  International  Development  (USAID)  in  contributing  $50  million  to  the Niger  Delta 
Partnership Initiative (NDPI) Foundation. This foundation was established by Chevron to 
address the socioeconomic challenges facing the area. Notwithstanding the effort and the 
amount invested, the effects of the initiatives on the on-going conflict in the region have been 
unnoticed, or at best, minimal, based on the local quest for involvement with regards to 
corporate giving’s. 
 
The Nigerian Government on its part has established specialized institutions to cater for the 
needs of the Niger Delta. These include the now defunct Oil Minerals  Producing Areas 
Development Commission (OMPADEC) and the current the Niger Delta Development 
Commission (NDDC). The basic mandate of the NDDC is to further pursue the aims and
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objectives of the community development paradigm, which concentrates on the provision of 
social and economic infrastructure. By 2006 NDDC, had undertaken a total of 122 major 
projects in Rivers State. Out of these, there are 40 roads, 29 water projects, 11 electrification 
projects, and three canalization projects. Others include 85 blocks of classrooms, one bridge 
and three jetties (allAfrica.com http//allafrica.com/headlines accessed 27/01/2012). 
Unfortunately, the communities viewed these efforts as paltry gifts vis-à-vis the perceived 
value of resource exploitation by the MNOCs and the Nigerian Federal Government from 
their areas; thus, violent conflicts have continued unabated (Isola, 2015). 
 
According to Nnoli (1998), CSR failures accounted for the inability of conflicting groups to 
accept  the  arrangements  and  procedures  that  has  been  adopted  to  resolve  the  conflict. 
Similarly,  Onosode  (2003) averred  that  the  current  top-down  approach  adopted  to  solve 
endemic problems has failed to deliver results that are simultaneously socially and 
economically sustainable. This can be attributed to the lack of a common developmental 
framework and focus on sustainable corporate social responsibility. This is evidenced by the 
state and multinationals’ delay in implementing the recommendations of the Ledum Mittee 
technical committee on the Niger Delta developmental master plan, which sets out the road 
map of for the development the host communities. 
 
There is an increasing consciousness of the exploitation and backwardness in the Niger Delta. 
In spite of the wealth produced in the region to benefit the Nigerian state and MNOCs, the 
host  communities have  been  at  the receiving end of oil  spillages,  gas  flaring and  other 
environmental hazards that results from oil mining waste. This has resulted in an increase in 
the demand by host communities for more CSR initiatives from the MNOCs operating in 
their localities. The CSR efforts of the MNOCs can therefore, be seen as contrasting attempts. 
Thus, while MNOCs endeavour to double their efforts for CSR in recent times, there is a rise
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in agitations from the host communities for such programmes and initiatives. This is ironic, 
and a plausible indication that the MNOCs CSR strategies either needs to be tailored to the 
communities’ needs or the host communities are being unreasonable in their demands. 
Previous studies on CSR and Community Development are inconformity regarding the fact 
that CSR is still at the growth stage in terms of its implementation and effectiveness, 
particularly in the Niger Delta. 
 
Worse still, the implementers are accused of misappropriating funds meant for CSR, thus 
contributing to the ineffectiveness of the programmes (Watts, 2005).  In this context, some of 
the reasons advanced to account for the low-level of commitment to CSR initiatives include: 
cosmetic projects that do not effectively stand the test of time (Osuntokun, 2008, Owolabi 
and Oluowolobi, 2009). In addition, pessimism, abysmal and ambivalent responses to CSR, 
corruption and faulty implementation of the programme, and negative impacts of the process 
of delivering the CSR programmes contribute to the dissatisfaction among the host 
communities with the efforts of the MNOCs (Okodudu, 2008; Frynas, 2005; Akpan, 2006; 
Watts, 2004, 2005; Newell, 2005; Eweje, 2007 and Tuodolo, 2007). In order to analyse and 
evaluate the root causes of the regions conflict and its management this study will critically 
explore the foregoing issues. 
 
The dependency mentality within the host communities has been fostered by the failure of 
most CSR programmes, which does not involve the local people in the initiation, planning 
and  implementation  process.  Since,  the construction  of  buildings  and  other  development 
projects do not genuinely involve the local people, these social initiatives are seen, as gifts 
from  outsiders  and  the  local  people  do  not  claim  ownership  of  the  projects.  Schemes 
introduced in this way cannot remain functional without the continued support of the 
owners/users, and this contravenes a basic principle of development.
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Thus, as stated earlier, while the MNOCs claim to be actively engaged in CSR and to have 
invested extensively (huge amount of money) towards the development of the oil producing 
communities, the latter contend that the MNOCs have not done enough. In this regards, this 
study is focused on evaluating the reasons why increases in CSR funding by the MNOCs, 
correspondingly produces intensive communal resistance. 
 
1.5 Aim and objectives of the study 
 
The  general  aim  of  this  study is  to  critically investigate  whether  or not  the absence of 
concrete CSR strategies of the MNOCs has contributed to the perennial conflicts in Nigeria’s 
Niger Delta region.  The specific objectives are: 
 
(i) to  assess  the  key  causes  of  the  conflicts  and  its  consequences  on  the  host 
communities in the Niger Delta region, 
(ii) to evaluate the CSR program and projects of the MNOCs and their impacts on 
conflicts management; and 
(iii) to evaluate the efforts of the Federal Government towards conflict management in 
the Niger-Delta region. 
 
1.4 Research Questions 
 
 
 
Given  the  importance  of  oil  in  the  Nigeria  economy,  and  the need  to  get  the  MNOCs 
operating  in  the  oil  producing  the  Niger  Delta  region  to  take  their  CSR  seriously,  the 
proposed mixed-methods study will answer the following specific research questions: 
 
1)   What are the key causes and who are the key actors responsible for restiveness in the 
 
Niger Delta? 
 
2) What are the prevailing CSR strategies of the MNOCs in the Niger Delta and how 
successful are they? And,
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3) What role has the Federal government played in the conflict resolution and how 
successful are the strategies employed? 
 
1.5 Assumptions  of Study 
 
 
 
In the course of the study, the following propositions were tested: 
 
 
 
H1. Increase in funding for corporate social responsibility leads to higher resistance 
from the host communities. 
 
H2. Haphazard implementation of CSR projects and policies by MNOCs aggravates 
the social conflict in the region. 
 
H3. If CSR projects/programs implemented stimulate local economy, there will be 
lesser social conflict in the study area. 
 
H4. If CSR projects are based on community needs, grievance/social conflicts in the 
study area are likely to reduce in the near future. 
 
1.6 Significance of the Study 
 
The significance of the study shall be discussed based on three perspectives: theoretical, 
methodological and practical perspectives, as elaborated below. 
 
1.6.1 Theoretical Significance 
 
 
 
The theories of conflict, frustration and aggression and the stakeholders’ theory were 
significantly elucidated in this research. The three theories were significant in the research 
although the stakeholder’s theory, mostly underpinned the themes under review hence; the 
stakeholder’s theory was adopted.  It’s important to note that both the conflict theory and the 
frustration and aggression theory buttressed the essence of conflict in society and its possible
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sources, the stakeholders’ theory is adopted because it explicates the relationship between all 
those that has both direct and indirect stake in a business and mandates businesses to be 
corporate citizen. 
 
Furthermore,   with   the   explication   of  CSR   and   conflict   management   in   oil-bearing 
communities of the Niger Delta, the study is significantly expository as it reviews existing 
studies on conflict in, the Niger Delta. Scholarly works by Adeyemi (2005), Breane (2007), 
Okodudu (2008), Ejibunu (2008) and Branco (2006), amongst others, will be reviewed. Most 
of these works exhaustively deal with the issue of oil and violence, CSR, policy failure and 
crisis in the Niger Delta. In this context, oil itself does not produce conflict, but the way 
stakeholders address issues concerning human relations and their expected benefits from the 
resource is significant. Previous studies do not sufficiently capture the interplay between CSR 
practices of multinationals and conflict management in oil-bearing communities as a response 
strategy to  the  conflict.  Therefore,  this  gap  forms  the point  of  departure from  previous 
studies. It is theoretically significant as the study is a paradigm shift from other studies on 
conflict in host communities of MNOCs in the Niger Delta. 
 
1.6.2 Methodological  Significance 
 
 
 
The adoption of a coherent methodology in a study of this nature is very important. Relevant 
existing literatures on CSR and conflict management are reviewed and thereafter the study 
adopts a mixed methods research design made up of field survey (questionnaires, interviews 
and focus Group Discussion, FGD) and a qualitative approach to generate data. At the end, 
the data collected is described in tabular form using simple percentages. Thereafter, SPSS is 
used to draw inference and establish relationships between variables. The study is therefore 
methodologically important, as it will contribute to the refinement of the methods used in 
studying corporate social responsibility and conflict management  problems in the future.
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1.6.3 Practical  Significance 
 
 
 
This research work will equally demonstrate the basic inherent contradictions in MNOCs 
CSR projects and policies, which impede the process of sustainable conflict management 
strategies, and policies in the Niger Delta .It will provide the framework for conflict 
management through the initiation of community-based sustainable socio-economic policies 
and programs by the Government and Multi-nationals that would reduce the vulnerability in 
the region. The findings of this research will provide the platform for the reorientation and 
revamping of policy for practitioners of conflict management. This will help to evolve a 
functional and sustainable CSR approach towards addressing the Niger Delta question in 
order to reduce the conflict that has ravaged the region. 
 
1.7 Research Design and Rationale 
 
 
Researches on the Niger Delta conflicts include Otite and Albert (2007), and Afinotan and 
Ojakorotu (2009), who examined the common factors responsible for oil-related revolutions 
in  the  rural  areas  of  the  Niger  Delta  region.  Additionally,  Afrin  (2013)  examined  how 
‘strategic  corporate  social responsibility supports  sustainable  development’.  Afinotan and 
Ojakorotu  (2009)  went  further to  explore the  link  between  domestic violence in  the oil 
producing communities and  the  concern  of  members  of  the  host  communities  regarding 
resource control as well as focusing on the use of ethnic militia in the depiction of the current 
conflict in the region. However, neither Otite and Albert (2007) nor Afinotan and Ojakorotu 
(2009) examined how the absence of concrete corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs 
has contributed to the Niger Delta crises and how it could be used by the MNOCs to resolve 
the conflict in the region. 
 
Notwithstanding the numerous studies carried out on the Niger Delta conflicts, as well as the 
role of multinational businesses in the Niger Delta, the much-desired cordial relationship
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between the MNOCs, communities and the Government is yet to be established. If there were 
a concrete CSR program, it would have otherwise massaged the host community's social 
needs. Thereby, providing for a peaceful coexistence among the various stakeholders and 
positive public relations as stipulated in the memorandum of understanding. Unfortunately, 
the breakdown in the social contract of the local people, which is significant to peaceful 
community relations, engenders the following consequences. 
 
1. Frustration: society is always peaceful when all actors in a social contract hold firm their 
respective roles. Unfortunately, the host communities in the Niger Delta tend to be at the 
receiving end of the consequences of a broken social contract while the MNOCs together 
with  the  Government  have,  over  the  decade,  have  continued  to  dominate  them.  This, 
alongside the resultant frustration, has generated distrust between the host communities, on 
one hand, and the MNOCs and the Government on the other. The poor community-relations 
strategy  of  the  MNOCs  has  generated  a  negative  perception:  a  situation  where  the 
communities believe that the MNOCs are only interested in exploiting them by extracting oil 
from  their  environment  thus  despoiling the  communities' ecosystem  with  no  subsequent 
benefit on the part of the host communities. Ironically, any initiative in the realm of CSR is 
rather perceived to the host communities by way of crisis management instead of a genuine 
corporate developmental effort. 
 
2. Aggression: The youths became aggressive after waiting for decades for promises made to 
them by the Nigerian government, which failed to materialize (Usang and Ikpeme, 2015). 
After becoming more conscious of their position as the engine of the Nigerian economy, the 
oil producing communities unanimously became confrontational. Consequently, some 
members (militant youths) of the communities attacked oil installations and MNOCs staff
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members. This detrimental impact would have been avoided had the MNOCs provided 
concrete CSR with positive effects on community relations. 
 
3. Economic Loss: at the peak of the Niger Delta when the communities were heated up and 
uninhabitable for the residents, owing to the clashes between the Nigerian military and the 
Niger Delta militants, accounting for the reduction in oil businesses (Ojakorotu, 2009). Both 
the government and the MNOCs recorded huge revenue loss at to the height of oil resource 
conflict in the Niger Delta. In 2007, for example, there were violent-related shutdowns of up 
to 800,000 barrels per day in some stations, which were recorded to translate to $4.4billion 
losses per day. Large MNOCs like Shell downsized its human resources resulting to up to 
5,000 job losses, smaller companies completely shut down1 Ostensibly, the impact of the 
 
Niger Delta crisis was felt internationally, when, in 2007, world oil prices rose from $55.00 
to $63.38 per barrel (Afinotan and Ojakorotu, 2009; Adams, 2014; (Okolie-Osemene, 2015); 
Nigeria could not supply its OPEC quota at the time. 
 
From the foregoing, it  becomes imperative to conduct a study that critically investigates 
whether or not the absence of concrete CSR strategies of the MNOCs have contributed to the 
perennial conflicts in the Nigeria’s Niger Delta region and how CSR strategies employed by 
the MNOCs can strengthen their community relations and mitigate the conflict. This study 
aims to expand on the existing knowledge with regards to CSR strategies and provide a 
baseline for other researchers particularly, in community relations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1A situation where Shell considered divesting onshore, majority of the workers that were 
engaged in some projects was affected. Additionally, job loss is one of the consequences of 
instability         caused         by         youth         restiveness         and         CSR         conflict.
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1.8 Scope and Limitations of the Study 
 
 
 
The purpose of this section is to describe the scope as well as limitations of the mixed- 
methods descriptive design study.  In every scholarly work, such as writing a thesis, the 
researcher is confined in certain ways, including, but not limited to, lack of funding, time 
constraints and scope of the study. All these are applicable to this study; but the researcher 
worked hard to limit the effect on this study. 
 
The mixed-methods descriptive design that this study employs explores the historical Niger 
Delta environmental degradation crisis as opposed to political Niger Delta.   The historical 
component of the Niger Delta comprised the BRACED States (Bayelsa, Rivers, Akwa Ibom, 
Cross River Edo and Delta States) that are reflected in the Henry Willink’s Niger Delta 
Report of 1958.  However, the political side of the Niger Delta was the creation of the Fourth 
Republic in 2000,2 during former President Olusegun Obasanjo’s administration.   It added 
Abia, Imo and Ondo states to the BRACED states as part of the oil producing states. The 
scope of this study is limited to the historical Niger Delta that has majorly felt the negative 
impact of oil mining activities. 
 
Further limitation to this study is that, whereas there are 20 major MNOCs operating in the 
region, the study has selected three MNOC, specifically, SPDC (Shell), NAOC (Agip), and 
Chevron.  The choice of these companies is based on their roles and sizes as they are the pace 
setters in the petrochemical industry in the region.  Thus, a good understanding of their CSR 
is adequate to explore in-depth, the activities of the remaining MNOCs in the region. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2This refers to the end of military rule in 1999 with the handing over of power to a 
democratically elected president.
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1.9 Operational Definition of Terms 
 
 
 
Niger Delta:  The Niger Delta region was formed by ‘the River Niger, West Africa’s largest 
river, which flattens out in Nigeria’s south-eastern coast into a tangle of creeks and mangrove 
swamps, suffused with fresh and brackish water. Most of the inhabitants are [the] Ijaws, 
Urhobos, Ogonis, Itsekiris, Igbos and other indigenous groups’ (Shaxson, 2008, p.194). The 
states making up the Niger Delta region has been politicised. The region is now based on the 
Nigerian geopolitical zones rather than the historic Niger Delta region. However, this study 
uses the historical Niger Delta. 
 
Oil Producing  Communities  (OPC):  following the title of this study, the OPCs refer to all 
the communities in which oil is produced in Nigeria. 
 
Shell Petroleum  Development  Company   (SPDC): The Shell Petroleum Development 
Company of Nigeria Limited produces oil and supplies gas to domestic customers through 
pipelines. The company was founded in 1937 and has its headquarters in is based in Lagos, 
Nigeria, with its major operations located in the Niger Delta. This company operates as a 
subsidiary of the Royal Dutch Shell Plc, simply known as Shell Nigeria, and is in joint 
venture with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and other MNOCs. 
 
Agip: Agip or “Azienda Generale Italiana Petroli”, which can be translated into English as 
General Italian Oil Agency. In 1976 it was incorporated by Eni to manage Nigerian deep 
offshore  exploration  and  production  assets  under the  name Nigerian  Agip  Oil  Company 
Limited (NAOC). It operates a joint venture with Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
(NNPC). It has a forty per cent share, while the NNPC have a larger share of sixty per cent. 
 
Chevron:   One of  the  major MNOCs  in  Nigeria,  Chevron  is  of  American origin.    It  is 
specifically  the  third-largest  oil  company  in  Nigeria  and  operates  under  a  joint-venture
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arrangement with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, where the NNPC owns 60% 
 
share of its profit. 
 
 
 
Niger Delta Development  Commission  (NDDC): The Commission was established in 2000. 
Its major mission is to facilitate the rapid, even and sustainable development of the Niger 
Delta  so  that  it  becomes  into  a  region  that  is  economically prosperous,  socially stable, 
ecologically regenerative and politically peaceful. 
 
Public Relations:   In the context of this study, public relations refer to a professional 
maintenance of a relationship between an organization and its communities. However, the 
British  Institute  of  Public  Relations’  (BIPR)  define  it  as  the  “deliberate,  planned  and 
sustained effort to establish and maintain mutual understanding between an organization and 
its publics,” (Daramola, 2003, p. 3). 
 
Community   Relations:   This  is  an  aspect  of public relations.  It  specializes  on  building 
cordial and commercial relationships involving organizations and their host communities. 
 
Conflict:  This concept means different things to different scholars but in the context of this 
study, it is a situation that springs up among people of divergent interest. This does not mean 
much. You need an academic definition. It occurs when the interest, goal or values of a group 
or individuals are said to have clashed. This is exemplified in the disagreement between the 
Niger Delta communities, the MNOCs and the Nigerian government. According to Otitte 
(2007) good can result from conflicts where the actors give room for a win-win situation. 
 
Corporate  Social  Responsibility   (CSR):  According to  the World Business Council for 
Sustainable  Development  (WBCSD),  CSR  is  an  environmental  friendly  management 
concept.  CSR  entails  that  businesses are  expected  to  invest  in  continual  commitment  to 
behave ethically and contribute to communities’ economic advancement. It can also mean
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developing the standard of the workforce within local communities, and the entire society by 
extension (Ako, 2014). 
 
Divide  and  Rule:  This is  a policy implemented with  regards  to  a superior  maintaining 
control over communities, subordinates or opponents by encouraging division and among 
them. Historically, this is a colonial government driven policy employed to instigate division 
amongst its colonies, particularly in Nigeria. This policy prevents the dominated individuals 
or groups from uniting in opposition against the colonial exploiter. In order to prevent any 
united opposition to its authority, the then British colonial administration adopted a divide- 
and-rule policy of keeping the Nigerian regions (even after the 1914 amalgamation) separate 
from one another as much as possible. Currently, the divide and rule strategy adopted by the 
MNOCs is aimed at not only disrupting the peace of the local communities but to encourage 
the communities distrusting one another. Consequently, the Niger Delta communities have 
been turned against one another hence, MNOCs could be blamed for the perpetual inter and 
intra community conflict. 
 
Politics  of Oil:  Politics of oil in the Niger Delta brings to light more national challenges 
which the Nigerian state will have to contend with. These include: issues of fiscal federalism, 
resource allocation, poverty alleviation, minority rights and human right violation. Simply 
put, it is the policy of “who gets what, when and how” from national revenue generated from 
oil (Johnson, 2015). 
 
1.10     ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
 
 
 
This work is divided into six  chapters. Chapter one introduces the study.  It reviews the 
background of the study; states the problems encountered with the study; states the aims and 
objectives of the study; reiterates the importance of the work; sets the scope of the work and 
brings to limelight the key concepts used in the study.
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Chapter two examines the research setting. It provides the Nigerian vegetation as well its 
political history. The chapter: establishes the reason why MNOCs situate their operational 
sites majorly in developing countries. The chapter further assesses both the implication of 
MNOCs double standards in developing countries and reason behind the double standards. It 
founded that in the case of Nigeria, MNOCs double standards are directly linked with 60/40 
partnership with the Nigeria Nigerian that subsequently incapacitate the later from enforcing 
its mining laws. The key causes of the conflict in the Niger Delta are explicated in chapter in 
two which culminated in establishes the gaps in existing literatures. 
 
Chapter three provides the theoretical framework of the study and reviews related literature 
on the subject of the conflict and CSR regarding the MNOCs in the Niger Delta. The chapter 
further expanded on the mechanisms oil  related conflicts as well  as the connotations of 
conflicts by different scholars. The chapter established that there is a direct linkage between 
corporate social responsibility and conflict. 
 
Chapter Four describes the method used for the study, the research design, data collection 
procedure and research setting. The mixed method descriptive design study is adopted. This 
method requires a rigorous pattern of data collection and analysis. The study used a 
combination of both quantitative and qualitative methods of data collection. 
 
Chapter five focused on data presentation and analysis. Here the data collected from the 
survey were analysed using bar charts, pie charts and tables and the results obtained used to 
test the study assumptions. 
 
Chapter six  presents the summary of findings,  conclusions, recommendations  and policy 
implications of findings. It also deals with the possible policies to be implemented by the 
government,  the  MNOCs  and  the  host  communities  in  line  with  the  study’s  research 
questions.
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1.11     SUMMARY 
 
 
 
This chapter introduces the subject matter of the research, ranging from issues of resource 
conflict  both  in  the  colonial  palm  oil  era,  the  modern  crude  oil  era  and  the  MNOCs 
inadequate CSR issues. It examined the background to the study and presented the statement 
of  the  problem,  the  aims  and  objectives  of  the  research,  the  research  assumptions, 
significance and purview of the study. The chapter also introduces the basic perception of 
MNOCs CSR in the Niger Delta and its consequent frustration and aggression effect on host 
communities; conflict management strategies; and how a purposeful  and effective public 
relation approach by the MNOCs and the Nigerian government devoid of divide-and-rule 
tactics can douse the tendon in the study region. The next chapter will provide the political 
history of Nigeria and the characteristics of MNOCs in developing countries as well as the 
implication of these, to this study.
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CHAPTER  TWO 
 
 
 
THE POLITICAL HISTORY  OF NIGERIA:  THE NATURE AND KEY CAUSES OF 
THE NIGER DELTA CONFLICT 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter is focused on the evaluation of relevant subjects in determining the key causes 
of the  Niger  Delta  conflicts  and  the efforts  of  the Nigerian  government  in  quelling the 
conflicts. To achieve its aim the chapter has been subdivided into eight sessions, thus: the 
Nigerian  political  history,   nature  and   character  of   the  Nigerian  state,  evolution  of 
multinational oil companies in Nigeria, the nature and character of MNOCs in developing 
countries, the nature of the conflicts in Nigeria, the key causes of the Niger Delta conflicts, 
MNOCs  CSR  programs  and  projects,  the  Nigerian  Governments  efforts  in  resolving the 
conflicts and the gap in literature. The sessions are examined sequentially starting with a brief 
political history of Nigeria. 
 
2.1.2 Nigeria: A Brief Political History 
 
Assessing the political history of a country is daunting, as the political behaviour of a people 
is a reflection of their history, geography, ethnicity and values. Like most countries in the 
world, Nigeria is not  a homogeneous  geographical entity;  and, like every other country, 
Nigeria has a history – a chronological record of significant events affecting the nation and its 
institutions (Fafunwa, 2002). 
Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa. The country is situated on the west coast of 
Africa. Although the 2006 census put the population of Nigeria at 140 million (Daily 
Independent,  January 10,  2007;  Punch,  January 11,  2007;  Sanyaolu,  2007,  currently the 
population is estimated at about 167 million. The economy of the country is tied to oil, which 
has  brought  unending  conflicts  and  destruction  in  the  Niger  Delta  region.  However,
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agriculture remains the major means of livelihood for about 70% of the population (Anya, 
 
2011, National Bureau of Statistics, 2011). 
 
Nigeria is bounded by Niger Republic on North, Chad Republic on the North-East; Benin 
Republic on the West; and the Republic of Cameroon on the East and South-East. Nigeria is 
the creation of European imperialism –“a policy of extending the power and dominion of a 
nation (especially by direct territorial acquisitions), or by gaining indirect control over the 
political or economic life of other areas” (Toyo, 1999, The Guardian, March 29). 
Flora Shaw, African correspondent for the London Times, was said to have been the first 
person to propose the name “Nigeria,” in 1898, in an article where she noted that the name 
Nigeria referred collectively to several “British protectorates on the river Niger” (Wiseman, 
1990).Another account  has  it  that the name  of “Nigeria” first  appeared  in  the Times of 
London on January 8, 1897 in an article by the same Miss Flora Shaw (Omoruyi, 2002).Flora 
Shaw later became the wife of Lord Frederick Lugard, the colonial Governor of Nigeria 
(1914-1919). 
The history of Nigeria extends back to some three millennia. The original archaeological 
discoveries were said to be of the Nok, who settled the central Jos Plateau (geographically 
located amid the Niger and Benue Rivers) between 300 BC and 200 AD. The Nok are the 
first known societies and the first known West African iron-smelting civilization. 
Contemporary ethnic groups existed before 1500 (Metz, 1998; Crowder, 1978; Fafunwa, 
2002).  Before  the  advent  of  the  colonialists,  the  communities  had  kingdoms  and  they 
interacted  with  one  another  peacefully  within  their  political  systems  and  transacted 
businesses with one another. No sooner had the colonial masters arrived than they started 
gradually to gain stronghold on the land. To safeguard trade, Britain established a colony in 
Lagos as early as 1861, and the Royal Niger Company was chartered in 1886 for trading
35  
purposes (Metz, 1998, June). The United African Company (UAC) succeeded Sir George 
 
Taubman Goldie's Royal Niger Company  (Lawal, 1994, p.94). 
 
 
 
By 1899, Britain had taken over the administration of Nigeria from the companies that ran it. 
At the turn of 1906, three countries had emerged, namely: the Colony of Lagos, the 
Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, and the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria. Between 1906 
and 1913, the three countries were reduced to two: the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, and 
the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria. Furthermore, in 1900, Britain named Lord Frederick 
Lugard High Commissioner of the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria. He stressed indirect 
British control through local rulers. Britain did not have enough army to govern a culturally 
diverse and wide area; thus, it turned to indirect rule of the land. To avoid rebellion, Britain 
relied on local administrators (chiefs) to keep order and collect taxes. That worked in the 
northern part of Nigeria, because the traditional government in the North was said to be 
similar to the British style of government, but indirect rule did not work well in the eastern 
and south-western parts because they did not like the system (Crowder, 1978). 
 
Lord  Frederick  Lugard  amalgamated  the  protectorates  on  January  1,  1914,  as  the  first 
Governor General of Nigeria. In the process of uniting the protectorates, Lord Lugard noted 
that it would be in the best interest of the countries then known as Southern and Northern 
Nigeria if they were amalgamated into one political entity mutually cooperating for their 
administrative and economic advantages (Ikime 1980). 
 
Before political independence in 1960, some sections of what is now known as Cameroon 
were part of Nigeria. After the First World War (1914-1918), when the League of Nations’ 
Treaty of Versailles was signed in 1919 (politically, the League of Nations’ was founded to 
guarantee peace), the western part of Cameroon was given to Britain (Crowder, 1978). The 
territory was then ruled as part of Nigeria because, at that time, Britain was ruling Nigeria as
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a territory and Western Cameroon as a Mandated Territory (an order or commission granted 
by the League of Nations to a member nation for the establishment of a responsible 
government over conquered territory) (Crowder, 1978; Ikime, 1980). 
 
When Nigeria became independent in 1960, there was a plebiscite in 1961 for the people of 
South Western and North Western Cameroon to decide whether they would remain with 
Nigeria or to stay with their kith and kin in the East. The North Western Cameroon went with 
Nigeria,  while  the  South  Western  Cameroon  stayed  with  the  other  side  of  Cameroon 
(Crowder, 1978; Ikimi, 1980; Fafunwa, 2002). 
 
In 1939, Nigeria was divided into three regions: Northern, Western and Eastern Regions for 
administrative convenience (Wiseman, 1990).   Because the minorities in these regions felt 
that they were not fairly represented, they started agitating for inclusion in the main agenda of 
governance in the nation or having their own states to enable them to control their own 
destinies. In 1963, a fourth region (the Mid-Western Region) was created by a plebiscite to 
accommodate the agitation of the Edo and Western Igbo that wanted to get out of the Yoruba- 
dominated  Western  Region.  Crowder  (1978)  criticizes  the  creation  of  the  Mid-Western 
Region, arguing that the fourth regional creation was the foundation of tribalism in Nigerian 
politics. 
 
The creation of the Mid-Western Region did not, however, end the agitation for creation of 
regions (Akinyele, 1996; Federal Government Paper, 1975, p.25). The Ijaw and Efik-Ibibio 
ethnic groups in the Niger Delta (the so-called COR = Calabar, Ogoja, Rivers) also wanted a 
new region to end Igbo dominance of the Eastern Region. This agitation had earlier led to the 
setting up of the Henry Willink Commission of Inquiry by the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies (Sir Allan Lennox Boyd) to determine the causes of the fears of the minorities and 
to recommend ways and means to allay their fears (Lewis, 1994). At a point, agitation for
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creation of more states out of the regions erupted (Ikime, 1980). This agitation almost 
paralyzed the Constitutional Conference of 1957 that was to craft the 1960 Independence 
Constitution.   The   desire  for   ethnic   self-determination   and   the   power  and   financial 
wherewithal that go with statehood (in a purely federal system) constituted the basis for the 
agitation for states by the minorities (Ikime, 1980; Crowder, 1978). 
 
In 1967 (at the beginning of the Civil War), the Yakubu Gowon’s military regime erased the 
concept of regionalism and divided the country into 12 smaller states (Kirk-Green, 1971; 
Ajulo, 1995). Nigeria was further sub-divided into 19 states by the Murtala Mohammed/ 
Olusegun   Obasanjo   military   regime.   Almost   every   military   leader   in   Nigeria   had 
demonstrated his power or authority by slicing Nigeria into more states: General Ibrahim 
Babangida created two states in 1987 and additional nine states in 1991. In his speech to the 
nation on October 1, 1995 General Sani Abacha hinted that he would create more states. In 
1996, General Abacha created six additional states. As seen above, Nigeria's short life has 
been packed with succession of social changes: it has transformed from regions to states, yet 
the country is not developing, as it should. All these changes have involved some form of 
political activities or politics (West Africa [London] 1991; see 26 August and 1 September 
issues; Ajulo, 1995). 
 
Currently, Nigeria is made up of 36 states (with a Federal Capital Territory –Abuja) that were 
created as the  government  caved in to sentimental demands for states by various ethnic 
groups. Most of the states are non-viable in terms of the ability to generate internal revenue. 
Thus, they depend on monthly federal allocation from oil revenue for their development 
programmes. At the moment, Nigeria has 774 local government areas; but the quality of life 
in the rural areas remains poor, as devolution of power and resources to the local areas
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remains problematic (Dike, 2006). The federal government remains powerful  yet corrupt 
 
(Diamond, 1984). 
 
 
 
2.1.3    Geography of Nigeria 
 
Most parts of northern Nigeria is made up of plateaux over 300m high rising to above I,500m 
near Jos. Crowder (1966, p. 23) describes northern Nigeria as lying on the marches of the 
Sahara and stretching from Sokoto to Lake Chad in the west and Oyo in the South. It was this 
great expanse of flat plain, interspersed with some granite rocks that produced the groundnut 
and cotton, which the Northern Region was for in the early period of the country’s political 
independence. Southern Nigeria is hot and humid all the year. Lagos has average monthly 
temperature of 27-28°C in March and 25°C in August. Adedeji (1987, p.37) observes that the 
climatic conditions of Nigeria are diverse. In his view, the Niger Delta region has the highest 
annual rainfall of over 300 mm, which is higher than that of Lagos estimated at 180mm. 
During the months of May to August, Nigeria usually experiences the highest rainfall, while 
the months of November to February are usually dry season. The northern part of the country 
has lesser rainfall to the extent that Kano, during the months of October to April, has longer 
dry season, with an average of 80 m of rainfall each year. 
 
The Niger River and its tributaries, the Benue, Katsina and Kebbi Rivers drain most of the 
country. Nigeria has a 500 miles (800km) coast line for the uppermost part made up of sandy 
beaches behind which lies a belt of mangrove swamp and lagoon 800 m, that is an average of 
10 ml (16km) in width, but increases to Circa 60m1 (100km) in the Niger Delta in the South. 
The  North  of  the  coastal  lowland  is  a  broad,  hilly region  with  rainforest  in  the  South 
Savannah.
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2.1.4    The Vegetation 
 
Nigeria has three major zones of vegetation defined roughly by the northern limit of the 60- 
inch and 70-inch lines of annual rainfall. These three zones, progressively driven from the 
South to North, vary in width, but their border runs approximately parallel to the coastline. 
They include the coastal, the savannah and the Sahara zones. The mangrove vegetation as 
well as fresh water swamp vegetation is found in the Delta, characterized by a maze of 
effluent creeks and swamps crisscrossing the low-lying plains in varying dimension. 
 
2.2       The Nature  and Character of the Nigerian State 
 
Understanding the nature and character of the state can only be meaningful if the concept of 
the state is understood; this effort will be of no avail too except the nature of man is known. 
Human beings are driven by the desire for survival and, therefore, material existence can only 
be reproduced through the creation of material wealth. This drags man into a social relation, 
which must be mediated by certain laws from the state. The state in this case is a repository 
of social organization. For Fredrick Engel (1978), the state is not a power forced on society 
from outside, but its product. 
 
The Nigerian state is, therefore, a product of certain dialectical acts ranging from the pre- 
colonial to the postcolonial ages. The state is a major concern in this discourse owing to its 
central role in the production of violence and conflict. The Nigerian state is polarized among 
the elite who are corrupting it without a sense of nationhood in them. The elite who took over 
political power rely so much on the wealth of the state for their sustenance. According to 
Fadakin (2002, p.46), no sooner independence was got from Britain than the class character 
of  the  nationalists  became  very glaring,  as  they not  only used  their  privileged  political 
positions in the state to amass wealth, but they also cared very little about the appalling
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existential conditions of the average, besides the inherent environmental, social and political 
injustice fostered on society by forces of colonialism and imperialism. 
 
Today, the Nigerian state is a centre of crisis, as the elite embark on various methods to 
acquire power and at the same time retain it. The Nigerian state is hence so powerful, over- 
developed and interferes in all aspects of human endeavours. Aloysius (2005, p.7) notes that, 
unlike its counterpart in Western Europe, the Nigerian state interferes more intently, directly, 
pervasively and extensively in the socio-economic and political spheres of the citizens. 
 
One of the most insidious aspects of the over-developed character of the postcolonial state is 
the economic centrality of the state. Public policies, especially in the area of economic policy, 
are basically the dictate of the state. The state itself regulates and controls the economy 
without any input from the private sector (civil society). Another character of the Nigerian 
state is the aggressive and coercive nature of the state, which is a hangover from colonialism. 
Alapiki (2004, p.84) asserts that the early nationalists did not fight  the colonial masters 
because they were really interested in changing the exploitative system of the colonizers, but 
because they wanted to inherit the powerful instruments of state hitherto used to oppress the 
Nigerian masses. This is why all postcolonial Nigerian governments have been repressive, 
exploitative and anti-democratic. 
 
The elite that took over power following the limited autonomization of the state could not 
develop  any  social  class.  Hence,  the  Nigerian  social  formation  was  then  and  now  an 
amorphous formation and became polarized along factional lines that struggle for hegemony. 
This behaviour of the elite’s has, made the Nigerian postcolonial state not to be able to imbue 
any appreciable degree of confidence among the citizens, nor has it been able to manage the 
economy in the best interest of the people. The state has also not been able to create an 
acceptable  pattern  of  political  inclusion,  tolerance  or  culture  (Julius,  2000,  p.  76).
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It is this character of the Nigerian state that marks the nature of politics as debased and in the 
form of warfare. Ake (cited in Alapiki Riot 4, p. 85) identifies the character of the Nigerian 
state as, one in which there is hardly any aspect of the citizen’s life that she (the state) does 
not assert herself. This informs the morbid competition for control of its coercive instrument 
by the local elite. In sum, the character of her institutions coupled with the drive for 
materialism makes the Nigerian state a very uncaring institution and this has reduced her 
assertive ability over the MNOCs and even over her citizens. 
 
2.2.2    Structure of the Nigerian Economy 
 
The Nigerian economy is an underdeveloped and oil dependent economy. Before political 
independence in 1960, the Nigerian economy was purely an agrarian one (with a contribution 
of about 63.4 percent to the GDP); the employment in agriculture was above 80 percent, with 
over 85 percent of Nigerian foreign exchange earnings coming from the agricultural sector. 
The discovery and subsequent exploration of crude oil caused a dramatic structural change in 
the agricultural sector. Much emphasis was now given to oil, which consequently displaced 
the  agricultural  sector.  Okowa  (1997)  lists  the  following  as  the  current  features  of  the 
Nigerian economy: 
 
 
Dependence on foreign technology 
 
Monoculture dependence on oil 
 
Dependence on the foreign sector for raw materials and spares 
 
Inadequate supply of skilled labour 
 
Low productivity and low per capita income 
 
Underdeveloped agricultural sector 
 
High rate of unemployment 
 
In-egalitarian distribution of income and wealth
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High rate of inflation and interest rate 
 
Excessive government involvement in the economy 
 
Heavy external debt burden 
 
Poor attitude to work, particularly in the public sector 
 
Systemic corruption 
 
 
The discovery of crude oil in commercial quantity resulted in the mass movement from the 
rural to the urban area by able  young men and  women, but the industrial sector, which 
depends largely on the external sector for its growth, remained backward. Moro (1995, p.2) 
remarks that, despite this discovery of crude oil, with its seeming satisfactory impact on the 
nation’s growth rate in the first half of the 1970s, the performance of the economy was, on a 
general note, not self-sustaining. 
 
Ikein (1990, p.71) provides an excellent description of the impact of oil boom on the Nigeria 
agricultural sector. According to him, Nigeria was one of the leading exporters of cocoa, 
groundnut, palm oil and rubber during the Post-World War II period. But beginning from the 
1970s, the country’s agricultural export experienced a steady decline and its contribution to 
the gross domestic product (GDP) fell from about 60% in 1960 to about 21% in 1977 and 
eventually to less than 10% in 1978. The agricultural sector dwindled as the crude oil sector 
attracted the highest labour. The massive drift to the urban area in search of jobs created a 
serious  distortion  in  the  peasant  economy,  which  consequently  affected  the  national 
economy. Unfortunately, unlike the agricultural sector, the petroleum sector employs a 
relatively small number of workers and accounts for just 1.3% of the employment in the 
modern sector.
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2.3 Evolution of multinational companies in Nigeria 
 
The operations of multinational companies in Nigeria dates back to the pre-colonial era, when 
the Royal Niger Company first appeared in Nigeria and started business with the traditional 
societies that existed in the era.   Nigeria was and is still known for her rich oil deposits, 
ranging from palm oil to crude oil. The West had engaged Nigeria in various trades that 
revolved around oil to the extent of involving their home government. Calabar and Lagos 
were then the major trade centres of these business transactions. During the early nineteenth 
century,  there were series of business  contacts  between  British  traders and  the  Nigerian 
indigenous or petty traders. 
 
When oil was discovered in Nigeria, the first multinational company that came prospecting 
for it was Shell Petroleum D’ Archy, a British and German consortium. The oil boom of the 
1970s and early 1980s  attracted other companies, such as Chevron, Agip  Oil  Company, 
Mobil Producing Nigeria Ltd, Gulf Oil Company, and Texaco. Apart from those in the oil 
sector, there are lots of multinationals whose history dates back to colonialism, especially 
those in the banking sector. These include the Standard Bank, which later got renamed as 
First Bank of Nigeria, Barclays Bank (later Union Bank) and many others in the insurance 
sector. The implication of the heavy presence of these multinationals in an economy is that 
the fiscal and monetary policies of a developing country, like Nigeria, can be frustrated by 
the economic power which they wield (Kabiri, 1998, p. 296). This shows that the fiscal and 
monetary policies of successive Nigerian governments are, in most cases, a direct reflection 
and control of the multinationals in the financial sector. They have never lost grip of their 
control of the country’s financial policies and repatriation of surplus.
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2.4 The Nature  and Character of Multinational Corporations in Developing Countries 
Multinational corporations operate in the Third World countries with varied character and 
attitude  distinct  from  their  operational  characteristics  in  developed  countries.  They  are 
predominantly found in the oligopolistic markets with substantial barriers to entry. These 
barriers could be those created by economy of scale and scope; for instance, Shell, Agip, 
Mobil,  Elf,  and  Texaco among others,  operating in  the Nigeria’s Niger  Delta region  is 
predominantly in the oil sector. Kabiri (1998-285) observes that this duopolistic behaviour is 
aimed at profit maximization in the short run. Because of their desire to make or maximize 
profit, multinational oil companies operating in Nigeria engage in practices that will enable 
them  to  spend  less  even at  the detriment  of  the host  communities  (failure in  corporate 
responsibility practices). This, perhaps, explains why there are incessant problems and crises 
between the oil multinationals and the host communities in the Niger Delta. 
 
Again, the multinational oil companies prefer strategic exploitation by directly siphoning the 
raw materials of their host communities to the metropolis. This has been the practice right 
from the colonial era of the Royal Niger Company till the present era of Shell and Agip 
among others (Kabiri, 1998, p. 293). Although multinational corporations are the vanguard of 
the most advanced technologies yet, they are also guilty of parading over-priced obsolete 
equipment in developing countries periphery. They not only rapaciously exploit labour and 
raw materials in the periphery, but they also, in alliance with the local bourgeoisies and 
engage in resource outflow to the detriment of their host country’s economy (Kabiri, 1998). 
 
These traits, as presented above, have specific impact on the economic development of the 
host communities in the Third World. In the case of Nigeria, the implications of these on the 
economy  are  many.  They  include  the  transfer  of  capital  abroad,  monopolization  of 
technology, political control of the host countries to the extent that no policy, be it domestic
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or foreign, is a direct reflection of the national interest of the host nation. Such policies are 
always teleguided. Worse still, the MNOCs have been fingered in many coups d’état in 
Africa, especially against popular governments whose pursuit may be detrimental to their 
interest. They also contribute to the cultural, social and economic disintegration of the host 
countries. The multinationals even dictate national development plans to ensure it is drawn up 
along the lines favourable to their interest (Kabiri, 1998 p. 293). 
 
Another characteristic of the multinationals in developing countries is the promotion and 
perpetuation of poverty. Oil multinationals in Nigeria, like Shell, Agip, and Chevron, where 
they engage new staff who are residents of their host communities: ensure that such new 
staffs are employed as casuals. One negative implication of labour casualization is job 
insecurity, because, at any time, such staff can be laid off (Dike, 2015). Their complaints 
have been that the Nigerian labour market is saturated with unskilled labour incapable of 
operating some modern technology. So, they usually go back to their home countries to bring 
in their expatriates who are paid very highly and allowed to repatriate their salaries, thereby 
worsening the country’s  balance of payment problems. Apart from the case of unskilled 
labour and technology, the peasants in Nigeria are alienated from production as their lands 
are appropriated by force, while they are visited with oil spills and gas flaring, sometimes in 
very close proximity to where they live. 
 
2.5 The Nature  of the Conflicts in Nigeria 
 
 
 
The conflicts in Nigeria tend to be characterised by ethnicity and religious prejudice, which 
can be considered as the fulcrum of the evolving forms of self-determination in the country. 
In the past, perceived marginalisation inspired various ethnic groups to embark on a self- 
determination  mission  that  creates  the  unfortunate  perception  of  an  oppressor-saviour 
situation in a multicultural and multilingual nation called Nigeria. The outcome of such a
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perception is the lack of cordial relationships, distrust and terror in Nigeria as well as an 
escalation into conflict (Salawu, 2010, p. 346-347). Furthermore, an ethno-religious crisis has 
manifested in different parts of Nigeria such as the Niger Delta region, the Kano, Bulumkutu 
Christian-Muslim riots, the Zango Kataf crises in Kaduna State and Kafanchan. The current 
Boko Haram  crisis  in  the  Northern  part  of  Nigeria has  also  been  categorised  as  ethno- 
religious conflict. 
 
ACLED (2013, p. 1) has described Boko Haram as the largest violent Islamic group in the 
northern part of Nigeria. It is comparable to the Islamic militants in Mali and Algeria that are 
affiliated with the infamous terrorist group, Al Qaeda. However, Boko Haram has implicitly 
refused membership with Al Qaeda and the recently (2015) the Boko Haram insurgent group 
claimed allegiance with the Islamic State rebellious group. Unlike its violent counterpart in 
Mali, Boko Haram has rejected involvement with civilian kidnapping and foreign interests as 
prevalent in the other violent groups. According to Abakaliki (2012, p. 1) the mission of Boko 
Haram  is the institution of God's dominion in Nigeria as they campaign against Western 
education. 
 
Given  the atrocities  and  crimes  against  humanity by Boko Horam  in  recent  times,  it  is 
difficult to believe the realities of its proclaimed mission. The group, which started in 2009, 
when the Niger Delta militants had dropped their arms, has been involved in many bombing 
activities in its five years of existence. For instance, in July 2009, the group's activity in 
Bauchi and Meduguri resulted in the killing of 800 people. Their 2010 church bombings in 
central  Nigeria  killed  86  people;  whilst,  its  2011  bombing  in  Damaturu  and  Postiskum 
claimed 65 lives; and in 2012 January, its bomb attack in Kano took over 200 lives. In 
February 2013, the group kidnapped a French family in Cameroon (Murdock, 2013, p. 1). 
However, the bombing and kidnapping activities have increased at an alarming rate since 
2014. The group has been kidnapping, killing and maiming innocent citizens since 2014. For
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instance, The continued detention of the over 200 Nigerian girls abducted on April 14 by the 
Boko Haram insurgents in Chibok, Borno State as well as the continued bombing of public 
and private places. As recently as June 2014, Boko Haram reportedly abducted another 20 
women near Chibok (Punch, 2014, June 10, para1). 
 
Since   Boko   Haram’s   operations   have   been   officially   recognized   by   international 
organizations as an inhumane Islamic sect, one of the ways forward is for the international 
community to proscribe the group and label it as a terrorist organization in a bid to support 
Nigeria’s efforts in tackling terrorism. Rhetoric is not enough to make changes happen. To be 
effective, spoken words must be followed by actions. This means, among other things, giving 
the people and organizations that are tackling the issue the tools and information they need to 
be successful in their efforts. The way forward must include economic development in the 
communities  to  tame  the  poverty and  corruption  that  often  lead  to  social  conflicts  and 
unending  crises.  For  instance,  enough  funds  and  tools  should  be made  available  to  the 
military, the police and other para-military agencies to effectively carry out their operations 
to tame the activities of the Islamic sect. Underfunding or delays in releasing allocations have 
often hampered the fight against terrorism in society. 
 
The Nigerian government is currently deliberating on the solution to this insurgency. 
Constructive discussions that will lead to dialogue and thus a peaceful resolution tend to have 
been embarked on by the government. Murdock (2013, p. 1) reported that has been offered to 
the terrorist group, as it had been to their Niger Delta counterpart, although Boko Haram's 
interest in accepting amnesty is yet to be communicated. Nigerians currently see amnesty as a 
code of interest for a pot of gold that could attract large interest; the ex-militants (the MEND) 
still get about $350 weekly after putting down their weapons (Eke, 2015; Murdock, 2013, p. 
1).
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As noted earlier, the activities, mission statement and aspiration of Boko Haram  makes it 
difficult to determine if its members are interested in the proceeds from oil resources as was 
the  case  with  the  Niger  Delta  militants  who  finally gained  amnesty when  Boko Haram 
evolved (ACLED (2013, p. 1). An evaluation of the objectives of the Niger Delta militants 
and Boko Haram members shows that their agendas are very divergent. 
 
While the Niger Delta militants tend to be warring over environmental degradation by the 
activities of the MNOCs, its proceeds sharing and by extension separatism, the Boko Haram 
members  appear to  be  trying to  gain  political  power. ACLED  (2013,  p.4) reported  that 
MEND has made some threats in recent times of targeting Islamic institutions and their 
members in the South-South in retaliation for the killing of Christians in northern Nigeria by 
the Boko Haram group.  This is an indication that the upheaval in both the south-south and 
northern Nigeria might be interrelated in terms of regionalism, religion and identity power 
politics. This tends to imply a landscape of violent behaviour that is highly discriminated and 
concurrent,  yet  the  actors  in  the  conflict  respond  to  one  another  and  to  the  Nigerian 
government (ACLED, 2013, p. 4). According to Duru and Ogbonnaya (2012, p. 164), the 
perceived indifference in addressing the challenges facing the people by the MNOCs and the 
prolonged outcry of the host communities over environmental degradation in the late 1990s 
motivated an unstable environment that led to militarization. The agitation emanated from 
demonstrations  by host  communities  against  the  complexes  of  the  MNOCs,  but  quickly 
degenerated into the destruction of oil facilities and homicide (Azigbo, 2008, p. 18). 
Consequently, towards the end of the 1990s, the Niger Delta region had become an 
ungovernable zone, where many angry youths engaged in the disruption of oil-production 
activities with the communities' development committees frequently engaging in agitation 
that climaxed in intergroup violent conflicts (NDDC, 2004). Such oil-related conflicts 
manifested themselves between and within communities where the oil companies acted as
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third parties (Okolie-Osemene, 2015).   The Niger Delta crisis further manifested itself in 
other ways, including, militancy, and kidnapping, the hostage taking of oil workers, and 
pipeline vandalisation, as well as the destruction of the installations of oil companies. 
 
In the view of Duru and Ogbonnaya (2012, p. 165), these activities were masterminded by 
prominent militant groups, including the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF), led 
by Alhaji Asari Dokubo; The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta  (MEND), 
led by Henry Okah; and the Niger Delta Vigilante Force (NDVF), led by Ateke Tom. It is 
important to mention that these militant groups created havoc in the region and were 
responsible for the kidnapping, hostage taking and various other forms of attacks on the 
Nigerian oil industry with the use of sophisticated weapons that far outweighed those of the 
Nigerian military. Duru and Ogbonnaya (2012, p. 166) provide the statistics of kidnapping 
and hostage taking in the region as follows: 
 
[b]etween  1999  and  2007,  a  total  of  308  hostage  taking 
incidents occurred in the region... A breakdown of this record 
shows that Bayelsa State was on the lead with 131 incidents. 
Rivers State had 113; Delta State 45, while Akwa Ibom had the 
least record of 15. The record further shows that in 2003, 18 oil 
workers were taken hostage in Bayelsa, in 2004, 5 hostages, 39 
in 2006 while between January and June, 2007 69 people were 
taken hostage, out of  which 50 were soldiers...  Rivers State 
recorded 2 incidents in 1999, one in 2005, 55 in 2006 and 60 as 
at June 2007, with 26 soldiers, 1 woman and a three year-old 
child involved. Unfortunately, the situation has since then 
deteriorated  and  the  spate  of  militancy,  hostage  taking  and
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kidnapping   incidents   has   increased   in   scope   and   tempo 
covering virtually all the oil producing states of Nigeria. 
 
This can be described as the second phase of the Niger Delta crisis, as Ako, Okonmah & 
Ogunleye (2009, p. 111-112) maintain that there are two faces of violent conflict over 
resources in the Niger Delta: that is, the historical palm oil resource era and the modern crude 
oil resource era. They view both the palm oil resource and crude oil as critical resources for 
the progress of individual and global industries. 
 
2.5.1 The Key Causes of the Conflict 
 
 
 
The  conflict  in  the  Niger  Delta  has  been  attributed  to  different  causes.  As  one  of  the 
objectives of this study, this section has been designated to examine the major sources of the 
conflict   provided   within   relevant   literatures.   It   includes;   environmental   degradation, 
legislation and empowerment, subjugation, colonial legacies, corruption, and poor leadership 
and   governance.   Others   include   a   lack   of   sustainable   development,   environmental 
degradation pollution, resource control agitation, oil policies and regulation, poor government 
response to the issues, and mention human rights violations and social injustice as discussed 
below. 
 
2.5.1.1 Environmental  Degradation 
 
 
 
Ojakorotu and Gilbert (2010, p. 7) assert that these companies have become active players in 
oil exploration and exploitation between 1956 and the present time. For many decades of 
exploration  and  exploitation  that have  generated  billions  of dollars to both  the  Nigerian 
government and the MNOCs, the Niger Delta people have been at the receiving end of 
environmental despoliation, and outright wretchedness occasioned by oil-induced 
environmental degradation and sabotage in the form of youth restiveness (Ojakorotu and
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Okeke-Uzodike, 2006, p. 96-97; Aghalino and Okolie-Osemene, 2014). Eyinla and Ukpo 
(2006, p. 4) present the following statistics of the oil spillages: between 1976-1996, there 
were approximately 60,000  oil  spillages  within  the Niger Delta, with  roughly 2,369,471 
barrels of crude oil leaking into the ecosystem, with Shell alone spilling 106,000 barrels from 
its Jones creek flow station in 1997 and 1998. 
 
The first decree to discourage gas flaring in Nigeria was attempted in 1979 in the form of 
Decree 99. The decree was aimed at eliminating gas flaring by 1985. The idea was defeated 
when Nigeria modified the decree with a proviso that the oil corporations could flare gas but 
would have to pay a fine; and most of the oil companies preferred paying the fine to stopping 
gas flaring (Ogunrin et al., 2005, p. 106; Ako, 2015). This activity by the oil multinationals is 
said to constitute a loss of potential economic resources to Nigeria (Epelle, 2004, p. 19). The 
pollution in the Niger Delta by the MNOCs is not limited to oil spillage but also extends to 
oil prospecting.  Ojakorotu and Gilbert (2010, p. 12) note that the environmental impact of oil 
production cannot be easily neglected when one considers the associated degradation. This 
has been the practice by MNOCs and their waste management companies who dump the 
wastes into rivers, seas and all the surrounding areas, whilst giving the impression that they 
were re-injected into old oil wells. The impact of this deliberate action is the high-level 
destruction of farmland and aquatic species, which also implies the destruction of the local 
communities’ means of livelihood 
 
2.5.1.2 Legislation, Disempowerment and Subjugation 
 
 
 
As  explained  by  Fidelis  and  Samuel  (2011),  the  Nigerian  state's  consciousness  on  the 
veritable nature of oil as a source of massive wealth alongside the realisation that oil is only 
concentrated in the areas of the southern minority of the Niger Delta prompted the Nigerian 
leaders  from  the  majority  ethnic  groups  into  the  promulgation  of  some  questionable
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legislation. These regulations were unambiguously used for the exploitation and 
disempowerment of the Niger Delta minorities. However, other authors blame the obnoxious 
laws that denied the people of the Niger Delta their natural inheritance on colonial laws (Ako 
and Okomah, 2009, p. 54; Obi, 2010; Ako, 2010).  By implication, the Nigerian government 
only modified the colonial Mineral Ordinances (Please, see the section on colonialism). Such 
post-colonial regulations include: 
 
 
   Decree No. 51 of 1969, which was used to transfer the ownership of the totality of 
petroleum products in the delta region to the Federal Government of Nigeria 
   The Land Use Decree of 1978, which also vested land ownership in Nigeria in the 
Federal Government and its accredited agents; thereby dispossessing the Niger Delta 
people of ownership and occupancy rights to their lands. 
 
The Offshore Oil Revenue Act of 1971, which vested in the Federal Government of 
 
Nigeria the exclusive rights over the continental shelf of the coastal areas. 
 
 
 
 
Ojakorotu and Gilbert (2010, p. 6) argue that these regulations usually become effective or 
operational whenever the companies and the government want to take advantage of the host 
communities as far as the natural resources in the region are concerned. The three major 
ethnic groups in Nigeria have been in firm control of these resources since political 
independence in 1960. Regrettably, these intolerable decrees are yet to be modified or even 
abolished despite the vociferous violent criticisms against their continued use by the Niger 
Delta environmental activists. The current view is that the northerners’ claim of ownership of 
the region’s oil is based on the American land law (Rivera, 2016).
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2.5.1.3 State-imposed Poverty 
 
 
 
State-imposed poverty is another major cause of the conflict. The Niger Delta region is seen 
as the powerhouse of the Nigerian economy, generating billions of dollars for the government 
since oil was first discovered in 1956. Nigeria is a member of the Organisation Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the sixth largest oil producer in the world. Oviasuyi and 
Uwadea (2010, p. 115) observe that, despite this huge amount of money, the local people in 
the Niger Delta live in abject poverty that expresses a state of deprivation, to the extent that 
the people have no access to basic social amenities, like good water and electricity. The 
majority of the Niger Delta people live in creeks where they watch daily the oil industries 
making a fortune from the petroleum deposits in the region. Similarly, Ejibunu (2007, p. 10) 
opines that the region tends to be a place: “where time seems to have stood still and where 
people live in poverty, leaving the residents of the region without any other option than to be 
bitter and angry over the neglect of the people by the federal government”.  Ejibunu reflects 
on the comments made by Mukagbo, the CNN reporter on Inside Africa. He said: “In the 
Niger Delta, a scene of abject poverty pervades the area, which is very similar to what one is 
likely  to  find  in  a  refugee  camp  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the  region  fetches  the 
government the money for running the affairs of the state” (Ejibunu, 2007, p. 10). 
 
Research has revealed that poverty and deprivation are the two major factors behind the 
agitation of the people of the Niger Delta region. Corroborating this view, Oviasuyi and 
Uwadea (2010, p. 115) argue that, prior to the discovery of oil in 1956, agriculture was the 
mainstay  of  the  people  and  the  major  source  of  revenue  for  both  state  and  federal 
governments.  The  Government  of  the  Western  Region  used  the  revenue  from  cocoa  to 
develop the region, providing the people with basic social amenities from Cocoa House in 
Ibadan. The government constructed a good network of roads, with schools providing free
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education  at  all  levels.  The  Northern  Region  had  good  road  networks  as  well  and 
infrastructural facilities in Mina, Kano, Kaduna, Zaria and Sokoto.  Paradoxically, in the case 
of the Niger Delta, government failed to re-invest the proceeds accruing from petroleum into 
other sectors of the local economy. This has accounted for the ongoing conflicts in many 
parts of the region today. 
 
2.5.1.4 Failed Promises 
 
 
 
The Federal Government has ignored public calls to compensate the people of the Niger 
Delta region for the negative impact of oil production on the environment in the form of oil 
spillage,  the  reduction  of  arable  land,  and  the  destruction  of  wildlife  and  fish  reserves. 
Instead, the government has been making several unfulfilled promises, which probably 
accounts for the hostage-taking hostage taking and kidnappings by some youths in the region. 
The youths also break oil pipelines in order to siphon crude oil (Afinotan and Ojakorotu 
2009, p. 195). The government’s reaction to these activities has rendered many communities 
homeless, women have been assaulted and others killed; this was the case in Odi, Choba, 
Umuechem and Ogoni communities.   Ironically, the oil companies operating in the region 
seem to have abandoned the idea of genuine CSR and the basic concepts of the stakeholder 
theory. 
 
2.5.1.5 Resource Allocation and Resource Control 
 
 
The revenue allocation formula being adopted by the Nigerian government has been 
particularly criticized and roundly rejected for not reflecting the interests of the people in the 
Niger Delta region where over 80 per cent of the national resource is generated. The Federal 
Government attributes the restiveness in the Niger Delta region to the politics surrounding 
resource control.    In the opinion of Ojakarotu (2009, p. 2), the Niger Delta upheaval has 
grown from bad to worse, assuming a debilitating pattern traceable to the formation of social
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groups that sought to challenge the state and its policies. The Niger Delta conflict is triggered 
by oil revenue allocation and oil related decrees that the restive youths believe must be 
abrogated as they do not represent their interests: as the host communities (Nna and Ibaba, 
2011). Closely related to this view is the argument by Watts, Okonta and Kemedi (2004) that 
the struggle for natural resources as a means of survival remains the driving force of agitation 
amongst groups in various communities. This is what Adunbi (2015) describes as the oil 
citizenship phenomenon. The Niger Delta conflict means different things to various ethnic 
nationalities  in  the  area  that  view  resource  control  as  paramount  to  their  sustainable 
livelihoods and need to be given much desired attention by policymakers if they mean well 
for the people and Nigerians at large (Ojakorotu, 2009, p.6). This does not require the politics 
of oil as far as the actualization of stability is concerned.  The foregoing is reaffirmed by Obi 
(2001, p. 87), in his argument that the revenue sharing formula being adopted in Nigeria is 
the major cause of most of the conflicts in the area, and how well the government is able to 
resolve it would largely determine the peace and development of the region. 
 
The objectivity and complexities of the situation in the region are crucial in helping people to 
comprehend the suffering of the residents whose children have grown up with the perception 
that, until the government and oil companies address the problem of resource control, there 
would be no peace in oil-producing areas (Ojakarotu, 2009, p. 6). The perception of the 
people within the host communities of the region is more negative than positive, as they feel 
the oil has brought more of a curse to them than a blessing, owing to associated lethal 
violence, insecurity, environmental crisis, and the loss of cultural values (Aghalino, 2011; 
Perouse, 2014; Okolie-Osemene, 2015). Oyefusi (2007) also note that the attitude of some 
stakeholders motivated the formation of restive groups.  These grievances of the Niger Delta 
people  over  the  revenue  allocation  mechanism  in  the  country  allegedly  prompted  the 
renowned environmental activist, Ken Saro-Wiwa, to embark on a peaceful struggle for the
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emancipation of the Ogoni people from state-imposed poverty (Ako, 2015; Moro, 2009, p. 
 
324). 
 
According to Ejibunu (2007; p. 7), in 1990, the Ogoni evaluated their situation. They came to 
a conclusion that, despite the stupendous oil and gas wealth in their land that feeds the entire 
nation, they still unfortunately live in poverty and squalor; unemployment and 
underemployment were running high by the day; and worse still, their environment has been 
adversely affected  by reckless  oil  exploitation, and  ecological  warfare  sponsored  by the 
transnational oil industries operating in the area. The Ogoni believe that their existence as a 
people was endangered by environmental degradation, political marginalization, economic 
strangulation and “slavery, which the people of the region were being subjected to every 
day”.     Ojakaruotu (2009, p. 5), suggests that it was their unprecedented response to the 
dangers to human existence that generated the emergence of environmental rights activism 
and civil society groups in the region. Some of the organisations fighting for the economic 
liberation of the Niger Delta people today include the Pan-Niger Delta Resistance Movement, 
the Environmental Rights Action (ERA); the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC); the Movement for 
the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP); the Movement for Reparation to Ogbia 
(MORETO); and the Movement for the Survival of the Ijo in the Niger Delta (MOSIEND). 
Each group was formed with an inclination towards ethnic nationalism in order to liberate the 
people in the Niger Delta region. Obi (2001, p. 87) describes the evolution of the politics of 
oil in the Niger Delta as a gradual process, where ethnic identity was transformed into a 
mobilizing element, not only to interrogate resource control, but also as a channel for social 
mobilization and an alliance for resisting alienation, extraction and exclusion of the Niger 
Delta people from the proceeds meant to alleviate their suffering having been deprived of the 
use of their land and water to earn a living.  Ethnic nationalism in the Niger Delta has become 
one of the major problems in the region, as many people, under the guise of fighting for the
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economic emancipation of the people, exploit the oil companies and the Federal Government 
by demanding money that never gets to the hands of the downtrodden citizens in the Niger 
Delta region. 
 
2.5.2 Fiscal Federalism 
 
 
 
To clearly understand the principles of fiscal federalism, the concept of federalism must be 
duly analysed. Economists sometimes appear to have a better understanding of the essence of 
government from the perspective of how a particular political system generates revenue and 
allocates  resources  to  different  communities  and  states  that  make  up  the  country.  For 
example, fiscal federalism is a politico-economic concept that places emphasis on how a 
country generates and allocates resources to the different estates of government (Rodden, 
2001, p. 9). 
 
According  to  Ajayi  (1997),  cited  in  Arowolo  (2011,  p.  4),  federalism  is  a  system  of 
government  that  involves  not  less  than  two  layers  of  government.  In  this  system  of 
government, power is decentralised into institutions called regions, states, cantons, republics 
and unions.    Sagay (2008), as quoted in Arowolo (2011, p. 4) has defined federalism as 
follows: 
As  an  arrangement  whereby powers  within  a  multi-national 
country   are   shared   between   a   federal   government   and 
component units in such a way that each unit, including the 
central authority exists as a government separately and 
independently from others, operating directly on persons and 
properties within its territorial area and with a will of its own 
apparatus for the conduct of affairs and with an authority in 
some matters exclusive of others.
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In this context, political power is usually distributed among the three layers of government. 
This explains why power is decentralised, with each layer acting independently from one 
another, but possessing the capacity to make its own decisions. Closely related to this view is 
the notion that "federalism is a system that is meant to integrate people in [a] society made up 
of diverse ethnic, cultural, geographical and religious backgrounds” (Uhunmwuangho and 
Ekpu,  2012,  P.  120).  The  concept  of  fiscal  federalism  is  a  part  of  the  fundamental 
components  of the  principles  of  federalism.  It  is  central  to  the technique  of  generating 
revenue among the three levels of government –federal, state and local (Tsegaw, 2009, p.4). 
Begg (2009, p.36) notes that fiscal federalism is a form of government where all the levels of 
government (the three-tier system) are responsible for generating national revenue for 
development programmes as well as for redistributing such revenues among the different 
levels of government based on the degree of their contributions. Some scholars have argued 
that  fiscal  federalism  is  a  form  of  government  that  “involves  intergovernmental  fiscal 
relations” (Roden, 2001; Obi, 2010; Arowolo, 2011, p. 2). 
 
Fiscal federalism is concerned with, but not limited to, the vertical structure of the public 
sector of the economy. This system of government enables the federating units of the nation 
to collectively support in financing the cost of governance (Oates, 1999, p. 1120). 
Intergovernmental   relations   are   not   limited   to   fiscal   federalism   since   the   elements 
underpinning fiscal federalism could also be found in a unitary system of government. The 
structure of generating revenue under a federal system of government may be similar to tax 
patterns in  other forms  of government. This is because  government,  no  matter its form, 
generally  relies  on  tax  revenues  to  finance  recurrent  and  capital  expenditure.  State 
governments levy taxes on goods and services within the state and, in return, pay taxes to the 
central government. The central government would redistribute the accruable revenue to the 
members of a federating unit based on the sharing formula agreed upon by the three estates of
59  
government. Although government could sometimes get some grants from donor agencies, no 
responsible government will solely depend on foreign assistance to run its affairs. 
 
Rugy and Haeffele-Balch (2010, p.3) describe “fiscal federalism” as involving the 
decentralization of decision-making that empowers independent nations to meet the demands 
of governance in all parts of the country, and formulate acceptable policies to all the units 
that make up the country. This makes the three tiers of government develop on their own 
while giving the central government the necessary support to finance the projects and policies 
contained in the exclusive list (Shima, 2014). Drawing upon the experience of the United 
States of America, one would tend to wonder why the Federal Government of Nigeria adopts 
a federal structure without “functional fiscal federalism” (Shima, 2014). 
 
The basis of the argument against  the extant revenue allocation formula adopted by the 
Nigerian government is the exclusion of fiscal federalism in the nation’s political system. 
Instead of the local and state governments generating their own revenue and pay taxes to the 
central government, the Federal Government of Nigeria collects the revenue generated from 
oil  in  the  Niger  Delta  region,  and  gives  a  monthly  allocation  to  the  state  and  local 
governments.  This  could  best  be described  as  financial  aid.  This  is,  perhaps  one  of the 
reasons for Rodden (2001, p. 1) to argue that fiscal federalism in Nigeria will remain 
unattainable until the federal government allows the states and local governments to generate 
their revenue and to develop at their own paces.  This means allowing them to manage their 
own resources and plough back whatever they generate into projects and services that would 
bring about further development in the community. 
 
Tanz (1995, p. 295-298) avers that decentralisation has become a problem in most states that 
are practising fiscal federalism. This is particularly the case with the problem of a lack of 
homogeneity in an ethnic and linguistic format as is the case in Nigeria, Russia and Ethiopia.
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In these countries, the natural resources that are deposited regionally have induced the central 
government to impose federalism upon the state. Under this condition, it is possible to think 
that fiscal federalism tends to contribute in the sustenance of social conflicts within a nation. 
It is relatively difficult to adopt any revenue allocation formula that all the members of a 
federating unit would accept. Blöchlicher et al. (2007) asserts that getting a revenue-sharing 
formula for a country that will not be contested by the people can be likened to passing a bill 
in the house without any debate.  The impact of revenue-allocation formula is enormous on 
the members of a federating unit, especially when the country concerned has a mono-cultural 
economic  system,  where  all  the  levels  of  government  depend  on  only  one  source  for 
generating the revenue for governance. 
 
The pattern of the revenue-allocation formula being adopted in Nigeria has the tendency of 
facilitating underdevelopment, as the non-oil producing states rely heavily on the revenue 
being generated from the oil-producing communities. The implementation of the Nigerian 
version of fiscal federalism tends to contradict every known conventional political system in 
the world (Sam, Eme and Emeh, 2012; Lamidi and Fagbohun, 2013). 
 
For instance, in the United States, the federal government has relieved itself of some of the 
issues contained in the concurrent list, where both the state and the federal government have 
the jurisdiction to make and enforce laws on the items on the list. This concerns matters 
relating to job creation/training, welfare packages, health care delivery, housing and legal 
services to citizens, because state and local governments are closer to the people than the 
central government. The state and local governments are better able to meet the immediate 
needs of the citizens than the federal government would have done if health and other related 
issues were the sole responsibility of the federal government. The government of the United 
Kingdom under the leadership of Tony Blair,  for example, decided to constitute another
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parliament for Scotland and Wales (1997) because of the desire to bring the government 
closer to the people. The decentralisation of power in Italy has been pushed so far that the 
people are increasingly becoming very optimistic of the chances of having two nations in one 
country (Oates, 1999, p. 6). 
 
2.5.3 Nigerian Federalism 
 
 
 
Federalism in Nigeria can be traced back to British colonial rule. Prior to the emergence of 
the British government in the West African sub-region, the political entity now known as 
Nigeria   was   populated   by  people   from   diverse   ethnic   nationalities,   kingdoms   and 
communities  governed  by  traditional  institutions.  Most  of  the  people  who  lived  in  the 
Nigerian traditional society shared almost everything in common, and resolved every dispute 
that occurred within the community through  the traditional judicial system.  Nonetheless, 
there were some unacceptable practices in the traditional African societies, such as the killing 
of twins (1874), and human sacrifices to the gods. There was also a despised sect of living 
humans dedicated to the gods. These people were referred to as “outcasts,” locally known as 
osu. They were treated as aliens or exiles in their own community. The early missionaries in 
Nigeria fought and stopped the killing of twins along with these other barbaric acts. The 
threats to modern norms and values were, significantly reduced by the British colonialists in 
Nigeria (Etekpe, 2009). Federalism was found to be the most appropriate political system 
because of the pluralistic nature of the society in terms of ethnicity and religion. 
 
The Nigerian federal system has been very problematic right from its inception. There has 
been a trend whereby the federal government tends to favour the section of Nigeria that 
produces the head of the government in every administration (this has been one of the sources 
of conflict in the region).  It was towards solving the problem of ethnicity and religious 
intolerance that Major-General Aguiyi Ironsi introduced a unitary system of government in
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Nigeria in May 1966. Unfortunately, General Aguiyi was killed in the July 1966 coup while 
implementing the principles and values of a unitary system of government. General Yakubu 
Gowon, who took over government from Aguiyi Ironsi, later returned the country to a federal 
system of government. It was the disagreement between the former Military Governor of the 
Eastern Region, Lt. Colonel Chukwuemeka Odimegwu Ojukwu, and the former Head of 
State,  General  Gowon,  coupled  with  issues  surrounding  the  Kano  riots  that  led  to  the 
Nigerian Civil War of 1967 to 1970. 
 
2.5.4 Colonialism 
 
 
 
The conflicts in the Niger Delta date back to colonial times (Fidelis and Samuel, 2011; p. 1). 
Not only is there a link between the conflicts in the colonial era and contemporary conflicts in 
the region (Ako and Okomah, 2009, p. 55), but also the later conflicts are, as a result of the 
colonially entrenched inequity that characterized the earlier ones. The division of the country 
into three regions in 1939 by the British Colonial government amplified the issue of ethnicity 
that  has  proved  to  be very divisive,  as  manifested  in  the  ongoing struggle  for  resource 
control. In other words, ethnicity, that pervades politics and socio-economic competition for 
resources in Nigeria, is a consequence of the political division of the country into three 
regions. 
 
As observed by Nnoli (1978), ethnicity is one of the major concerns in Nigerian politics. The 
three major ethnic groups in the country (Igbo, Yoruba, and Hausa/Fulani) are politically 
united when it comes to decisions regarding the exploitation of the Niger Delta oil resources. 
The people of the Niger Delta first manifested their fear of marginalization by the major 
ethnic groups in 1958 under the colonial government and, therefore, opted to separate from 
the rest of Nigeria. This request led to the formation of the Willink Commission, whose
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report  in  1958  held  that  the Niger Delta  region  should  be  treated  as  a special  area  for 
development (see Colonial Office of Nigeria, 1958, p.94). 
 
The British Colonial government amalgamated the regions that now constitute Nigeria in 
 
1914. It is posited that, without the amalgamation, there would be no country called Nigeria. 
The Niger Delta grievances and conflicts are deeply entrenched in colonialism. The people 
believe that the British colonial government enacted obnoxious laws that bestowed ownership 
and control of their oil to the Crown. For instance, the Mining Regulation (Oil) Ordinance of 
1907 provided that: “[i]t shall be lawful for the Governor to enter into an agreement with any 
Native Authority for the purchase of full and exclusive rights in and over all mineral oils 
within and under any lands which are the property of any Native Community” (Ako, 2010, p. 
8).  This implies that the land (beneath which the oil resources lay) ownership was vested on 
these communities prior to the Ordinance. 
 
The colonial government promulgated the Mineral Oil Ordinance in 1914, with amendments 
in 1916, 1945, 1950 and 1959 (Ebeku, 1998). The Ordinance simply reaffirmed state 
ownership and control of the oil resources (exclusively deposited in the Niger Delta) by the 
central government (Ebeku, 1998, p.1). The Eastern Nigerian elite were uncomfortable with 
these laws; they felt that they had deprived the inhabitants of the oil-rich region the right to 
their natural property. Ironically, the same Nigerian elite who criticized the colonial Mineral 
Acts  amended  the  laws  to  vest  natural  resources,  hitherto  vested  in  the Crown,  on  the 
president on behalf of the Federal Government (Fidelis and Samuel, 2011, p. 2). Dr. Nnamdi 
Azikiwe made this amendment; he was the first Head of State of Nigeria. Ako (2010, p. 9) 
observes that the struggle over the ownership  of oil  was  a cynical  cause of the Biafra/ 
Nigerian war that took place between 1967 and 1970. The easterners attempted to secede 
from Nigeria because the Niger Delta was politically under the Eastern Region. While the
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war was ongoing the then federal military government re-asserted the state ownership of the 
oil resources, which still stands till today (Ako, 2010, p. 8).   Obviously, when an existing 
culture is transformed via colonialism, there would normally be a negative impact on the 
newly transformed communities as is the case in the Niger Delta region. The colonial 
transformation in Nigeria has only led to ethnic schism and sowed the seed of conflict. 
 
 
 
It appears erroneous to blame the Niger Delta conflict on the colonialism, as other countries, 
such as Malaysia, Ghana and America, were all former British colonies. The Malaysian 
economy has continued to grow. The corruption in Nigeria cannot be compared to the level in 
Ghana; and America, through her technologies and industrial revolution, has transformed into 
a world power.   All these are indications that the restiveness in Nigeria are as a result of 
corrupt governance. Obi (2010), however, insists that the current government policies and 
constitutions are benchmarked on the legacies of colonialism. 
 
During the period of colonization, some of the early multi-national oil corporations (MNOCs) 
became  more  established  in  Africa,  although  those  in  the  agricultural  sector were more 
concerned with sourcing of raw materials for their parent companies in Europe. For instance, 
in West Africa, cocoa, groundnut, sorghum, and palm oil were exported to Europe, while 
those in the mining sector became major employers of labour, as exemplified in East and 
Southern Africa (Gartenstein-Ross, Willcoxon and Basuni; Kennedy 1998). The relationship 
between the African states and the MNOCs during this era of colonialism was based more on 
economic benefits, and with no direct attempt at CSR. During this period, while the MNOCs 
supplied materials to the local African communities, which were more of firearms and 
manufactured  goods, neither the MNOCs nor their protectors (the colonial governments) 
tolerated obstructions to trade (Pakenham, 1991).
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The modern MNOCs are sophisticated; influential, and large are also impacting considerably 
on Africa’s culture, politics, security, environment, governance, development, regional 
integration and industrialization (Lall, 1996). These MNOCs are sources of employment, 
products, capital investment, skills and technology, infrastructure development, creation of 
industries, taxes and fees to government, and foreign direct investment (FDI) in many Africa 
states (Dietrich, 2000; Pedersen and Huniche, 2006). They have become relatively powerful, 
rendering the African states almost powerless and unable to control themselves. They have 
also been implicated in environmental degradation, socio-political crises, labour exploitation, 
and economic crises in Africa (Dietrich, 2000; Stern, 2005, Pedersen and Huniche, 2006). 
 
2.5.5 Politics of Oil 
 
 
 
Easton (1965, p. 21) defines politics as the authoritative allocation of values. In other words, 
politics has become the most reliable instrument for distributing national resources to the 
different federating units that make up a nation. Modebadze (2010, p. 40) describes politics 
as the exercise of power and authority in a decision-making process, which involves the 
allocation  of  scarce  resources  and  the  practice  of  deception  and  manipulation  by some 
political leaders. This implies that politics could mean different things to different people, 
depending on the prevailing circumstances. There is a direct link between politics and the 
allocation of values. However, it is the nature of a political system that determines how 
national resources can be allocated to the different units of the country. Under a unitary 
system of government, national resources are evenly distributed to the various regions that 
make up the country, as is the case of the United Kingdom. But under a federal system of 
government, national resources are supposed to be distributed proportionately based on the 
level of contribution of each of the federating units, as in the case of the United States of 
America (Rivera, 2016). As a result, most people tend to wonder whether Nigeria is a federal
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state with unitary structure, or a country practising a unitary system of government having a 
federal structure. 
 
The revenue allocation formula adopted by the Nigerian government has been particularly 
criticized and rejected by scholars on the basis that it does not reflect the interests of the 
people in the Niger Delta region, where over 80 per cent of the national resource is generated. 
Indeed, a fundamental contributory cause of restiveness in the Niger Delta region is attributed 
to the politics of resource control.   In the view of Ojakarotu (2008, p. 2), the Niger Delta 
upheaval in  relation to  revenue allocation has grown from  bad to worse by assuming a 
dreadful pattern during the 1990s, especially the regimes of Babangida and Abacha, when the 
youths became restive through the social movements formed. The development became a 
source of worry to the government and oil companies. The Niger Delta conflict is premised 
on the laws regulating oil exploration and land ownership, which the Niger Delta militants 
believe must be abrogated, as it does not represent their interests as the host communities 
(Okonta, 2001; Giroux, 2008). Closely related to this view is the argument by Watts, Okonta 
and Kemedi (2004), that the desire to control natural resources is the driver of high passion 
about the issue of resource control by ethnic groups. It has been observed that, in the region, 
it is difficult to separate the people from the abundant natural resources, which they desire to 
benefit from. As far as the Niger Delta is concerned, resource control, which is the central 
idea in oil politics in Nigeria, is the sine qua non for sustainable peace and development in 
the country (Ojakaruotu, 2008, p. 6). 
 
2.5.6 Oil Companies’  "Divide and Rule" Strategy: A Source of Conflict 
 
 
 
For several years, oil companies in Nigeria have been involved in the strategy of divide and 
rule, which remains one of the challenges of peaceful co-existence in the Niger Delta region. 
As mentioned earlier, the divide and rule strategy is a strategy used in politics to destroy an
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existing concentrated power, with the aim of infringement of strong power structures. This 
strategy breaks up existing relationship among groups and individuals. Oil companies in the 
Niger Delta region, in partnership with the Nigerian state, employ this strategy within the oil- 
producing communities (OPCs) (Faleti, 2009 p. 17). The oil companies, rather than carrying 
out international standard of oil mining practices, choose to concentrate on bribing the most 
vocal people in the communities to quell the pressures from the communities for the oil 
companies  to  be  corporately responsible.  The divide  and  rule strategy has  been used to 
destroy the traditional institutions that were previously famous in community governance, 
such as the elites, chiefs, elders and age-grades (Faleti, 2009, p. 17). 
 
These influential people, often said to hold the peace of the communities in pre-conflict era, 
became the powerless members of the communities as others now entertain the view that they 
are corrupt. The phases of power in the communities no longer trust each other, thereby 
giving rise to inter-communal conflicts, intra-communal conflict, and conflict with the oil 
companies as well as conflict with the Nigerian state. Pa Jim Beeson Saro-Wiwa, the father 
of Ken Saro-Wiwa, complained, thus: 
 
 
 
We were living in peace before Shell came. We were sharing 
our forests with animals and monkeys, but when Shell came, 
they started  setting one  community against  another...  Before 
you knew it, they started killing our people (Social Action, 
2009, p.11). 
 
 
 
 
For instance, Shell's activities in Rumuekpe community resulted in leadership tussle that 
claimed  many  lives  and  property.  It  has  been  noted  that  Shell  has  always  supported 
individuals who are connected with the company to become their liaison officer within the
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community. This appears to have worked directly against the traditional institution of 
governance in the community, resulting in intra-communal conflict, as Shell's chosen 
community leaders may sometimes impose their will on the communities. In agreement with 
the observation of Ken Saro Wiwa's father, Umuechem, Ogoni, Odioma, Edagberi and 
Rumuekpe were very peaceful communities prior to the advent oil exploration (Remembering 
Saro-Wiwa, undated). 
 
The oil companies that came in search of the “black gold” deposited in the Niger Delta stole 
the peace that existed in the region (Social Action, 2009; Morrow, 2009). Before the advent 
of oil, the youths in the region who would normally act on the instructions of the chiefs and 
elders have discovered that they have been deceived. The directions from the chiefs and 
elders were perverted through financial benefits from the political elites. Shell appears to be 
enjoying the  communal  conflicts,  as  the  government  supplies  them  with  armed  military 
troops to guard their oil facilities while the communities are allowed to kill one another 
(Idemudia, 2010). This shows that the Nigerian state appears to be more interested in the 
Niger Delta oil than in the welfare of the people, since the state has allowed the communities 
to destroy one another without interference from the government. Some of the group leaders 
that championed the conflict in the region are believed to be recognised by the Nigerian 
ruling political elite (Social Action, 2009, pp. 17-19). 
 
Chevron has also adopted the “divide and rule” strategy at Ugborodo community of Delta 
State.  The  oil  corporation  had  an  agreement  with  the  community  to  improve  on  its 
community projects as well as to ensure peaceful operational activities within the community 
as part of its crisis management. In the end, both parties freely signed the new MOU (Faleti, 
2009, p.12). Rather than Chevron carrying out the agreed projects, she decided to bribe the 
most vocal people of the community with the sum of N25 000 000.00 (twenty five million
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naira). Chevron enjoys this chaos because the company knows that unity in the host 
communities would amount to a collective strength to fight the company. Therefore, Chevron 
prefers to turn the community against one another (Faleti, 2009, p. 12). 
The community, however, carried out a peace protest to remind the company of the earlier 
MOU agreed upon. The response from Chevron was brutal, and about 30 of the members 
who took part in the demonstration were injured, while one died as a result of the injury. 
Chevron repudiated the MOU with the reason that it was signed under duress (Faleti, 2009, 
p.19). This implies the oil companies in partnership with the Nigerian government prefer the 
oil in the Niger Delta to the people’s well-being. According to Nwogwugwu et al. (2012), 
when the money meant for CSR to empower the people and transform communities is given 
to a few individuals or more influential groups, it becomes problematic because the neglected 
groups would definitely come to demand their own share. In that case, instead of being a 
source of inter-group harmony, planned CSR becomes a source of intra-communal or inter- 
communal conflict and an avenue for groups to show their will. 
 
2.5.7 Corruption 
 
 
 
Many high-level government officials are said to have participated in the stealing of the oil 
resources going on in the Niger Delta region; but, with the advent of the amnesty programme, 
the military is now in control of the area (Vidal, 2013, p.4). The implication is that that oil 
theft in the region will no longer be an issue of breaking up the oil pipeline, but collaboration 
between the pipeline vandals and the military. Vidal (2013) also observes that the rich are 
currently carrying out the oil theft in the region; the poor people of the Niger Delta, who 
would only normally take very small quantity of oil out of the vandalized pipeline, no longer 
do it. It now involves army officers, naval officers, big politicians, and so on. Since there is
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plenty of money in it, all authorities (military, politicians, and even the oil companies) engage 
in it (Katsouris, Christianaa, Sayne and Aaron, 2015). 
 
Oil theft has also become highly organized, as the thieves are not being protected; the illegal 
vessels carrying oil can be arrested but discharged without prosecution (Vidal, 2013). For 
instance, the MT African Pride a ship of Russian origin, carted away about 11,000 tons of 
crude oil from Nigeria. The Nigerian Navy for illegal bunkering arrested the tanker but it 
suddenly disappeared till today (IRIN, 2004, p.1; Adeniyi, 2013, p. 2).  This implies that most 
of the oil stolen from Africa has support from the international community. It is, therefore, no 
wonder that President Goodluck Jonathan, in his open letter to former President Olusegun 
Obasanjo dated 2nd January, 2014, warned that the Western world should stay away from the 
purchase of stolen oil from Nigeria (Vanguard News, 2014; Information Nigeria, 2014). 
The World Bank (2005) has revealed that the money from oil by top Nigerian politicians who 
have access to Nigeria’s oil revenue is hidden in European banks, American banks and Swiss 
banks. Corruption, poor leadership and governance in Nigeria tend to have direct or indirect 
contributions from the developed world. The World Bank, for example, lends huge amounts 
of money to the Nigerian government, which is often embezzled by the governing elite 
(Obasanjo, 1993; Peel, 2006; Igwe, 2012). 
 
Worse still, Britain and the United States of America train Nigerian soldiers and police in a 
bid to demonstrate their support for the Nigerian government in fighting the protesting Niger 
Delta people (Donwa and Jlius, 2015; Nilsson, 2010). For instance, in December 2005, the 
then American President, George W. Bush, was reported to have planned the deployment of 
US  Marines  to  help  crush  the  Niger  Delta  militants  so  that  oil  will  continue  to  flow 
unhindered to America. In 2006, the media reported that the George Bush administration 
donated six (6) gunboats to the Nigerian government to help suppress the militants so that
71  
America’s energy needs would be met (Dagne, 2005).  All these have made the oil-producing 
communities (OPCs) perceive oil as a curse rather than a blessing to them. 
 
2.5.8 Government’s Coercive Responses 
 
 
 
Government’s  coercive  response  to  the  Niger  Delta  conflict  did  not  start  in  1999.  The 
confrontation of the people rather took a more deadly dimension when the military embarked 
on a punitive expedition that climaxed in the mass murder of residents of Odi in Bayelsa 
State, after over  12 policemen  were murdered  (Human  Rights  Watch,  1999;  Idu,  2011, 
p.123). The Obasanjo administration, in 1999, adopted the establishment of committees, 
setting up of a Joint Task Force, and arrest of militants and their leaders as response to the 
Niger Delta  conflict.  After the  establishment  of  the JTF  and  military casualties,  it  was 
obvious that the solution to the crisis would not be achieved through militarisation and this 
made Obasanjo to establish the Council on Socioeconomic Development of Coastal States of 
the Niger Delta in April 2006 (Ojameruaye, 2007; Okolie-Osemene and Aghalino, 2011). 
Through the use of security operatives at her disposal, the government demonstrated her total 
control of oil  and  mineral  resources in  the region (Obi,  2004). The impact of coercive 
response cannot be ignored. Unfortunately, the  JTF established in August 2003 did not 
restore total order as expected. Rather, their roadblocks and multiple checkpoints in most 
parts of the Niger Delta ended up alienating them from the people (Okolie-Osemene and 
Aghalino, 2011). 
 
Even though most responses from government were mainly focused on preventing the 
obstruction of oil production and distribution, such actions were at the expense of those in the 
host communities. According to Sawyer (2010, p.245), the military sent to quell the crisis in 
Bayelsa that led to Odi massacre became agents of human degradation that climaxed in a
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high number of fatherless babies. This degradation was not only in the form of wanton 
destruction of lives but also a generational psychological trauma. 
 
The disarmament programme of 2004 initiated by then President Obasanjo produced the 
expected result, when militant groups headed by Asari Dokubo and Ateke Tom participated 
in peace talks and thousands of weapons were later destroyed in public.   Later at a church 
service,  the  repentant  militants  prayed  God  to  forgive  their  sins  (Obuoforibo,  2011). 
However, after this period, it was obvious that more armed groups needed to be disarmed 
before stability would be restored to the region. 
 
2.5.9 Leadership and Governance 
 
 
 
The Federal Government of Nigeria is a formidable stakeholder in the petroleum industry 
because it reserves the exclusive right to regulate the activities of multi-national oil 
corporations (MNOCs) as they carry out their business.  Emoyan, Akpoborie and Akpohonor 
(2008, p.32) note that, as “a shareholder in the oil and gas industry, government’s oversight 
function has been characterised by legislative acts, regulations and decrees aimed at 
superseding many environmental problems.” However, this legislative intervention has not 
made  any  significant  impact  in  the  abatement  of  environmental  degradation  or  abuse, 
including gas flaring. While writing on the lack of implementation of regulations on the 
Niger Delta-oil environment, Raji and Abejide (2013, p.52) state that, in spite of 
“government’s  efforts  to  limit  gas  flaring  through  legislative  intervention,  the  problem 
remains unabated because the government’s major goal is the continuous exploration of crude 
oil and the concomitant revenue generation without considering the implication of the activity 
on the environment and the health of the people. Luqman (2012, p.417) asserts that a rentier 
state is like Nigeria “characterised by fiscal reliance on petrodollars, which strengthens state
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jurisdiction  and  weakens  authority as  other productive capabilities  whither”.  Udeke and 
 
Okolie-Osemene (2012, p.6-8) argue that: 
 
 
 
[b]etween 1958 and 2012, the Niger Delta  could be described 
as a victim of committees, commissions, reports and counter 
recommendations  which  are  never  implemented  as 
recommended by members without alteration by government, 
partial  implementation  or  even  outright  suspension  of  the 
reports; to the extent that much of the anger against the oil 
producing companies in host communities arose out of the way 
the indigenes lost their farmlands, crops, and economic trees 
with very little compensation. 
 
According to Olumide (2011, p.99), “from 1960 to 1999, corporate politics intersected with 
successive dictatorships – military and civil government – which facilitated government’s 
signing of laws that appropriated oil resources and placed them under the control of multi 
nationals and the government.” In this case, host communities were neither involved nor 
considered. 
2.6 Impact  of the Niger Delta Conflict on the Communities 
 
According to Adeola (2001, p. 40), the Niger Delta (oil resources) conflict has negatively 
impacted on the host communities. To ascertain the nature of this impact, this section of the 
study is designed to deliberate on the adverse effects of the conflict on host communities. The 
apparent ecological devastation of the environment has relieved the natural fishermen and 
farmers of their occupation with its resultant effect on poverty and unemployment, among 
others. Poverty in the oil-producing communities in the Nigeria's delta is no longer news. 
This can be perceived in the obvious manifestation of frustration and aggression of the local
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people. The various oil-producing communities in the Niger Delta are of the view that oil 
exploration and exploitation have not contributed to their development when compared with 
the revenue accruable from oil. Nwankwo (2015) observes that the Ogoni, in 1990, summed 
up their oil revenue contribution to the Nigerian government to the tune of $30 billion at the 
time but got nothing in return other than negative environmental externalities, which UNEP 
(2011) has noted will take up to 30 years for Shell to remediate. 
 
The foregoing argument does not imply that oil exploration and exploitation have generated 
poverty to all actors of the conflict; oil has given the Nigerian economy both huge revenue 
and  popularity but  left  the host  communities  impoverished.  Thus,  the  host  communities 
believe that there is traceable to ethnicity. This is based on the premise of sudden shift in the 
derivation policy of allocation in the country from what it used to be in the early 1960s. The 
host communities consider this shift as injustice, because the derivation principle was 
considered a policy of justice in the country at the time. The principle of derivation was 
created on equity grounds. Which implies that each region that contributes the bulk of the 
country’s revenue receives an extra share above what other regions received (Okoko, Nna 
and  Ibaba,  2006).  This  made  the  majority  ethnic  groups  who  were  then  in  control  of 
agriculture to be reimbursed 100% of the revenue they generated from agriculture. However, 
when the Niger Delta communities (minorities) came to the scene, through oil revenue, the 
principle of derivation was reduced from 100% to 1.5 % and now marginally increased to 
13% (Ikporukpo, 2001). The local communities perceived this socio-economic manipulation 
as unjust and unacceptable. Consequently, the youths began to ask for a fair deal from both 
the  oil  companies  and  the  government.  In  response,  the  government  engaged  several 
dastardly special police and military units to invade, occupy, harass, torment, suppress and 
outright destroy the Niger Delta communities. This is in order to make the people of the 
region stay clear of oil exploration, as the government prefers to have the oil flow to ensuring
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the good health of the local people.  Ojakorotu and Gilbert (2010, p. 5) summarise some of 
 
the various occurrences of the oil-bearing communities' militarisation below: 
 
 
 
The Nigeria Mobile Police Force (MOPOL) was used to brutally repress a non-violent 
youth  protest  against  Shell  at  Umuechem  in  Rivers  state.  Consequently,  the 
community was practically destroyed on 31 October 1990, resulting in the killing of 
80 indigenes and hundreds of buildings destroyed with increase in the number of 
internal displacement (ICG, 2006A, p. 6-7) 
The Rivers State  Internal Security Task Force, one of the best equipped  military 
squads, was formed mainly for the purpose of  repressing, suppressing,  harassing, 
humiliating, arresting and unlawfully, detaining members of the Movement for the 
Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) and its followers, who had moved against Shell 
and demanded self-determination in Ogoni land between 1993 and 1996). 
 
 
 
Apart from the unconstitutional execution of the Ogoni nine (Ken Saro-Wiwa and his 
eight Ogoni compatriots), the Nigerian military engaged in wanton destruction of the 
Ogoni people; they virtually metamorphosed to an army of occupation involved in 
rape, torture, maiming,  looting and summarily executing about 2000  people extra 
judicially (HRW, 1999, p. 9; Adeola, 2001, p. 40). 
 
 
 
A combined team of Nigerian state MOPOL and the Army were used for the invasion 
of Choba community to repress a peaceful protest against WILBROS (a foreign oil 
servicing firm) in 1999; 10 people were killed, 25 women raped and the community 
was temporarily deserted (CLO, 2002, p. 50-61). 
 
 
 
In  January  1999,  a  state  of  emergency  was  declared  by  the  Nigerian  Federal 
 
Government, in Bayelsa State with heavily armed military men in armoured vehicles
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deployed to battle against the Niger Delta ns, particularly the IYC and Egbesu Boys 
 
of Africa (Sesay et al., 2003). 
 
 
 
One of the most tragic and internationalised militarisation in the Niger Delta occurred 
in November 1999. The Nigerian state, through an operation tagged Hakuri 2, 
embarked on one of its most sordid genocide attacks in the Delta region by deploying 
the army to invade Odi community, the second largest town in Bayelsa state, after 
Amassoma. Consequentially, more than 1000 people were brutally murdered; several 
others were declared missing with their houses demolished, except three of the houses 
which were left standing; the community was deserted, and property worth of millions 
of naira destroyed (CLO, 2002, p. 67-74). 
 
 
 
In 2003, a set of the Nigeria military known  as the Joint Task Force (JTF) and 
nicknamed “Operation Restore Hope” was formed. Mainly carved out for the 
consistent, persistent and aggressive suppression of all oil-related protests in the Niger 
Delta, the JTF is made up of about 4,000 troops (Ikelegbe, 2005). 
 
 
 
In October 2005, Odioma was also attacked by the JTF, resulting in at least 17 people 
losing their lives, including a two-year old child (ICG, 2006a, p. 7). 
 
 
 
 
It was against this background of exploitive militarization of the Delta communities alongside 
the perpetration of repugnant human rights violation that numerous ethnic environmental 
movement organizations (EMOs) and armed state youth organizations emerged (Gear, Kotze, 
2015). The groups were believed to have been formed to counter the Nigerian state and its 
collaborative   oil-company   partners   in   their   constant   harassment,   terrorization,   rape, 
subjugation and suppression of the Niger Delta people.  The EMO formulated in this regard
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include: MOSOP, Ikwerre Youth Movement (IYM), and Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), Urhobo 
Youth Movement (UYOMO). In addition, Ojakorotu and Gilbert (2010, p. 6) list the non- 
state armed groups formulated to include: 
 
[t]he Federated Niger Delta Izon Communities (FNDIC), the 
Membutu Boys, the Niger Delta   Vigilante (NDV), the Niger 
Delta     Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF), the Coalition for 
Militant Action (COMA), the Movement for the Emancipation 
of the Niger Delta   (MEND) and the Martyrs Brigade also 
sprouted in the region. 
 
It might not be right to blame the government for the formation of these groups, but it would 
be apt to argue that the government contributed to their formation through her deployment of 
military troops to terrorise and traumatize the oil-bearing communities. No doubt, the state 
monopoly of the violent means of destruction was challenged by the pervasive deployment of 
arms locally by the non-state armed groups, who proliferated and wielded lethal violence 
(Watts, 2007, p. 642). It is germane to reiterate the fact that the militants, from the onset, did 
not acquire the guns they used on their own. They got them (their guns) from both the 
government and the oil companies prior to their transformation into militants. Most of the 
boys were used as thugs in election campaigns as well as for the rigging of elections and were 
thus fully armed. The arms were never returned at the end of the elections, but utilised to 
latter counter government repression. 
 
Rather than engaging in concrete CSR, the oil companies, particularly Shell, embraced the 
local  content  of  by-cutting  processes.  In  addition,  using  the  government  troops,  Shell 
employed the youths and equipped them with arms to guide their pipelines.  Tuodulo (2009, 
p. 337) observes that “‘Shell sponsored some youth in Nembe community, purchased arms
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and ammunition for them to fight whoever that is fighting them (Shell)”. Consequently, in 
time, these ammunitions were reused to fight both the companies and the government but 
also contributed to community disorder as it generated inter- and intra-communal conflicts. 
Tuodulo summarises the impact of the Niger Delta resource conflicts on the communities as 
follows: 
 
[T]hese oil or multinationals have thrust a knife in our midst 
and we have fallen apart. The love for money and our political 
selfishness have set us against each other and we no longer see 
ourselves as brothers, fathers, chiefs, sisters, we disregard 
ourselves for temporary and temporal things, which have led to 
the formation of nocturnal and clandestine groups which have 
transformed Nembe to Sicily (Italy). Groups that are sponsored 
by chiefs, elders, politicians, government agents and the 
multinationals have succeeded in causing our aged parents and 
children,  while  our   young  men  die  prematurely  in  arms 
struggle, our parents die of heart attack and the children are 
denied knowledge by preventing them from  going to school 
(Tuodulo, 2009, p. 338). 
 
While it might not be right to argue that the oil multinational companies have done nothing in 
the realm of CSR but bring the local communities a curse, it will be wrong to agree that the 
MNOCs have done enough. The basis for the above premise is that various CSR strategies 
have been adopted by the MNOCs over time. The changes in CSR adopted measure are 
suggestive of failures. Aaron (2012) categorises the strategies adopted as “old” and “new” 
CSR strategies. The old model of CSR in the Niger Delta took place in 1960-1997. During 
this period, the MNOCs resisted the oil-producing communities’ call for developmental role
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with the claim that it is the government’s responsibility to develop the communities since 
they (the MNOCs) met their statutory obligations to the Nigerian government to operate in 
the land. It is, therefore, not surprising that the local environmental activists (Asaac Boro and 
Ken Saro-Wiwa) rose up against both the government and the oil companies. This uprising 
prompted the oil companies to kick-start the first phase of CSR in the local communities 
called “community assistant” projects (Ite, 2007). The oil companies gave the communities 
gifts, which, in their perception, constituted the needs of the communities. These community 
assistance programmes were not just one-off gifts but included provision of graduate 
employments,   scholarships   and   apprenticeship.   However   the   corporate   gifts   to   the 
communities  rather  exacerbated  the  conflict.  Okoko  (1996)  argues that  there is  a direct 
relationship between oil companies’ provision of basic amenities and community conflicts, as 
the  philanthropist  system  adopted  by the  oil  companies  amplified  corrupt  practices  and 
accentuated a higher level of inter- and intra-communal conflicts. By all means, the local 
environmental activists continued to clamour for environmental justice and a change of CSR 
strategy by the MNOCs. 
 
Furthermore, the dissatisfaction of the people as expressed in various protests necessitated the 
change from community assistance strategy to community development in 1998-2003 and 
sustainable community development in 2004. Many authors conclude that all three old CSR 
strategies are dissatisfactory, adding that the MNOCs, in their policies, express commitment 
to concrete environmental practices but in reality have failed the Niger Delta ns (Ibeanu, 
1997; Nigeria Rights Watch, 1999; Frynas, 2005; Akpan, 2006; Ite, 2007). Okoko, Nna and 
Ibaba (2006, p. 187)  argue that the oil  companies only changed their CSR strategies to 
include people-oriented practices just to assuage the feelings of the local communities who 
have stepped up their protests against the exclusivist policies of the oil companies. However, 
the oil companies appear to have noble CSR policies which are not pragmatic in the Niger
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Delta, prompting the oil companies to bribe the most vocal and the traditional institutions in 
the communities rather than engaging in concrete CSR delivery. This singular act has 
weakened the local traditional institutions, which wielded power in the era prior to the oil 
boom. Similarly, Nweke (2012, p. 204) notes that the traditional institutions meddled in the 
conflict with the aim of achieving peace but eventually became absorbed in it, probably 
because of the financial gains. This possibly accounts for why the traditional institutions 
could not manage the ongoing conflicts in the Niger Delta. 
 
2.6 MNOCs’ CSR Programmes/Projects 
 
 
 
As noted earlier, CSR is an integral part of community relations. Thus, corporations must 
think about taking responsibility for their actions if they want the communities in which they 
operate and make money to accept them. Daferighe and Adedeji (2010) raise two critical 
CSR issues that demand examination: “(1) that the pursuit of CSR projects by companies 
greatly depends on their definition of CSR as well as the value they place on it; (2) that issues 
of  ethnicity,  absence  of  efficient  social,  economic  and  political  institution  constitute 
challenges for CSR practice in Nigeria” (p.1-2). 
 
Usually, organizations and individuals accept responsibility for the things that are working 
for them and repudiate those that are not working properly. In Nigeria, for instance, not all 
companies attach much importance to the execution of CSR programmes; and, expectedly, 
such companies will not be in the good books of their host communities. Again, lack of or 
weak institutional mechanisms to check lapses seem to aggravate CSR crisis in some parts of 
the country (Daferighe and Adedeji, 2010; Ako, 2012). For instance, CSR programmes or 
projects pursued by MNOCs, especially Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria 
Ltd  (SPDC),  do  not  seem  to  conform  to  international  best  practice  in  environmental 
protection (UNEP, 2011). The oil-mining giant does not appear to understand the meaning
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and implication of adopting adequate CSR strategies; hence they do not consult or liaise with 
the  host  communities  when  carrying  out  any  CSR-oriented  project.  For  example,  in 
Equatorial Guinea, ExxonMobil, as part of its footprint in the society, donated mosquito nets 
to the country's Ministry of Health to foster prevention of malaria; but the Ministry officials 
sold  these  mosquito  preventive-aids  to  Cameroonians.  Another  incidence  took  place  in 
Angola  where  BP  distributed  Asian  condoms  to  the  citizenry  as  part  of  its  anti-AIDS 
campaign. The condoms, however, turned out to be undersized for an African man (Frynas, 
2005, p. 587).   Had the MNOCs liaised with their host communities, their corporate giving 
would have been recognised and appreciated rather than being faulted. This also explains the 
reason for white elephant projects or non-functioning CSR projects in the Niger Delta region 
of  Nigeria.  Some  of  these  projects  include  finished  or  unfinished  buildings  without 
electricity, water projects or hospitals and schools. 
 
Without any doubt, the MNOCs have been involved in corporate philanthropy. However, not 
all the CSR motives appear to have been genuine. This has resulted in the failure of these 
projects. The independent audit report of 2001 revealed that less than one-third of Shell's 
commissioned  CSR  projects  are  functional.  Shell's  interest  was  to  buy  off  the  oil 
communities rather than their development (The Economist, 12 May, 2001). 
 
Bottom-top CSR is focused on carrying the local people along, which, by extension, makes 
them part of their own developmental strategy. This is described by Ellerman (2001) as 
helping people to help themselves. In other words, participatory CSR is perceived as the best 
route   for   development.   The   cardinal   idea   of   the   Central   Bank's   Comprehensive 
Developmental Framework suggests that the “doer” (which refers to a person or community) 
ought to be on the driver's seat and actively help him (Frinas, 2005, 589).  In this sense, if the 
local OPCs in the Niger Delta region were helped to help themselves, the region would have
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been developed. In the argument of Schumacher (1973, p. 204), it is not possible to achieve 
development in a local community through skilful grafting of activities carried out by foreign 
expatriates or an indigenous leader that has lost communication with ordinary members of the 
community.  Ironically, this describes the situation in the Niger Delta.  It is, perhaps, the 
reason the OPCs have been fighting against the MNOCs and the government. Foreign 
technicians carry out developmental projects in the Niger Delta without inculcating in the 
people the principles of development. 
 
The Ogoni ethnic group in the Niger Delta region complained that their fertile and productive 
lands have been destroyed by SPDC’s oil-mining activities. This resulted in peaceful protests 
by the people, under the auspice of Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) 
(Moro,  2009;  Ako,  2015).      Ken  Saro-Wiwa brought  the  matter to  the  attention  of the 
international community in the 1990s. Ken Saro-Wiwa was said to have continued from 
where Isaac Adaka Boro stopped, in 1966.    However, unlike Isaac Adaka Boro, who was 
said to be violent in his approach, Ken Saro-Wiwa peacefully executed the struggle for the 
right of the Ogoni. Saro-Wiwa believed that the entire Ogoni  land had been “degraded, 
devastated  and  poisoned,” and  that  the  oil  companies  and  the Nigerian  state  were only 
interested in the revenue derived from Ogoniland without caring for the environmental effects 
of oil exploration on the people of the Niger Delta (Saro-Wiwa, 2009, p. 324). Since the 
Ogoni Bill of Rights in 1990, and the repulsive and negative attitude of SPDC and the 
Federal Government, SPDC has remained a "persona non grata" in the Ogoni community 
(Giroux, 2008).  According to Social Action (2009, p. 7); 
 
In 1990, the Ogoni took stock of their condition and concluded 
that in spite of the stupendous oil and gas wealth off their land, 
which has fed the Nigerian ruling elite; they were extremely
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poor, and had no social amenities. Unemployment was running 
higher   and   worse   still,   their   environment   was   severely 
devastated  by three  decades  of  reckless  oil  exploitation,  by 
Shell’s ecological warfare. The Ogonis felt that their existence 
as a nation was threatened by environmental degradation, 
political  marginalization,  economic  strangulation  and  slavery 
and adopted the OGONI BILL OF RIGHTS, which was 
presented to the Government and people of Nigeria in October 
1990. It is as a result of the Nigerian government’s insensitivity 
to their demands that SPDC was sacked from Ogoniland on 4th 
January 1993. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the protests were peaceful until on 21 November 1994, when four 
prominent sons of Ogoniland were executed. Those executed were Edward Kobain, Albert T. 
Badey,  Samuel  Orage,   and  Theophilus  Orage.  They  were  suspected  to  be  brutally 
murderedby youths loyal to Ken Waro-Wiwa.  It was further suspected that the youths acted 
on the instruction of Ken Saro-Wiwa (Etekpe, 2007). The government responded by arresting 
Ken Saro-Wiwa and 9 others and set up the Justice Ibrahim Auta Panel to investigate the 
incident. Ken Saro-Wiwa and his fellow eight activists were later sentenced to death by 
hanging  by  the  military  government  of  General  Sani  Abacha,  on  10  November  1995 
(Ejibunu, 2007). The alleged injustice was further made obvious by the government that 
killed them without allowing them the 30 days for appeal given by the panel.  The people of 
Ogoni believed that SPDC was responsible for the death of the first “Ogoni 4” and, later 
“Ogoni 9” (Ako, 2015).  This opened the vista for the people to interrogate Shell's corporate 
social programmes/projects that could have averted the crisis (Moro, 2009, p. 325). Shell
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was, therefore, declared ‘illegitimate’ and ‘forced’ out of the Ogoniland since 1995 for their 
inability to executive concrete social development projects (Ejibunu, 2007). 
 
The nonchalant attitude of Shell in relation to exploratory activities impacted negatively on 
the farming activities in Ogoniland. Technical researchers, such as the UNEP (2011) and 
United Nation Development Project (UNDP) (2006), as well as the  Niger Delta  Human 
Development Report of UNDP, reported that Shell's unfriendly environmental activities have 
prompted the farmers in the Niger Delta to sue Shell in Netherlands, the company’s corporate 
headquarters, with the support of Friends of the Earth. In the legal suit, the farmers demanded 
that Shell should clean up the damage it has caused their environment and regularly maintain 
the pipelines to avoid further oil spillages.   In addition, the farmers’ demanded that Shell 
should pay financial compensation for destroying and dislocating their local economy. The 
case was related to the oil spillages in Goi (Ogoni, Rivers State), Oruma (Bayelsa State), and 
Ikot Ada Udo (Akwa Ibom State) (Friends of the Earth, 2012, p.1). 
 
Shell, on the other hand, claimed that the damage was caused by sabotage, and that it has 
made several unsuccessful efforts to repair the pipelines. Etekpe (2007) disagrees with the 
position of SPDC and posits that studies have shown that SPDC, in its usual character, has 
delayed any efforts to clean up the environment. The company's lawyer, Jan de Bie Leuveling 
Tjeenk, further claimed that Shell had made several efforts to repair the pipeline but it was 
unsuccessful because of the region's insecurity and sabotage. However, Shell’s claim, of not 
being culpable is questionable for the simple reason that the oil spillages were caused by her 
oil exploration activities. This is because, without Shell’s oil exploration in the land the 
people, would not have suffered the brunt of oil spillages. The people noted that the farmers 
had no business with sabotage; rather the company was irresponsible not to guide its facilities 
(Ako, 2013).
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Sabotage may have, however, contributed to the spillages, but Shell’s activities played a 
greater part in the environmental damage. Shell’s contractors have been repairing a section of 
the over 50 year’s oil pipeline along Ogoniland and the Ogu-Bolo terminal in Bonny. The 
pipeline was said to have been rusty and eventually exploded. But an official investigation 
into the cause of this explosion reported that the accident followed a botched attempt by some 
people to steal thousands of barrels of crude oil. It was also observed that other groups of 
engineers were removing illegal taps on the same pipeline (Vidal, 2013). In addition, some 
engineers were installing equipment to allow huge amount of oil to be siphoned into barges 
that would be transported to the high sea where tankers bound for Europe and the United 
States were waiting (Pyne-Frank and Timberlake, 2013). Reverend Obi, a Catholic Priest 
who was appointed to be an official observer, argued that both Shell and the government 
must have been involved in the high-level oil theft. 
 
Shell's  resistance  and  delay to  the  hearing  of  this  case  that  was  registered  in  2008  by 
Miliudefensie and Associates suggested to the farmers a success in their mission. The farmers 
were further strengthened by the insistence of Shell to return the petition to a Nigerian court, 
thereby questioning the authority of The Hague Court in the matter. As the Nigerian court 
ruled against Ken Saro-wiwa, the people of the Niger Delta have always linked the Nigerian 
state and Shell as partners in the act and, therefore, would not expect any from a Nigerian 
court (Friends of the Earth, 2012, p.1; Ako, 2015; Ako, 2013). They further argued that 
Shell’s tactics suggested, "Shell is acting in the knowledge that the Nigerian court has a poor 
justice system" (Friends of the Earth, 2012, p. 1). This is one of the examples of SPDC’s poor 
CSR, which is applicable to the other 19 MNOCs operating in the Niger Delta region. 
 
According to Vidal (2013, p.1),  “Shell scheduled resume talks in London by July 2013 with 
lawyers standing in for Ogonis demanding compensation from Shell as a result of ecological
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damage by crude oil.” This tends to be evidence that the impoverished farmers in the Niger 
Delta have suffered damage from environmental degradation without the national 
government’s  check  on  the  environmental  impact  of  oil,  but  concerned  more about  the 
economic benefits of oil. A situation where President Goodluck Jonathan worried about 
400,000 barrels of oil lost daily to theft and its impact on the economy without addressing 
how the OPCs cope with the adversity of oil degradation gives a disturbing impression (Pyne- 
Frank and Timberlake, 2013). 
 
The ethical standard of an MNOC like Shell appears different in Africa compared to the rest 
of the world, such as the Gulf of Mexico and United States of America.   For instance, in 
2012, the US government took up a matter with Shell on behalf of its victims for an estimated 
 
4.1 million barrels of oil that was spilled in the Gulf. Shell, with speed, cleaned up the oil 
spillage and paid financial compensation of about USD3billion. This was regarded as one of 
the biggest settlements for causing the Deepwater Horizon disaster (Daily Star, 2012, p. 19). 
However, with over 50 years of oil exploration in Nigeria, SPDC or any other MNOC has not 
paid any reasonable amount for the oil spilled into the ecosystem nor made any major attempt 
of cleaning the environment. All the cleaning done in the environment has been labelled 
crisis management. 
 
A critical analysis of the Shell spills in Ogoni and other parts of the Niger Delta region shows 
that the spills are incomparable to that of the North Sea spillage in United States. Shell's 
inability to plug a leak in the North Sea resulted in the company forcing its Chief Executive 
to resign (Aghalino, 2009; Steiner, 2010). This is a clear indication that the oil companies 
operating in the Niger Delta of Nigeria have adopted a double standard. This is because, 
while, in reality, the environmental standards are strictly followed in Mexico and the United 
States,   Shell   has   not   done   so   in   practice   in   Nigeria   (Steiner,   2010,   p.   17-18).
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Another MNOC-OPC clash was that of Umuchem community located in Etche Local 
Government Area of Rivers State, in 1990 (Social Action, 2009). The people carried out a 
peaceful protest against Shell for the environmental degradation of their land, especially as 
SPDC did not respond to the demand for cleaning up and payment of compensation. The 
Nigerian government reacted on behalf of Shell by dispatching 1000 mobile policemen to 
“shoot-at sight” (Social Action, 2009) and in the process killed over 50 people and destroyed 
the community. This action also supports the thesis that CSR and/or standards in Nigeria are 
different from what is  obtainable elsewhere probably because of their romance with  the 
political leaders (Adelabu, 2015). 
 
However,  Tuodulo  (2009) observes  that  the  MNOCs  have  been  involved  in  community 
development activities in the Niger Delta.   A situation where the communities perceive the 
MNOCs as enemies or “strange bedfellows” (Yazji, 2006) handicaps the MNOCs’ efforts in 
carrying out positive community relations. This does not rule out the fact that many MNOCs 
have been more focused in their businesses, bringing returns to their shareholders rather than 
benefiting the society (Gilbert, 1999). 
 
It will not be true to say that Shell has not invested anything towards the development of 
OPCs in the Niger Delta where she is operating. Shell is the major employer of labour among 
the other MNOCs in the region; the corporation has been involved in scholarship awards 
from primary level to university level. It has also contributed towards an improved transport 
system in the OPCs by donating buses, constructing roads and jetties in the region (Tuodulo, 
2009, p. 536). It has also provided boreholes and electricity for most of the OPCs and micro 
finance for farmers. 
Notwithstanding that most people in the region are of the opinion that the services provided 
by Shell are inadequate, others compliment SPDC for its benevolence.  For instance, the
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members of Nembe host community noted that Shell has built houses for the people in 
Nembe. Some members of the community benefitted from the microfinance services, 
scholarship awards and some classroom teachers benefited from the SPDC educational 
allowances.  Nembe community is host where Shell’s largest oil wells are located (Tuodulo, 
2009). The Nembe community annual report for 2006 revealed that the people appreciated 
 
Shell’s generosity: 
 
 
 
 
Shell has done well for us. They have given us so many things 
classrooms, judges’ quarters, scholarship, micro-credit, 
generators   and  speedboats.  Without  Shell,   none  of  these 
facilities will come to Nembe. We enjoy these things because 
of Shell, they are our saviours for now but it is not enough, we 
want Shell to do more (Tuodulo, 2009). 
 
 
 
The 2005 Nembe community annual reports noted that the communities believed that for 
Shell’s efforts in comparison with that of government “you will think that Shell is a saint” 
(Aluko, 2015, p. 179). The question now is: has Shell been pragmatic in delivering its CSR 
programmes and ethical in its practices? Why are the communities still questioning Shell’s 
corporate citizenship? Is it a case of dissatisfaction in the CSR delivery process? Could the 
MNOCs be involved in crisis management instead of a concrete CSR? With the nature of the 
CSR  conflict  in  the  Niger  Delta,  it  is  possible  that  Shell  has  been  involved  in  CSR 
programmes, but the delivery process may be flawed resulting in the ongoing conflict. This is 
an indication that there is a direct relationship between CSR and conflict. 
 
The MNOCs have management that are responsible for the sustenance of business ethics and 
effective service delivery to enhance job performance in the oil and gas sector. Akuma (2013,
89  
p.31) outlines the three levels of management that multinationals, like Shell, Chevron and 
others, have, to include top management level, middle management level, and lower 
management level and well equipped to manage the community relations’ conflict in the 
region. 
In most MNOCs, the managerial functions of planning, organising and directing or 
commanding are determinant factors in actualising the companies’ corporate goals and work 
objectives. In addition, when communities make demands or agitate over poor CSR 
implementation, the type of management put in place would determine the nature of response 
to the perceived negligence, especially through the community relations officer(s). However, 
most times, those that represent MNOCs are in the upper-middle management level, while 
the top members of management who make crucial decisions that affect policy changes or 
implementation are always absent in such meetings 
 
2.7 The Nigerian Government’s Efforts in Resolving the Conflict 
 
 
 
The Federal Government has devised many ways to resolve the oil conflict in the Niger Delta 
region. The effort started in 1961, with the creation of agencies. In recognition of the 
recommendations of the Henry Willink Commission’s report, the government established the 
Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB) to address the developmental needs of the region in 
order to “quench” their grievances (Enemugwem, 2009 p.167). Although this effort initially 
brought smiles on the faces of the people of the Niger Delta, it failed to develop the region. 
 
The collapse of the Niger Delta Development Board did not mark the end of government's 
effort in developing the region. In 1976, the Federal Military Government created eleven 
River Basin Development Authorities along that of the Niger Delta River Basin Development 
Authority (NDRBDA) (Fidelis and Samuel, 2011 p.280). This was followed, in 1980, with 
the establishment of a committee to administer 1.5% special fund meant to develop the Niger
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Delta. The amount was later increased to three percent, and the Oil Minerals Producing Areas 
Development Commission (OMPADEC), set up in 1993, to administer the fund.     This 
notwithstanding, the situation in the Niger Delta appears to have remained the same. As noted 
earlier, the OMPADEC failed in its objectives, as it could not complete many of its numerous 
projects. The Commission was alleged to  be "a jack  of all trades and  master of  none," 
thereby, lacking proper  planning (Iyoha, 2006,  as cited in Oviasuyi and Uwadiae, 2010, 
p.121). However, the host communities contended that the Commission failed as a result of 
lack of proper funding on the part of the Federal Government.  This belief revived the protest 
for resource control (Tuschl and Ejibunu, 2007, p.19). 
 
The failure of OMPADEC paved the way for the creation of the Niger Delta Development 
Commission (NDDC), another developmental commission in the region, during the former 
President  Obasanjo  administration.  The  agency was  said  to  have  been,  formed  to  bring 
development closer to the people. The major responsibilities of the agency are to improve 
education and transportation, as well as to bring industrialization, electricity, housing and 
agriculture to the region (Gilbert, 2010, p.19).     Like the previous development agencies 
created by the successive administrations, the “mandate” of the NDDC has not been achieved 
after over 13 years of its existence (Etekpe, 2011). The host communities as another failed 
government intervention programmes perceive this; and that has aggravated the people’s 
anger (Tuschl and Ejibunu, 2007, p.19).  It is probably for this reason that the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) report, in 2006, emphasized the need to promote peace as 
the “only underpinning guarantee in developing the region” (Gilbert, 2010, p.19). 
 
Oviasuyi and Uwadiae (2010, p.121) observe that the leaders of the region have equally 
frustrated government’s  effort, especially concerning their alleged involvement in corrupt 
practices  and  the  diversion  of  public  funds  for  private  use.  This  has  remained  a  major
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challenge to the region’s development despite the setting up of the Ministry of Niger Delta 
 
Affairs in 2009 by former President Umaru Yar’Adua. 
 
 
 
Like the previous intervention agencies, the MNDA has not embarked on any meaningful 
programmes and projects. For instance, it has not been able to complete the East-West Road 
that cuts across the region. The ministry has suffered from insufficient funding and might 
eventually fail like its predecessors (Aghalino, 2012, p.148). The budget allocation made 
available for the ministry in the 2009 financial year was a clear evidence that the government 
has been “using the Ministry as purveyor of development in politics” rather than in reality 
(Obiyan, 2009;  Aghalino, 2012, p.148). This may have been responsible for the diverse 
feeling of the members of the communities when the ministry was created. Some thought it 
was a new way of developing the region as well as creating job/employment for the youths, 
while others felt it was only a replication of inactive developmental agencies in the Niger 
Delta region. We will discuss the historical antecedents of the agencies in detail below. 
 
2.7.1 NDDB 
 
 
 
As  Dike  (2009,  p.393)  puts  it,  the  Niger  Delta  region  needs  a  special  development 
programme to right the long-standing wrongs done to the communities by the multinational 
oil corporations and the Federal Government. The Sir Henry Willink Commission was set up 
in 1958 (even before Nigeria’s independence in 1960) to study the Niger Delta crisis and 
recommend  solution  to  the  problem.  After the  commission  had  submitted  its  report,  the 
Federal Government established the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB) in 1961 – the 
first development programme for the Niger Delta region (Please, see the 1958 Sir Henry 
Willink Commission report, as cited in Dike, 2009, p.393). But the government of the time 
could not implement the objective of the Board; the purpose of the Board was neglected.
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After NDDB the Niger Delta River Basin Development Authority (NDBDA) was created in 
 
1976, but the region continued to boil, as it remained backward. 
 
 
2.7.2 OMPADEC 
 
 
 
After the failure of the two previous development programmes, the Oil Mineral Producing 
Areas  Development  Commission  (OMPADEC)  was  established  in  1993  by the  General 
Ibrahim Babangida administration. Like the two previous intervention agencies, OMPADEC 
also failed in its objectives because of poor funding by the government and its attempt to do 
too many things at a time. 
 
2.7.3 NDDC 
 
 
 
Although the NDDC Bill was intended to replace the OMPADEC to offer a lasting solution 
to the Niger Delta crisis, it was not until December 21, 2000 that it was officially inaugurated 
(Dike, 2009, p.376). The NDDC Act provided for generous funding from various sources to 
tackle the Niger Delta crisis, but the Federal Government refused or failed to meet its own 
obligations to the Commission. Thus, like the other development programmes before it, the 
NDDC has not made any meaningful contribution to the development of the Niger Delta 
region (Ojameruaye, 2006). According to the UNDP 2006 Niger Delta Human Development 
Report, “The Niger Delta is a region suffering from administrative neglect, crumbling social 
infrastructure and services, high unemployment, social deprivation, abject poverty, filth and 
squalor, and endemic conflicts” (Dike, 2009, p.377).  Unfortunately, because of corruption, 
as well as poor leadership and governance, the region remains the same until today. 
 
2.7.4 Niger Delta Ministry 
 
 
 
Many people thought that the end of the Obasanjo era would bring some positive changes in 
the Niger Delta region. Still searching for a practical solution to the socio-economic problems
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of environmental degradation caused by oil spillage and gas flaring in the Niger Delta region, 
the Umaru Musa Yar' Adua's administration established the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs 
(MNDA) in 2009 (Vanguard, October 17, 2008; Vanguard, September 13, 2008; Dike, 2009, 
p.396;  Obuoforibo,  2011).  But  like  in  the  other  agencies,  nothing  changed  because  the 
MNDA and the Yar’Adua administration were equally confused and thus dysfunctional. The 
Ministry has not embarked on any meaningful projects, including rehabilitating the East-West 
Road that cuts across the region. The Ministry has been hamstrung by lack of funding, and, 
thus, could collapse like its predecessors (Aghalino, 2012, p.148). 
 
2.7.5 The Amnesty Programme 
 
 
 
The conflict in the Niger Delta deepened as a result of the activities of the militant groups on 
oil installations and expatriates. This affected the nation’s economy and generated serious 
security challenges in the region. The Federal Government, on June 25, 2009: kick-started the 
peace process through the granting of amnesty to the militants (“Will Amnesty Bring Peace,” 
2009).This  was  followed  by Disarmament,  Demobilization  and  Reintegration  (DDR).  In 
return,  the  repentant  militants  were  assured  of  empowerment  programmes  that  would 
guarantee them sustainable livelihood for human resource development. The amnesty was 
aimed at facilitating post-peace building through all the programmes that make up the DDR 
for stability of the Niger Delta. The Federal Government had a targeted population of 20,192 
ex-militants (Anugwom, 2015).  By May 2011, a total population of 16,336 ex-militants had 
graduated from the demobilization course at the Amnesty Training Camp in Obubra, Cross 
River State. 
 
Zimbio (2010) claims that, of the 16,336 ex-militants that had graduated from the 
demobilization programme, 2,618 were slated for training outside Nigeria, 4,759 were placed 
in 59 skills acquisition centres in 13 states of the country, while the remaining 8,959 are still
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awaiting further directives. Over 600 ex-militants were undergoing degree and vocational 
training courses in Ghana, Malaysia, Russia, South Africa and United States. 
According to Okoko (2009), the Amnesty Programme lacked transparency in its introduction 
and implementation. Equally, Zimbio (2010) avers that the so-called amnesty would fail if 
the task of prioritizing development needs of the region is relegated to the background even if 
some youths or individuals are offered monetary gains. 
 
Similarly, Akinwale (2010) contends that one of the problems with the amnesty option is the 
poor human development by the government, which needs adequate consideration, to prevent 
crisis escalation (Okinono and Badariah, 2015). Richard Moncrieff, West Africa Project 
Director for the International Crisis Group, in his reaction, asserted that it was a timely idea 
and initiative for the government to consider adopting amnesty but it required a change of 
strategy in terms of collaborative participation of the stakeholder (The Guardian  6/8/2009). 
This means that youth empowerment is a task that must not be downplayed. 
 
2.8 Gap in the Literature 
 
 
 
The conflict in the oil-bearing communities of the Niger Delta has attracted both local and 
international scholars. Several researches have been carried out on the issue of conflict in the 
region, with major focus on the activities of the multinationals in the Niger Delta. Most of the 
works, which were reviewed, dwelt extensively on oil politics, degradation and 
disempowerment of the people of the Niger Delta (Watts, 2004; Ibaba, 2004; Etekpe, 2007; 
Aaron  &  Patrick,  2008;  Edeogu,  2008;  Slack,  2012).  However,  these  studies  did  not 
adequately address the problem associated with the new community-based development 
strategies  aimed  at ensuring a viable link  with  host  communities. These studies  did  not 
sufficiently capture the interplay between CSR practices of the MNOCs and conflict 
management in the oil-bearing communities of the Niger Delta.
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In other words, there is a plethora of academic research and technical reports on the 
investments of the MNOCs in the realm of CSR in the Niger Delta as reviewed; however, 
there are scanty studies on the use of concrete CSR in managing the conflicts. The available 
literature appears to focus on CSR as a problem in the region, thereby lacking pragmatic 
suggestions to policy-makers on how the implementation of environmental-friendly strategies 
can be used to manage the conflict (Amadi and Roger, 2015). 
 
The investments in CSR by the MNOCs, particularly Shell, Chevron and Agip, are currently 
on the increase but the more the investment in CSR, the more the communities' resistance is. 
For instance, in the early months of 2015, Shell started a 1-billion naira health project in the 
deserted Oloibiri (Nwankwo, 2015). Oloibiri is the community where oil was first discovered 
in commercial quantity in Nigeria. The oil was discovered and mined by Shell but the oil 
revenue did not benefit members of the community. Shell abandoned the community when 
the oil wells dried up. It is believed that the attitude of Shell in Oloibiri was the foundation of 
its problem in Ogoni land, which did not want to share the same experience with the Oloibiri; 
hence, the Ogoni cries over Shell's poor CSR strategies. 
 
Shell has returned to Oloibiri but its return to Oloibiri in a bid to carry out CSR projects is 
perceived  by the  community as  crisis  management  (repairing  relationship)  rather  than  a 
concrete CSR. It is crisis management in that both the community and the environmental 
activists in the region have been protesting for decades over Shells neglect of the community. 
Consequently, the communities have lost trust in the oil companies’ CSR strategies; they 
believe that the oil companies cannot be relied on for the development of the Niger Delta’s 
complex terrain. Aaron (2008) contends that, notwithstanding the huge amount alleged to 
have been invested by oil companies in their host communities, the standard of living, extent 
of underdevelopment within the communities and the upsurge of conflicts suggest that the
96  
MNOCs CSR strategies are an apparent failure. The summary of Aaron’s report is that it 
would result to a wishful thinking to expect MNOCs to significantly develop the Niger Delta 
region, given that they are profit-oriented organizations, whose major objective is to make 
more profit. 
 
One wonders if the oil companies in reality invest the amount they proclaim to have sunk into 
community development projects in their host communities. If their claim is true, then it is 
more worrisome and an issue of serious concern as the communities have stayed the same 
after various developmental investments. One would want to ask: Was the amount entrusted 
with wrong persons or given out at all? Was the amount too small in comparison with the 
apparent developmental plans? The disbursement of millions of dollars in the region and the 
communities still complaining suggests that the money was spent on crisis management or 
the MNOCs need a change of CSR strategy. The available literature has not been able to 
distinguish between CSR and crisis management.   On the other hand, the MNOCs are 
international organisations with an understanding of CSR, as stated on their profile and the 
signed memorandum of understanding. 
 
This study, therefore, became imperative owing to the gap existing in the reviewed literature 
that has examined the issue of conflict in oil-producing areas. The study focused on the gap 
between the host communities and the MNOCs. Furthermore, the study explored the CSR 
strategies employed by the multinational oil companies in managing the conflicts and the 
differences between MNOCs and their host communities' perception of the conflicts. The 
study further explored what the host communities think would have been done differently. 
The  existing  divergent  perceptions  on  the  CSR  strategies  of  the  MNOCs,  their  alleged 
failures, the drive of their efforts in CSR or the possible lack of communities' involvement 
from   planning   to   the   execution   of   CSR   projects   made   this   study   imperative.
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The study seeks to provide a holistic perspective of the conflict in the Niger Delta so as to 
create synergy between the conflict major actors (the communities, MNOCs and the 
government). Not much research has focused on the MNOCs organisational culture as a 
contributor to the conflict. A study of this nature cannot overlook the obstacles within the 
corporation's frontiers on the potentiality of successful CSR. According to Frynas, (2005, p. 
592), MNOCs, particularly Shell's projects, are often planned and managed by office 
managers, engineers and other professionals with very little or no experience in the local 
culture, developmental strategies and community concerns. 
 
The corporate culture within MNOCs particularly focuses around the technical skill of 
resolving a particular hindrance that is usually quantifiable (Frynas, 2005, p. 592). This may 
have accounted for the increased dissatisfaction with MNOCs’ community involvement and 
the lack of ownership of their projects by the host communities as well as the projects’ lack 
of sustainability. Thus, some communities see these projects as a model of “buying support” 
and short-term “gifts” to communities as opposed to being long-term projects (Frynas, 2005, 
p. 589). Obviously, oil companies’ community relations strategies employed in the Niger 
Delta have recorded a failure. The proactive public relations strategy is said to be most 
strategic. This model of public relations is preventive and involves taking action ahead of 
time (Igben, 2008). The strategy may have failed owing to its application procedure, since the 
oil companies are more involved in managing crisis than preventing it. It is in the light of 
these that this study is justifiable, as it filled these existing gaps in previous studies, focusing 
on  determining  the  CSR  strategies  employed  in  executing  the  community  relations 
procedures in the Niger Delta and why the more the oil companies’ involvement in CSR, the 
more the conflicts
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2.9 Conclusion 
 
The chapter examined the Nigerian political system and its implication in this study. It started 
by analysing the Nigerian vegetation and characteristics (local content), which is believed to 
have contributed to both the CSR strategies of the MNOCs and the Nigerian Government’s 
ineffective implementation of environmental friendly policies. The chapter established that, 
MNOCs alleged negligence in the realm of CSR is traceable to its union (60/40 partnership) 
with the Nigerian government (Annan, 2014). In determining the causes of the Niger Delta 
conflict, the chapter found that environmental degradation, Nigerian Government legislations, 
corruption and poor leadership and governance among others are major factors accountable 
for the ongoing conflict. Consequent upon the problems of environmental degradation and 
pollution, Adeola (2001), report has demonstrated that, the ecological  devastation in  the 
Niger Delta has relieved the fishermen and farmers of their occupation. Paradoxically, the 
presence of the MNOCs in the Niger Delta has caused the regions farmers their means of 
livelihood. Thereby: increasing both poverty and unemployment in the Niger Delta. By way 
of quelling the conflicts, the Nigerian Government has established a number of commissions 
charged with the responsibility of, the region’s development, which would in turn eradicate 
poverty. Nonetheless, these commissions are purported unsuccessful either because of lack of 
funding or because of corruption. The next chapter will explicate the study theoretical 
framework  and  conceptualise the  concept  of  conflict  and  corporate  social  responsibility.
99  
CHAPTER  THREE 
 
 
THEORITICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: A REVIEW  OF 
LITERATURE 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
 
 
Any attempt to undertake an analytic study of this nature and ensure an acceptable empirical 
result   will   involve   the   explication   of   various   scholars’   views   on   corporate   social 
responsibility (CSR) and conflict management by MNOCs. The review of literature will be 
conducted on two major themes, namely: the theoretical framework and conceptual 
clarification. The chapter begins with exploring the theoretical framework of the study. 
 
3.2 Theoretical framework 
 
 
 
According to Anugwom (2009, p. 37), a theory is a valid statement presented to offer a 
comprehensive explanation of some observable uniformity and consistency in the social and 
the  natural  world.  This  implies  that  theories  are empirical statements  with  a connection 
between phenomena and variables and are premised on cause and effect. Similarly, Kerlinger 
(1973) defines theories as “a set of interrelated constructs, definitions and propositions that 
present a systematic view of phenomena by specifying relations among variables with the 
purpose of examining and predicting the phenomenon” (1973, p. 8). Naturally, theories share 
a relationship with research for they help in specifying relationships between the variables 
being studied. For this reason, theories are perceived as a tool for research, particularly for 
social scientists. Relevant theories enable scholars to hypothesize what will happen, even 
before they do happen. Put differently, theories are significant in providing focus for social 
research as well as in managing reality. Therefore, in order to provide a focus for this study, 
conflict theory, frustration and aggression theory, and stakeholders’ theory will be discussed.
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3.2.1 Social Conflict Theory 
 
 
 
Karl Marx (1818-1883) is regarded as the father of modern social conflict theory. Marx was a 
revolutionary thinker who believed in the irrepressible unanimous power of the masses in 
redressing their social conditions of existence. According to Ollman (1976), Marx maintained 
that social classes identify a particular way of relating among themselves.  Marx argued that 
social classes arise from the relations of production, in which case, "people come to reify 
classes and as a result these classes come to have a life of their own that constrains the actor" 
(Ritzer,  1996,  p.  67).  Marx  tended  not  to  have  explicitly  seen  classes  from  a  reified 
perspective but as a dynamic entity, oriented toward revolution. It is difficult from Marx’s 
ambiguous pattern of writing to understand his usage of classes in the analysis, whether they 
were used as a framework or as a theory. In this respect, Anugwom (2009, p. 36) averred that 
Marx's concept of social conflict centres on the manifestation of social classes in his capitalist 
regime.  On  the  other  hand,  Marx's  social  relations  of  production  bred  two  distinctive 
capitalist classes: ‘the haves and the have nots,’ that is the bourgeoisie referred to as those 
with access to the means of production (for example, capital), and the proletariat, those that 
have nothing but access to labour. Similar to this notion is the argument of Okeibunor and 
Anugwom (2003, p.67), who state that: 
 
 
 
[It]  is  the  relations  of  production  that  produce  the  classes; 
hence the relations are defined by subjection and domination or 
exploitation. Marx clearly emphasised that these relations are 
independent of those who enter them because, following 
industrialisation, people could only provide their daily needs in 
cooperation with others.
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From the foregoing, it is apparent that the advent of capitalism demarcated not just the era of 
post  industrial  revolution,  but  also  placed  more  emphasis  on  the  Marxian  notion  of 
dominance. This is a period when power was bestowed not on the impeccability of character 
but on money. This brought to the limelight the class division of the society into the “haves” 
and the “have nots”. The capitalist, with grave implications, therefore, sowed the seed of 
division in society and the exploitation of the have-nots. In his discussion of the possibility of 
the capitalist destruction of the capitalist class, Anugwom (2009, p. 42) observes that the 
proletariat (the have-nots) will, at some point, muster the required courage and consciousness 
to violently challenge the status quo of the bourgeoisie in the form of revolution. Such a 
revolution could culminate in the emergence of socialism and eventually communism, which 
typifies an extreme counter-narration of the capitalist system. In essence, the Marxian conflict 
theory   argues   that   such   a   revolution   is   inevitable   and   consequential   for   societal 
transformation. Ironically, that transformation is needed to bring about the change necessary 
to move the society forward. This view resonates with Ottite's (2007, p. 1) argument that 
conflict is not always negative oriented but can be used to induce the positive transformation 
of a society. 
 
According to Wallace and Wolf (2006), conflict theory was advanced as a major substitute to 
the functionalist method of analysing a society’s general structure. Similarly, Ritzer (2003) 
contends that, apart from the theory’s initiation in response to structural functionalism, it also 
has other backgrounds that include mainstream Marxist theory. Georg Simmel’s (1903) views 
on social conflict, which identifies the ‘sociological significance’ of conflicts, stipulates that 
despite the dangers of conflict, it offers an opportunity for socialization in communities and 
can serve a positive purpose when negative actions involved are eradicated or transformed. 
In other words, it will be appropriate to argue that conflict theory offers an alternative to the 
functionalist  approach  of  the  early  1950s  and  60s.  However, it w a s d i s p l a c e d by  the
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multiplicity of neo-Marxian theories at the end of the 1960s (Ritzer and Goodman, 2004), as 
systems in which equilibrium is generated by way of the mutual interdependence of all the 
parts of society. 
 
The  proponents  of  the  functionalist  framework  acknowledge  the  existence  of  conflict 
although they accept that society also evolves the means by which it can be controlled. By 
implication to this study, it means that CSR-related conflicts are a part of human existence 
and that they can be resolved if every stakeholder carries out his/her obligations at the right 
time, while carrying everybody along with them. It is towards this premise that Wallace and 
Wolf (2006) argue that, for conflict to be controlled; one group must be able to provisionally 
subjugate its rivals. The apparent difference between the functionalist approach and conflict 
theory is that conflict theory focuses on the struggle for the balance of power between the 
capitalist and the proletariat, whereas the functionalist approach focuses on the establishment 
of equilibrium through mutual coexistence. 
 
George Lukacs (1968, p. 46) explains Marx’s conflict theory through the following 
propositions: 
• Humans are naturally or fundamentally self-oriented and therefore inclined to 
pursue personal interests and are divergent at the expense of others; 
 
• Humans and societies exist in a state of perpetual scarcity for most resources 
needed for the survival of themselves and that of their members; 
 
• Humans are continually involved in an inherent confrontation within society 
as a germane condition for social change; 
 
• Everyday life produces conflict as people with divergent interest relate with 
one another in pursuance of the capitalist resources and life opportunities;
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•          Conflict settles itself as people fight and negotiate for peaceful coexistence; 
 
 
• Conflict experience helps in moulding individuals to maturity, helps groups 
move forward and creates an avenue for societal growth; 
 
• Everyday life enriches conflict theory and deepens its analysis of groupings, 
social hierarchies and societal structuring; 
 
• Societies consist of intrinsic unequal characteristics; the consequence of these 
inequalities is the involuntary social organization of society into classes: the 
haves and the have-nots, the desirous and the satisfied, minorities and 
majorities, the rich and the poor, and males and females. 
 
 
 
The propositions of conflict theory suggest that a social structure is susceptible to constant 
erosion and change. What this means is that social change is pervasive as a result of the 
fundamental nature of conflicts built into society itself. As a result, conflict is inevitable 
between individuals and groups. Similarly, the inherent nature of conflict makes it possible 
that people must, at some point, disagree with one another. The differential distribution of 
social power appears to be a contributing factor to the inevitability of conflicts in societies, as 
people, especially the rich and the poor, struggle to acquire a larger share of the scarce 
resources selfishly. 
 
The connection between the Marxist's views of inevitability of social conflict in this research 
cannot be undermined. The Marxist perspective of conflict has been particularly applied to 
multinational organizations, which is the focus of this research. The Gramscian Marxist and 
the traditional Marxist have two distinct notions of hegemony. While Gramscian Marxists 
assert that hegemony is in relation to consent to political and socio-political leadership, the 
traditional Marxists relate hegemony with economic dominance (Simon, 1982). According to
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Pease (2003, p. 79), the answer is by way of aligning the values of the haves (bourgeoisie) 
with that of the proletariat (the have nots) class without subduing any of the classes. This 
necessarily encompasses  the  development  of  a rational  set  of  values  and  principles  that 
transcends both classes. 
 
From the foregoing, one can infer that, on the one hand, Marx’s social conflict theory is 
pivotal to this study given that MNOCs are agents of exploitation, domination and 
underdevelopment, especially in the area of sustainable development goals that affect the 
people.  The latter is based on of Peace’s (2003, p. 80) argument that MNOCs hunt for states 
with lax economic, political and environmental legislations and cheap labour under the guise 
of drives for market efficiency because laws are mainly not effectively implemented. This is 
why some of them locate in areas where labour is not organized into trade unions. Obviously 
the MNOCs in the Niger Delta are taking advantage of the irregularities of the Nigerian 
state’s implementation of its environmental legislations to increase their profit. On the other 
hand, it can be argued that, with regards to natural resource industry, MNOCs locate their businesses 
where the resource exists. 
 
The social conflict theory has facilitated the identification of sources  of conflict and its 
ineluctability in society as a result of man’s inherent inequality, thereby leading to class 
struggles. Indeed, it is applicable to the Niger Delta region. However, the theory does not 
provide for the dimensions of conflicts, specifically between communities and oil companies, 
and how local people could present their grievances when frustrated. Logically, after a long 
period of frustration, it is in human nature to become aggressive, but conflict theory fails to 
address this essential teleological part of conflict hence the inclusion of the frustration and 
aggression theory.
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3.2.2 Frustration and Aggression Theory 
 
 
 
The Frustration and aggression theory, as propounded by Dollard and his colleagues in a 
published monograph, explains the causes of conflict and why people exhibit aggressive 
behaviour (Green 1972; Zillimann, 1979, p. 1-37). The issue of aggression has attracted the 
attention  of  scholars  in  recent  times,  especially  on  the  role  it  plays  in  generating  and 
escalating conflicts. The theory posits that aggression is generally traceable to frustration 
usually caused by people’s actions tend to be hinged on accumulated anger targeted at an 
individual or groups with the aim of inflicting pains on them (Dill and Anderson, 1995, p. 
360).  The  model  outlined  by  Berkowitz  (1989)  highlights  the  danger  associated  with 
justifying aggressive behaviour. This is comparable to the situation in the Niger Delta, where 
most people have justified youth restiveness with economic and environmental injustice to 
the extent that more social movements were formed with increased agitation.   The revised 
frustration aggression (F-A) hypothesis maintains that: 
(a)       Frustration instigates behaviour that may or may not be hostile or aggressive. 
 
 
(b)       Any  hostile  or  aggressive  behaviour  that  occurs  is  caused  by  frustration 
 
(Miller, 1941; Dill and Anderson, 1995, p. 63). 
 
 
In other words, aggressive behaviour is occasioned by frustration (Zillmann, 1979, p. 4) In 
spite of the seeming relevance of the frustration and aggression theory to the conflict in the 
Niger Delta, the hypothesis could not identify the rationale that informed the surplus 
accumulation of the multinationals to the perceived detriment of the host communities. 
Although it is not out of place that the skewed imbalance against the local community people 
could result in frustration and aggression, the theory could not explain the interplay between 
the activities of multinationals and the oil-bearing communities.   The theory only identifies 
what could lead people to conflict, which is frustration, but this is not adequate in dealing
106  
with the issue of conflict, especially in oil-bearing communities.   Hence, the theory is not 
completely appropriate in explaining the conflictual social relations of production among the 
state, multinationals and the local communities. Therefore, the concept of the stakeholder’s 
theory will be discussed next, as it is considered best suitable for this research since it covers 
the lapses of the conflict theory and the frustration and aggression theory. 
 
3.2.3 Stakeholders  Theory 
 
 
 
In Freeman’s view (1984, p.46), a stakeholder is “any group or individual who can affect or 
is  affected  by the  achievement  of  an  organization's  objectives”.  Freeman  (2004,  p.  42) 
expanded on this definition of stakeholders by positing that stakeholders involve: “those 
groups who are vital to the survival and success of the corporation…or individuals who can 
be  affected  or  is  affected  by  corporation's  existence”.  Regarding  the  implication  of 
stakeholders on the survival of business corporations in a community, Hatch (2013, p. 82) 
rightly argues that: “organizations that attend to the demands of all stakeholders will 
outperform organizations that ignore some of their stakeholders while privileging others”. 
The high level of responsibility of a business organization in their environmental activities is 
necessary to a better understanding and to more effective management in turbulent times. 
This is a prototype of the dynamic characteristic of a corporation's environment in recent 
times (Freeman, 1984, p. 1). Hence, the stakeholder's theory has made provision for various 
ways of addressing the diverse demands of different individuals and groups that possess a 
legitimate stake in an organization. One of which is the concrete implementation of CSR. 
 
 
 
The economic theory generally proposes two schools of thought regarding CSR. These are 
the shareholder's model and the stakeholder's model (Wisdom, 2012, p. 60). According to 
Wisdom, with the shareholders model, the only responsibility an organization has is profit
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maximization for its owners, whereas the stakeholder’s model focuses on the ability of a 
business to satisfy its stakeholders. In other words, organizations are expected to be corporate 
citizens (p. 63).  In their purest forms, the two schools appear irreconcilable. 
 
Capitalism, the foundation of the modern firm, implies that companies are set up with the 
 
'sole' responsibility of making profits and maximizing those profits for their owners, the 
shareholders. This extreme view makes it clear that companies must be accountable to their 
owners. Anything that reduces opportunities to maximize profits can be considered as poor 
stewardship on the part of company management. Cynical views of this extreme school note 
that companies engaging in CSR programmes do so that they may appear good in the eyes of 
communities (thereby enhancing their corporate images) with the ultimate aim of enhancing 
sales through appearing to care for communities. 
 
Related to this view is the thinking that governments collect taxes from both individuals and 
companies and hence are better placed to cater for community needs, such as schools, roads, 
electricity, hospitals and medicines. Accordingly, it is the duty of governments to provide 
these amenities; any CSR expenditure by firms is a form of 'double taxation'. Companies 
should, therefore, obey the laws and pay taxes (and that should be all), while governments 
must  use  these  taxes  from  company  profits  to  improve  the  lives  of  communities  and 
taxpayers. 
 
The stakeholder’s theory of CSR is a concept employed in determining whom the 
organizations should be responsible to. A firm constitutes a sequence of links of stakeholders. 
Moir (2001, p. 8) has categorized stakeholders into primary and secondary stakeholders. The 
primary stakeholder refers to employees, customers and supplier, as well as investors, who 
are  the  main  initiators  and  have  the  capacity  to  sustain  corporate  goals.  The  public 
stakeholders   are   the   governments   and   communities   that   provide   infrastructures   and
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legislations,  which  the  business  organizations  adhere  to.  This  sometimes  involves  the 
payment of taxes (Clarkson, 1995, p. 106). The secondary category is made up of those who 
are affected by business activities within the environment. This group does not form part of 
the day-to-day running of the business (Moir, 2001, p. 9). 
 
According to Treviño and Weaver (1999), cited in Moir (2001, p. 9), the debate about the 
stakeholder’s theory centres on whether it is a coherent set of theories or solitary set of 
theories. Hence, theories have to be coherent if they are to be accepted. Whilst solitary 
theories are perceived to be a self-set of theories and might not be a body of knowledge, 
coherent theories are consistent and are acceptable theories of truth. It is obvious that the 
stakeholder's theory is a coherent and acceptable theory. This is because, currently, there are 
various laws governing the existence of businesses in society and some corporations have 
received hostile behaviours and even been forced out of their operational locations by their 
primary stakeholders (Ako, Obokoh and Okonmah, 2009). 
 
Furthermore, researchers have found that the stakeholder’s theory is normative and is based 
on ethical and not empirical proposals but has, however, remained an area of debate in most 
of  the  CSR  literature (Moir,  2001,  p.  10).  Proponents  of the  concept  of CSR  persuade 
businesses to be sensitive to the host communities' environmental needs. However, it appears 
difficult to satisfy all stakeholders. The stakeholders’ analysis appears not to provide for the 
set  of  stakeholders  to  pay  most  attention  to  whether  it  is  the  primary  or  secondary 
stakeholders as they have been categorized, even though studies have shown that the 
satisfaction of both classes is crucial. 
The stakeholder’s view of CSR recognizes that companies do not operate in isolation. They 
operate in societies as corporate citizens, and must, therefore, be sensitive to the needs and 
wants of communities in which they operate. Freeman (2004, p. 10) established a positive
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link between what is considered good corporate citizenship and profitability. Therefore, CSR 
in this sense is considered a good investment, as it promotes goodwill towards companies, 
their   products   and   operations;   while   the   stakeholders   enjoy   satisfaction   from   the 
organization’s activities within their environment. 
 
An extensive study of the positive view of researchers on the subject of corporate CSR makes 
it a necessity for oil companies that operate in various oil-producing communities to be good 
corporate citizens. In the Niger Delta, for example, CSR is a strategy that enables the oil 
companies to co-habit peacefully with the host communities; hence, irresponsible behaviour 
within  the  environment  by the  business  organizations  might  be  detrimental  to  their  co- 
existence with host communities. In addition, CSR is a model that prompts business 
organizations to seek the interest of its physical environment. 
 
There are various oil companies currently operating in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria – 
Royal Dutch Shell, Chevron and Agip, among others. The public relations departments of 
these multinational oil companies' claim to have done well in being socially responsible 
however, host communities do not trust their corporate citizenship and this might be the 
reason for the continuous conflict in the region (Alabi and Ntukekpo, 2012, p. 366).   The 
understanding is that the companies are rather more involved in crisis management than CSR, 
which shows that there might be a gap in the companies’ understanding of the concept of 
CSR. This is an expectation gap that could be considered as another cause of the conflict in 
the Niger Delta. The companies wait for CSR issues to arise. Thereafter, they manage the 
situation. Conversely, in the concept of CSR, this should be in the companies’ operational 
ethics as part  of on-going projects.  Furthermore, most  of the companies appear to have 
documented their ethics to include CSR but, in reality, they do not practise it. Shell, for 
example,  has  documented  oil  mining  best  practices,  such  as  protecting  the  life  and
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environment where they carry out their operations. However, the current UNEP (2011, p. 10) 
report on Ogoniland asserts that Shell's oil-mining activities in Ogoniland have resulted in the 
severe contamination of the land and implicated in deaths of the members of the host 
communities.  The report adds that Shell has not been able to maintain its internal oil-mining 
standards in Ogoniland and recommends a prompt cleaning action, which the company is yet 
to carry out. 
 
On the contrary, Tuodulo (2009, p. 535) has argued that the oil companies, particularly Shell, 
have largely contributed to the development of the Nigerian economy and that of the local 
Niger Delta host communities. This is evident in Shell’s participation in community 
development activities, such as educational programmes. Shell has awarded a good number 
of the Niger Delta residents, scholarships from primary level to university level. Others have 
benefited from Shell’s skills development programmes, like craftsmanship, mechanics and 
tailoring. Shell has also been applauded for its provision of basic amenities within the local 
communities, such as the construction of water pipelines and good roads, the presentation of 
farming equipment to farmers and training them in its usage, and the provision of electricity 
within oil-producing communities (Tuodulo, 2009, p. 535). 
 
The stakeholder’s theory has been applied to a number of studies. Prominent among them 
includes Ullmans’ (1985) research that focused on CSR. By implication, CSR is one area of 
study in which the stakeholder’s theory is highly applicable (Roberts, 1992; Clarkson, 1995; 
Davenport, 2000). Given that CSR is the social attribute of the corporate entities, the major 
technique business institutions are expected to communicate  with the people in areas of 
operation is to establish a rapport through the demonstration of concerns about the 
environmental and social needs of the people (Idowu, 2014, p.21; Ansah, 2015).  It is capable 
of solving and reducing significant social nuisance, particularly those they have directly or
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indirectly   created.   Following   the   argument   of   Elijido-Ten   (2007),   CSR   generally 
encompasses, although it is not limited to, such variables as the businesses' "community 
involvement, acknowledgement of concern for employees, energy conservation, making 
products safer, pollution abatement and other environmentally related issues". 
 
Furthermore, in a bid to apply the stakeholders theory, Ullmann identifies economic 
performance, the power of stakeholders influence and strategic posture are part of the main 
framework for discussing corporate practices (Ullmann, 1985). This is especially the case 
within their operational environments. Elijido-Ten (2007) applied Ullmann's framework to 
the 2002 ranking of 100 top companies’ environmental performance by the Australian 
Conservation Foundation. The study notes that there is a positive relationship between CSR 
and a firm’s financial performance. This accounted for the reason why most countries 
participated  in  the  Earth  Summit  hosted by Rio  de Janeiro  (1992),  which  succeeded  in 
enlightening global citizens on the relevance of sustainable development goals. Additionally, 
it also involved environmental issues as well as identified areas in which governments can 
intercede between businesses and their host ecosystem (Deegan and Gordon, 1996). 
Apparently, the prelude to that summit was based on policies such as the Environmental 
Offences and Penalties Act 1989, in Australia as well as the Clean Air Act of 1977, in the 
United States. The considerations for enacting these regulations must have been focused on 
the heightened environmental problems in the last couple of decades. 
 
 
 
Following the success of the stakeholders theory and its application in studies such as the one 
analysed above, the stakeholders’ theory is most suitable for this study, hence its adoption. 
The decision to adopt the stakeholders’ theory was based on its administrative nature. The 
theory triggers MNOCs to action by making them aware of a number of members of 
stakeholders that they ought to be responsible to. In the context of this study, the theory
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enables MNOCs operating in the Niger Delta to become conscious of the evidence that there 
are numerous groups and persons that are directly or indirectly affected by their activities. 
Prominent among the people affected by the negative activities of the MNOCs are the Niger 
Delta host communities. The obvious reason being the physical closeness of the local people 
to the location of the oil companies, apparently they share an environmental space. According 
to Obi (2001), Watts (2004), Ojakarotu (2009), Obiyan (2009) Aghalino (2012 p.148), there 
is yet to exist a cordial relationship between the host communities and the oil companies in 
the region. However, this study attempted to discover to what extent the MNOCs have been 
corporately irresponsible as against the communities’ perceptions of CSR, using the 
stakeholder theory. 
 
3.3 Conceptual Clarification 
 
 
 
3.3.1 Corporate Social Responsibility  (CSR) 
 
 
The business of social responsibility has gained attention in recent years, especially since the 
 
1990s thereby demonstrating a nexus between businesses and society (Idemudia, 2007, p. 5). 
At the heart of every CSR programme is the need to satisfy the aspirations of the people in 
the community where the business is located (Ansah, 2015, p.4). Obi (2015a) asserts that 
CSR is effective when corporate behaviour is aligned to the needs and expectations of not 
only the organizations, but also the communities where the company is situated. By 
implication, the social and environmental welfare of the people must be considered as a 
responsibility of the company, even while making a profit (Obi, 2015b). The foregoing means 
that the companies are obliged to plan towards enhancing the human and environmental 
conditions of the communities where they carry out their businesses as friends of the people 
and not their foes.     Such obligations are identified by Jones et al. (1998) as protection, 
improvement and consideration of the welfare of all the stakeholders in the communities.
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There are different views on CSR. One of which is the classical perspective, which focuses 
on the economic benefits of business. Another one is the stakeholder view, which, in line 
with the stakeholder theory, states that corporations must live up to the expectations of being 
socially responsible to the people and the entire environment (Clarke, 1998; Lantos, 2001). In 
line with the “constrained profit- making view,” Manuel Castelo Branco, Lucia Lima 
Rodrigues (2007) averred that the profit making goal of companies overshadows some of 
their basic obligations owing to the fact that the ethics of business does not receive the 
desired attention, as earlier noted by Carr (1968). Also, Friedman (1998) maintains that the 
high level of honesty in their dealings with the people would enhance corporate image while 
generating and maximizing profit. 
 
 
 
 
3.3.2 Spectrum  of Viewpoints on the Role of Business in Society 
 
 
View The position of a Business’ Role in Society 
Classical The pure profit-making view; business has 
lower standards of ethics than society and no 
social responsibility other than obedience to 
the law. 
The constrained profit-making view: business 
should  maximize  shareholder  wealth,  obey 
the law, and be ethica1 
Stakeholder view Business  should  be  sensitive  to  potential 
harms of its actions on various stakeholder 
groups. 
Social activism: business must use its  vast 
resources for social good. 
Source: Lantos (2001), cited in Manuel Castelo Branco et al., 2007 
 
 
The stakeholder view emphasizes that corporations must prioritize the needs of people while 
implementing their corporate goals. It holds that “the goal of any company is or should be the
114  
flourishing of the company and all its principal stakeholders” (Werhane and Freeman, 1999, 
cited in Manuel Castelo Branco et al., 2007, p. 1). Stakeholders include creditors, employees, 
customers, suppliers, and the communities at large. 
 
3.3.3 The Evolution of Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
 
 
Although the concept of CSR which refers to ‘the practice of a company taking responsibility 
for its corporate actions and any detrimental effects they may have’ (Thenasseril, June 6, 
2014, p.1), has its origin from the 1930s, the modern perception of its meaning is taken from 
the 1950s (Carroll, 1999). As noted, from its foundation, the CSR emphasis on the role of 
businesses in a society (Sokolsky, 1937). Notwithstanding the early attempts to identify the 
definite role of businesses, Berete (2011) has argued that academic literatures lack a universal 
definition of the concept. 
 
However,  CSR  has  been  linked  to  the  decisions  and  actions  of  corporations  that  are 
interwoven  with  the  goals  and  values  of  a  society in  which  it  operates  (Okoye,  2009). 
Lindgreen  and  Swaen  (2004)  seem  to  perceive  CRS  as  an  unconditional  necessity that 
organizations efficiently mainstream their societal responsibilities or roles with a focus on 
global ‘ethical and legal practices’ to the benefit of host communities/environment as their 
venture grows. CSR aims to enhance positive community relations and prevent community 
resistance,  secure  public acceptance  and  establish  closer identity with  host  communities 
(Ogelenya and Ogelenya, 2009, p. 30).  Positive social and community relations are crucial 
for organizations, because no company can comfortably operate in an environment of chaos. 
Thus, CSR  is a form of community relations’  strategy that is  used to address issues of 
corporate  citizenship  as  well  as  to  identify  with  communities  in  which  an  organisation 
performs its business and makes huge profits (Ogelenya and Ogelenya, 2009). In essence, 
CSR offers an opportunity for image making or re-branding, through well-coordinated CSR
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projects. With this, companies earn trust, friendship and positive response to their activities 
from the host communities. 
 
Frynas (2005) is of the view that a corporations’ CSR involves the protection of stakeholders’ 
interests, setting the rules of engagement that would curtail any form of abuse or economic 
injustice. Good examples of participation of Multi-national Oil Corporations (MNOCs) in 
community development  programs  that  have  global  impact  include the “United  Nations’ 
Global Compact, the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), the Sullivan Principle, the Voluntary 
Principles on Security and Human Rights, the  Millennium Development Goals, the Dow 
Jones Sustainability Index, and the World Summits on Sustainable Development in Rio de 
Janeiro and Johannesburg” (Tudulo, 2009, p. 531). Put differently, they exemplify businesses 
that operate to meet set global standards. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the concept of CSR has been viewed differently from various 
organisations and cultures. For instance, Lord Holme and Richard Watts have defined CSR 
as: 
[T]he systematic obligation by business to perform ethically and add 
to economic and social development while recuperating the quality 
of life of the workforce and their families as well as of the local 
community and society at large”(Baker, 2004, p. 1). 
 
 
 
Social responsibility is, therefore, “a situation where firms, corporations and government 
establishments are committed to socially desirable interests, projects and the welfare of those 
within the areas they operate. It is perceived as a ‘self-imposed’ obligation in recognition of 
numerous services rendered to it, by such groups, as local communities, employers, 
governments,   creditors,   management,   churches   and   others”   (Akuma,   2013,   p.309).
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In addition, the issue of corporate reputation is valuable not only to companies but is also 
taken seriously by stakeholders who take note of CSR practices, design, implementation and 
beneficiaries (Daferighe and Adedeji, 2010, p.4). While Fombrum (1996) has posited that: 
“the crucial principles which add value to the reputation of companies are credibility, 
responsibility to stakeholders, and reliability,” among others. Kapferer (1997) has maintained 
that  a  company’s  behaviour  that  is  observed  by  the  public  could  ‘make  or  break’  its 
reputation (Daferighe and Adedeji, 2010, p.5). This is a pointer that a company’s corporate 
reputation  is  as  critical  as  its  corporate  goals  and  profit  maximisation. 3      The  social 
responsibility of business refers to: “a situation where business institutions function as social 
 
institutions through which the entire society fulfils its social and economic objectives, and 
 
‘owe[s] certain moral duties and obligations to the society where they operate” (Akanwa and 
 
Agu, 2005, p.93). 
 
 
 
Other definitions of CSR refer to the sequence of beneficial corporate partnerships between 
businesses and the environments in which they operate; there by providing a situation in 
which business organisation can gain a good reputation from all stakeholders (Ekeocha, 2001, 
p. 46). This implies that there is a direct relationship between the organisations and the 
communities where they are located. In the view of Onabanjo (2005), CSR is: 
[C]oncerned solely with how to create an enabling environment in 
the host community so that the company can carry out its activities 
without any hindrance, but rather with the assistance and support of 
host inhabitants. Community Relations is a problem solving process 
 
 
3Any company that does not give priority to ‘corporate reputation’ is as good as sitting on 
‘gun powder’ or planting the seeds of hostility against its operations/economic interests. It 
would  therefore  become  difficult  for  the  company  to  mobilize  local  support  or  win 
cooperation         of         host         communities         especially         youth         associations.
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and this involves strategic analysis of the problem, planning, taking 
action, and evaluating programme effectiveness, inadequacies, or 
outright failures” (Onabanjo, 2005, p. 44). 
 
 
 
In other words, CSR involves a process of successful strategic planning of establishing good 
relationship in community, which further allows for determining the irresponsible activities 
of the oil companies that require subsequent corrective measures. Similarly, for Bahl (1994, 
p. 109) CSR is of the view that ‘Community Relations is an organization's well thought [out 
policy],  designed  to  protect  the  business  and  community  environment.  This  calls  for 
businesses  to  regularly  evaluate  their  impact  on  their  operations  or  actions  in  society. 
However, businesses are only able to impact fully in a society in terms of CSR if it is 
profitable and efficient. Some scholars such as Wood (1991) and Cannon (1992) believe that 
the essence of CSR is the nexus between business and society. This is apt, because every 
business is located in a community where people live or interrelate. It has been noted that 
when businesses  go beyond  industrial impact assessment and  consider community based 
impact assessment a lot more could be achieved in the area of CSR. 
 
 
 
Notwithstanding the importance of the concept of CSR in exploring the stakeholders and 
corporate relationships, the necessity of the concept is still contested. It is on this premise that 
Windsor (2006) described CSR as an embryonic contested concept. One of the reasons put 
forth   is   that   “advocates   of   the   concept   are   not   in   consensus   on   functionality  or 
implementation  of  CSR  and  at  the  same  time  have  different  views  on  the  essence  of 
businesses in every society” (Idemudia and Ite, 2006b). This is similar to the neo-classical 
view of CSR, which holds “that corporations should mainly be committed to the paying of 
taxes and creating employment or empowerment opportunities” (Moir, 2001, p. 2). In other
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words, the only responsibilities that businesses ought to undertake are that of profit 
maximisation for its shareholders. This is well captured in Friedman (1962, p. 133) where it 
is posited that few tendencies would challenge the very principles of a free society hence, 
businesses acceptance of CSR will undermine its aim of making as much money as they can 
for their shareholders. It is towards this direction that most businesses view CSR concept as a 
waste of time (Frynas, 2005, p. 582).4 
 
Conversely, advocates of the stakeholders' theory hold the CSR commitment of the MNOCs 
in a high esteem. Governments and policy makers also view CSR programs of businesses as 
lawful by enshrining the ethical rules governing business activities in their constitutions. It is 
pertinent to note that even the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (Carroll, 
1996) perceive CSR as a worthwhile undertaking. That is why the council has defined CSR 
as the ethical behaviour of corporations in society, where the management maintains a 
responsible relationship with all stakeholders. In this view of CSR, businesses are required to 
contribute to the development of Oil Producing Communities (OPCs) as well as to improve 
on their quality of life (Carroll, 1996; Business Impact, 2000; Steiner and Steiner, 2000). 
 
For  the  purpose  of  this  study,  the  CSR  concept  is  viewed  from  the  perspective  of 
multinational  businesses  adopting environment  friendly activities  alongside  genuine CSR 
projects that would add value and bring development to the host communities. However it 
should be emphasised that while host communities are adopting strategies on ways of 
protecting their image and environment, MNOCs should also work to boost their corporate 
image through public relations units saddled with the responsibility of giving updates on CSR 
related projects. 
 
 
 
4 Viewing CSR as ‘a waste of time’ gives company’s bad image instead of enhancing 
their ‘positive corporate reputation’.
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Furthermore,  the  changing  socio-economic  development  across  the  globe  calls  for  a 
pragmatic  approach  to  the  issue  of  harmonious  relationships  amongst  stakeholders  in  a 
business environment. “Three important international institutions have underlined the need 
for governments and companies to adhere to the principles of CSR. These are the World 
Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBGSD), the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the Dow Jones Sustainability Group Indexes 
(DJSGI)” OECD, 1990, p. 540). While explaining the roles of companies as part of CSR, the 
World Business Council for Sustainable Development notes that CSR is a vital link: “to the 
long-term prosperity of companies as it provides the opportunity to demonstrate the human 
face of business,” and underscores: “the value of creating practical partnerships and dialogue 
between business, government, and organizations” (OECD, 1990, p. 547). 
 
WBCSD  has acknowledged the following “core values” as  fundamental to  CSR: human 
rights,   employee   rights,   environmental   protection,   community  development,   supplier 
relations, monitoring and stakeholders’ rights (OECD, 1997, p. 93). 
 
As noted by Nature (2001), the rights of employees and stakeholders are critical issues in 
determining the level of responsibility of companies as far as the protection of environment 
and community development are concerned. They can also influence the relationship between 
the people and the corporations. Apparently, the role of the community as a major player in 
the social relations of production could not be ignored. Its status ought to be respected as a 
stakeholder in the project. Thus, the company, which is a “tenant” in this context, should 
establish a base for close partnership and discussions with the host communities, and ensure 
community-based  development  initiatives  for  developing  cordial  relationships  with  the 
people.
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Similarly, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) “has also 
been engaged in developing the concept of CSR. For instance: the OECD, at its Ministerial 
Meeting  on  June  27  2000  approved  a  set  of  Guidelines  for  Multinational  Enterprises” 
(OECD, 2000, p. 10). The guidelines included a set of “voluntary principles and standards for 
responsible business conduct consistent with applicable laws” (p. 10), and the OECD strained 
the need for both governments and companies to demonstrate their corporate responsibility 
by pursuing sound environmental and society-based policies. The guidelines were developed 
“to ensure that the operations of these enterprises are in harmony with government policies, 
to strengthen the basis of mutual confidence between enterprises and the societies in which 
they operate…and to enhance the contribution to sustainable development made by 
multinational enterprises” (OECD, 2000, p. 12). They confront multinational businesses to 
implement  environmental  best  practice that  would  promote  sustainable  development  that 
would ensure coherence between social, economic and environmental objectives. 
 
The General Policies of the Guidelines advise enterprises to: 
 
 
          contribute to economic, social and environmental progress with a view to achieving 
sustainable development; 
          respect the human rights of those affected by their activities consistent with the host 
government’s international obligations and commitments; 
          encourage   local   capacity  building   through   close   co-operation   with   the   local 
community, including business interests, as well as developing the enterprise’s 
activities in domestic and foreign markets, consistent with the need for sound 
commercial practice; 
          encourage   human   capital   formation,   in   particular   by   creating   employment 
opportunities      and      facilitating      training      opportunities      for      employees;
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          refrain from seeking or accepting exemptions not contemplated in the statutory or 
regulatory framework related to environmental, health, safety, labour, taxation, 
financial incentives, or other issues; 
          support and uphold good corporate governance principles and develop and apply good 
corporate governance practices; 
          develop and apply effective self-regulatory practices and management systems that 
foster a relationship of confidence and mutual trust between enterprises and the 
societies in which they operate; 
          promote employee awareness of,  and  compliance with,  company policies through 
appropriate dissemination of these policies, including through training programmes; 
          refrain from discriminatory or disciplinary action against employees who make bona 
fide reports to management or, as appropriate, to the competent public authorities, on 
practices that contravene the law, the Guidelines or the enterprise’s policies; 
          encourage,   where  practicable,  business   partners,   including  suppliers  and   sub- 
contractors, to apply principles of corporate conduct compatible with the Guidelines; 
abstain from any improper involvement in local political activities (OECD, 2000, p. 
 
13-15). 
 
Although the OECD strategies are focused at multinational businesses, they also apply to 
domestic corporations. The need for the government and companies to incorporate the three 
major sustainable development strategies thus; economic, environmental and social best 
practices in their decision-making processes are critical in achieving a concrete CSR within a 
given environment. Most countries and companies seem to ignore or pay little attention to the 
social component of sustainable development (OECD, 1998, p. 40). This was apparent in a 
recent OECD study, in which member states were advised to formulate and adopt a more 
robust and balanced approach to sustainable development that would emphasize the three
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outlined dimensions  (OECD,  1998).  The economic,  social  and  environmental  justices,  if 
applied by the MNOCs in developing countries such as Nigeria could curb the anger of the 
host communities with respect to the cumulative brunt of oil production. In this study, 
environmental   justice   implies   an   objective   treatment   and   involvement   of   the   local 
communities in CSR  process and implementation with the Government’s enforcement of 
environmental policies (Ako, 2015). 
 
3.3.5 The Concept of Conflict 
 
 
 
The World Health Organization (WHO) has described conflict as "the intentional use of 
physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person or against a 
group or community, leading to injury, death, physical harm or deprivation" (WHO, 2002, 
p.5). Prior to the existence of any conflict (violent and non-violent conflict) there are usually 
indicators or catastrophic signals exhibited by the factional leaders in the conflict.   These 
signals include unpleasant utterances, unfriendly attitudes and non-compromising posture, 
which would normally be noticed among the persons in a conflict (Akpuru-Aja, 2009). When 
these warnings are ignored in their early stages, they would normally metamorphose into 
violent conflict and genocides (Akpuru-Aja, 2009). 
 
Lewis Coser (1956) notes that the availability of resources, which individuals assume are 
scarce, puts them in opposition to one another in order to possess the resources they need, or 
attain a certain level of power at the expense of a rival group. This means that conflict creates 
room for unhealthy competition or intra-group/inter-group rivalry that often culminates in 
clannishness and other forms of divisive strategies aimed at downplaying the success of other 
groups. There is hardly any conflict scenario where belligerent parties are not concerned with 
better ways of winning or making the other party give up on assumed incompatible goals.
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Conflict is an integral part of a modern society, and a necessity for social survival. What this 
means is that conflict does not always have a negative implication, although conflict can have 
both functional and dysfunctional connotations.  In the view of Folarin (1998), there is a 
general consensus amongst intellectuals that there is hardly any development in the world 
without some elements of conflict. Developments are modernisation (changes) of existing 
infrastructures and cultures, which could be resisted.   According to Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
(1987), the tranquil state of nature was corrupted by human desire and greed. This implies 
that human selfish-interest and greed is tantamount to conflict. Additionally, Otite (2001) 
aver that conflict arises when persons or groups in a particular environment pursue divergent 
desires,  interests,  goals  and  aspirations.  The  occurrence  of  a  change  in  the  social 
environment, such as the discovery of new resources normally raises a fertile ground for 
conflict. The occurrence of conflict in any society makes it crucial for stakeholders to take 
conflict management as a necessary project. Through conflict management, stakeholders take 
steps towards enforcing a mechanism and strategic responses aimed at achieving goals of 
conflict resolution as an integral part of the agenda of peaceful coexistence. Such an initiative 
could involve confidence building and conflict-sensitive programmes at various levels. 
 
Conflicts  manifest  themselves  in  various  ways  all  over  the  world.  While  some  groups 
struggle over resources, others struggle for power and other economic benefits either for self- 
actualisation  or  to  meet  their  desire  for  basic  human  needs.  Some  conflicts  are  also 
occasioned by an endless drama of political domination and economic oppression, especially 
those involving majority and minority ethnic nationalities. There is conflict when two or 
more  people/groups  clash  over  issues.  One  thing  that  should  be  noted  here  is  that  the 
perception of parties to any conflict has the potential of escalating or de-escalating conflicts. 
One feature of conflict is that it is seen as an inevitable aspect of human relationships in 
societies operating with social, economic and ideological differences. Globally, the origins
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and nature of conflict are best described or explained within the framework of human nature 
and a human environment (Albert et al., 1995, p.2); even in organisations, conflict is not 
avoidable (Okojie, 1999;Okojie, 2000, p.177). In fact, it is described as a natural experience 
by the human relations school of thought. There is that natural tendency in every human to 
feel threatened by activities, actions and decisions of others, especially when differing 
perceptions exist. The world would not have experienced such turbulence in recent times if 
not for human brutish nature. 
 
The positive aspect is that humans have the capacity to engage belligerent parties in peace- 
making, peace-building, conflict prevention, conflict management and long-term programmes 
that  sustain  peaceful  coexistence  in  the  world.  This  means  that  proper  and  timely 
communication;  third-party  intervention  and  effective  mediation  and  negotiation  are  all 
effective conflict-management initiatives. A factor that makes some intra-state or inter-group 
conflicts remain intractable despite the need for peace is communication breakdown. Edgar 
Schein (1980, p. 127-176) observes that, when there is conflict between competing groups, 
hostility increases while communication decreases; each group perceives other groups as the 
enemy and not as a neutral group.  According to the early scholars in the field of conflict and 
conflict resolution, there are a number of schemes and sources of conflicts. Generally, the 
major sources of conflict include economic, value, ineffective communication and power 
conflict (Mack & Snyder, 1958; Daniel Katz, 1965; Fink, 1968) as elaborated below. 
Economic  conflict:  This type of conflict arises when individuals or groups compete over 
resources. The aim of conflict in this case is directed towards the "slicing of the national 
cake". Each conflict actor's aim here is to gain or even control economic resources. 
 
Value conflict:  In this case, conflict occurs over incompatibility in culture (the inclinations, 
main beliefs, customs and traditions that people that make up a particular society believe in)
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Nigeria is a multi-ethnic country where most activities, which should have been secularised, 
are  dominated  by  ethnic  and  religious  inclinations.  The  divergence  in  both  ethnic  and 
religious beliefs has always generated conflicts. 
 
Ineffective   communication:  Another major source of conflict is miscommunication and 
misunderstanding. The inability of parties to communicate effectively often creates confusion 
and anger which would have been resolved amicably had the parties involved communicated 
the facts of the contended argument.   Groups or individuals may have diverse perceptions 
regarding the actual fact of a specific situation, which could trigger animosities until the 
information is tactfully and skilfully clarified. A typical example of a consequential conflict 
as a result of ineffective communication is the killing of the Ogoni four (high-class chiefs) on 
21 May 1999 by some infuriated  youths who claimed that the chiefs had some form of 
communication with the management of the MNOCs, to the disadvantage of other members 
of the host community. This unconfirmed information generated a succession of militias and 
human  rights  violations  that  culminated  in  the  execution  of  the  “Ogoni  nine”  (Ken 
Sarawiwa’s compatriots as explained in chapter one). 
 
Power   conflict:   In  this  context,  conflict  arises  from  an  individual’s  or  a  group’s 
determination to maintain and maximize the level of influence possessed in the associations 
and particularly the social settings concerned. Paradoxically, in this regard, Fisher (2000, p.2) 
argues that one party is usually stronger than the other, especially with reference to direct 
exert influence over a weaker party. Accordingly, in the power tussle, the stronger party, this 
usually ends up victorious, defeats the weaker group. This is one source of conflict that is 
evident in all sources of conflict; all conflict actors directly or indirectly attempt to control 
each other.
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3.3.6 Types of Conflict 
 
 
 
There are different types and levels of conflict. However, Okojie (2000, p.172) views types of 
conflicts as hierarchies of conflict with a varying pattern of management, which could be 
inter and intra community, intra-personal, inter-personal, inter-disciplinary, intra- 
organizational, inter-organizational and even international.  Conflicts assume an international 
dimension when they are between two or more nations or affect foreign nationals. 
 
 
 
Inter and Intra Community Conflict 
 
Inter-community conflict- is a type of conflict between host communities in the region, for 
instance the conflict between the Ogonies and Okirika communities. Inter-ethnic disputes, 
involves confrontation between two or more ethnic nationalities within any given region or 
state, which is caused by the lack of cordiality or geniality, distrust and terror. These types of 
conflicts would normally end up or climax in violent confrontation (Salawu, 2010, p. 346).5 
On the other hand, intra-community conflict is a type of conflict that exist between groups 
 
within a community, such as one that occurs within social/militant groups in the community; 
 
and that could be among the elders, youths or the women. 
Intra-personal  Conflict 
Intrapersonal conflict occurs when an individual no longer feels at peace with himself. Such a 
person is said to lose his comfort and peace, thereby making it almost impossible for him to 
be happy. Whatever issue is the source of such problem, his happiness sometimes depends on 
his ability to communicate to other people on the matter or possibly sort it out by himself 
(Omokhoa, 2015). 
5 Mutual suspicion characterizes every intergroup or ethno-religious conflict especially in 
terms of relationship. This leads to loss of confidence in all the ability of groups to protect 
neighbors’     interests     and     sustain     economic,     cultural     and     political     relations.
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Inter-personal  Conflict 
 
 
 
Interpersonal conflict involves two or more individuals who may have an incompatible goal 
or have a disagreement over an issue. This type of conflict usually has a source which may 
include: gossip, unsettled debt, feeding allowance, the failure of one person to return what he 
collected from the other, poor communication of ideas, a struggle for power at places of work 
or in political offices, and actions that portray hatred against the other. Managing such a 
conflict demands high-level tact from both parties who may decide to involve a third party in 
the resolution process. In fact, third-party intervention may manifest itself in the form of 
inviting both parties to the negotiation table either by an elder or by parents. When 
interpersonal  conflict  is  not  given  the  required  response,  it  may  escalate  to  intergroup 
conflict, involving the groups that support each of the individuals involved. 
 
Intra-organisational Conflict 
 
 
Intra-organizational conflict implies a disagreement between workers in a given institution or 
organisation. The sources of this type of conflict are numerous, such as matters of promotion; 
especially  when  there  are  grievances  in  some  quarters  within  the  organization;  salary 
increases, which could lead to strike action and mass protests; the delivery of redundancy 
notices to some members of staff; and the failure of some workers to adhere strictly to official 
rules or keep confidential documents in order. 
 
Inter-organisational Conflict 
 
 
Inter-organisational  conflict  involves  two  or  more  organizations.  This  type  of  conflict 
assumes inter-organisational status when the management of two or more organizations are 
involved in any disagreement.  It is possible for them to struggle for the control over a 
particular environment or sales.
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International  Conflict 
 
 
 
International conflict involves two or more countries. This type of conflict requires high- 
powered diplomacy from both sides to be managed effectively. The conflict between Israel 
and Palestine has assumed an international dimension as a result of divergent interests from 
both sides.   According to the Human Security Report (2013), armed conflicts are classified 
into state-based armed conflicts, international conflicts and civil wars, in which at least one of 
the warring parties is the government of a state (p. 12). 
 
 
 
The major causes of international conflict include border disputes, historical animosities, 
economic disputes, differences in political systems, arms races and the influence of major 
powers (Grabendorff, 1982, p.269). It is during international armed conflicts that security 
forces exhibit some bizarre acts that relate to weariness, the fear of bombardment, and also 
the  mistreatment  of  prisoners  in  a  prisoner  of  war  camp  (Prestwich,  2003,  p.250).  An 
example of international conflict is presented in the 2011 Uppsala Conflict Data Program 
(UCDP) list of 37 armed conflicts with a minimum of 25 battle-related deaths, indicating that 
international armed conflict heightens humanitarian crises and political consequences and 
instability  (Themner  and  Wallenstee,  2012).  This  problem  escalates  when  the  nations 
involved  fail  to  manage  the  situation  well.  Examples  of  international  conflicts  are:  the 
conflict between Israel and the Arab states, the conflict in Liberia, the conflict in Sierra 
Leone and, recently, the conflict in Mali, where the Economic Community of West African 
States had to intervene through its ECOMOG troops.     The failure of states to reach an 
agreement on ceasefire or adopt a diplomatic approach has the capacity of making them 
violate human rights.
129  
3.3.7 Conflict Resolution Strategies 
 
 
 
There are different strategies adopted to resolve conflicts. While some people adopt a non- 
adversarial approach, others adopt confrontational strategies or even the total avoidance of 
the conflict. This section will discuss alternative dispute resolution, confrontation and 
arbitration as conflict resolution strategies that are adoptable in the Niger Delta. 
 
 
 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) 
 
 
 
 
Miller (2005) argues that alternative dispute resolution (ADR) aims to address conflicts in 
such a way that the outcome would be mutually acceptable to the parties involved. ADR does 
not involve litigation (which lasts longer and seems to be a more complex method of conflict 
resolution). The nonviolent approaches or ADR approaches have been discussed by Hadi 
(2010) to include negotiation, mediation, reconciliation and arbitration. Ojiji (2006) adds that 
the joint-problem solving approach, which involves constructive listening by both parties in a 
conflict, so as to comprehend the elements in the conflict with the aim of addressing them. 
Ojiji (2006, p.125) asserts, that it takes two parties that are willing to actualize a win-win 
outcome for the joint problem solving approach to be successful. In addition, Albert (2010, 
113) gives an example of joint-problem solving, with the argument that the best way to deal 
with the herdsmen and farmers conflict is by assisting both parties to appreciate the 
opportunities offered by joint problem solving. However, joint problem solving entails that 
parties collaborate to address their problems (Onyima and Iwuoha, 2015). 
 
 
 
Confrontation 
 
Confrontation could be a direct expression of a group or a person's view, thoughts or feelings 
regarding a conflict situation. Confrontation could be an invitation to actors in conflicts to
130  
express their views on a particular conflict. Confrontation as a conflict resolution strategy is 
basically concerned with exploring and clarifying issues of conflict, but it can be aggressive. 
When  it  becomes  aggressive,  those  involved  in  the  conflict  attack  each  other,  either 
physically or emotionally, sometimes in verbal form (Ojiji, 2006, p.124). An example of 
confrontation is the Federal Government of Nigeria’s approach to resolving the Niger Delta 
conflict. The Nigerian state adopted the option of the military intervention principle (Etekpe, 
2011). This intervention strategy was utilised by the Obasanjo administration between 1999 
and 2007.It deployed Nigerian soldiers to contain the restiveness of youth and criminal gangs 
that sought to hinder oil production and distribution without taking into consideration the 
reasons  for  their  grievances  (Okolie-Osemene  and  Aghalino,  2011;  Etekpe,  2011,  p.  2). 
Before the  establishment  of the Joint  Task  Force in  2003,  the  Federal  Government  had 
adopted the principle in Ogoni, in 1990; Umuechem, in 1990; and Odi, in 1999 (Etekpe, 
2011, p. 3; Okolie-Osemene and Aghalino, 2011, p. 25). The confrontation strategy caused 
the Federal Government to spend billions of naira to sustain the presence of security forces in 
most Niger Delta communities to protect oil installations and oil workers (Okolie-Osemene 
and Tor, 2012, p.81). 
 
 
 
Arbitration 
 
Arbitration is a form of alternative dispute resolution that requires third-party intervention in 
conflict situations. This requires disputants to appoint arbitrators to hear evidence and take a 
decision on the issue (Hadi, 2010, p.78). An arbitrator is a third party that seeks to address the 
source of the prevailing conflict. According to Lewu (2010, p.42): “third party decision- 
making methods occur when third parties acting on behalf of the larger society such as a 
court  of  law,  pronounce  mandatory  judgments  to  resolve  the  conflict.”  The  impact  of
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arbitration is felt when the decision of an arbitration tribunal is enforced, like the judgment of 
a court, and such an award is usually binding on all the parties involved (Hadi, 2010). 
 
3.3.8 Conflict Management 
 
 
 
Conflict management does not necessarily imply conflict resolution but implies designing 
effective macro-level strategies to reduce the dysfunctions of conflict. It also involves 
developing the constructive functions of a conflict in order to enhance learning and 
effectiveness in an organization (Rahim, 2002, p. 3). When the negative aspects of conflicts 
are downplayed in favour of positive peace, then conflict management is in progress. The 
term is concerned  with  the proper planning for actions that  are required to prevent  and 
mitigate conflicts so that they do not escalate to violence in a society where government and 
civil society are crucial stakeholders (Rahim, 2002). 
 
Tanner (2000)  argues  that people manage conflict when the sources  are limited without 
outright resolution. Wallensteen and Swanström (2002), cited in Swanstrom et al. (2005, p. 
23)  observed  that  the  main  task  is  to create  a  situation  where conflict  no  longer has  a 
destructive outlook leading to the effective management of the situation. A potential conflict 
requires the building of confidence of parties involved in every conflict to save the situation. 
Also, Zartman (1997, p. 195) notes that, when the violent aspect of conflict is eradicated from 
a conflict situation, that conflict is managed. This view has received criticisms from 
organizations that are involved in conflict transformation. According to Swanström et al. 
(2005, p. 24) conflict management sets the platform for the resolution of conflicts, which 
differs from conflict management in terms of the total eradication of the roots and factors 
responsible for generating the conflict.
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3.3.9 The Mechanisms  of Oil Conflict 
 
 
 
Oil conflict has become one of the characteristics of conflict in nations that are endowed with 
the resource. These conflicts – also referred to as resource-based conflict, are a fundamental 
source of instability in many oil-rich states, particularly with emerging economies such as 
Nigeria. These contestations often start from the community level where the oil exploration 
and exploitation take place, either between communities, or between the communities and 
government agencies. It is usually violent when deprivation and confrontation become the 
order of the day. 
 
In Nigeria, the main source of the conflict is what most people call the struggle for the 
“national cake,” which has caused youths in host communities to sabotage the interests of the 
Nigerian state in different ways, including the outright vandalisation of flow stations, the 
sabotage of oil installations/gas pipelines and the stealing of crude oil (Iduh, 2011, p. 124). 
Such actions and responses have made oil discovery a paradox to the people (Aghalino, 2009, 
p. 221), because it has brought misery, repression and unmitigated environmental devastation 
to oil-producing communities (Evoh, 2009, p. 40). 
 
Greed and Grievance Concept 
 
 
Conflict has varied dimensions and it is caused by human behaviour. Social scientists, in 
particular sociologists and psychologists, have studied this issue for decades. Humphreys 
(2005, p. 508) identifies two major elements that could trigger off conflict: the “rebel greed 
mechanism” and the “grievance mechanism”. The “rebel greed mechanism” describes the 
perpetration of violence by a group of people to compel the government and the operators of 
the oil industries to  meet the needs of  the  members of the host community.  This  view 
corroborates the position of Brunschweiler and Bulte (2009, p. 652), who note that loot- 
seeking rebels usually exhibit a non-conformist approach, tending towards using any means
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at their disposal to get whatever they want from the operators of the oil companies. Related to 
this are the findings of Murshed and Tadjoeddin (2007, p. 5), which support the view that 
civil wars stem from the greedy behaviour of a rebel group that usually organizes an 
insurgency against the government in order to make demands on the government and the 
operators of the oil industries on issues not covered by the constitution. 
 
The “grievance mechanism” is mostly based on the effects of extraction, such as the forced 
migration of fish, sea-bed destruction, environmental damage, relative deprivation, social 
exclusion,  marginalisation,  inequality and  lack  of  job  opportunities  (Brunnschweiler  and 
Bulte, 2009, p. 652). Empirical researchers have further suggested that conflict could also 
stem from the grievance of the “rebels”, who believe that natural resources are unevenly 
distributed. This is a regular claim in Nigeria and Sierra Leone (Humphreys 2005, p. 512). It 
has, therefore, been asserted that dependence on natural resources has a link to conflict, 
which will most likely end up in military intervention (Ross, 2006, p. 266-283). 
 
This  study has  evaluated  other  resource  conflict  mechanisms.  Notable  among  them  are 
resource curse hypothesis, the rentier state paradigm, the paradox of plenty and the Dutch 
disease. 
 
The Dutch Disease 
 
 
 
The Dutch Disease was said: to have been named in honour of the economic impacts of an oil 
boom in Holland first coined in 1977 (Dunning, 2008, p. 272). It has been argued that the 
impact of the Dutch disease includes an increase in the real exchange rate, reflecting how 
exports are being sold in the world markets. Dunning (2008, p. 272) claims that the Dutch 
Disease made other export products more expensive abroad, which, in turn, slowed down 
demands  for  those  products  abroad.  This  disease  is  perceived  as  providing  significant
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evidence of the resource curse that cripples other trade-able sectors of the economy, such as 
agriculture. Although this is largely dependent on the system of government in place, the 
presence of oil resources can contribute to the growth of other local services, particularly 
because of the cash inflows from the oil operatives. 
 
John (2010, p. 2) defines the Dutch Disease model as: “the economic concept that refers to 
the potential negative effects that natural resource windfalls, and the accompanying 
appreciations of exchange rates, can have on the rest of the economy”. During this period, the 
Netherlands oil boom resulted in an increase in the country's exchange rate and a dramatic 
reduction in diversification into other sectors of the economy. 
 
According to Giroux (2008, p.11), the coming of multinationals and state actors to African 
oil-producing states has contributed to increase of foreign direct investment and economic 
growth. The increase in Nigeria’s output of oil began from 1970, with the production of over 
one million barrels per day, and the country was able to join the Organisation of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries in this period (Edet, 2015; Frynas, 2000; Giroux, 2008, p.12). The oil 
boom of the 1970s, during the regimes of Gowon, Murtala and Obasanjo, affected other 
sectors  of  the  economy.  The  discovery  of  oil,  and  later  the  “oil  boom  of  the  1970s”, 
accounted for the neglect of other sectors of the economy, which sustained the country before 
oil exploration and exploitation began. One of the worst hit sectors was agriculture. The mid- 
19th  century  antecedents  to  the  20th  century  developments  in  the  oil  palm  industry 
contributed immensely to the development of Nigeria (Udeke and Okolie-Osemene, 2014). In 
the view of Udeke and Okolie-Osemene (2014, p. 1), the deplorable state of the nation’s 
agricultural sector and, indeed, the palm oil industry, could be as a result of the fact that those 
in position to give the much needed impetus to agriculture and even policy makers continued 
to neglect the lucrative and human development-oriented industry.
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In Nigeria, even though the agricultural sector still accounts for over 26.8 per cent of GDP, 
and two-thirds of employment, it has suffered enormous mismanagement, poorly conceived 
government  policies,  and  the  lack  of  basic  infrastructure  (Osalor,  2012).  Observations 
showed that agriculture is not the only victim of this mismanagement and gross neglect. 
Mining has also witnessed decline over the years (2007 & 2011) especially in the advent of 
the oil boom in the country. The implication is that Nigeria now imports almost everything, 
including refined petroleum. 
 
The Rentier Economy Effect 
 
 
 
The Rentier State Theory accounts for another plague of oil-rich natural resource countries. 
According to Gray (2011, p. 1) “The Rentier state theory is a political economy theory that 
seeks to explain state society relations in states that generate a large proportion of their 
income from rents, or externally-derived, unproductively-earned payments.” Although “rents 
are most commonly royalties or other payments for oil and gas exports, other income such as 
fees and aid typically are considered rents as well” (Gray, 2011, p. 1). The argument is that 
given that the government is saddled with the responsibility of revenue allocation, the issue 
of a tax imposition on the people would no longer be necessary. 
However, Smith (2004, p. 232) avers that the “rentier state theory” suggests that nations rich 
in natural resources are inclined to economic stagnation, corruption, authoritarianism and 
civil war. This view is contestable because oil deposits have not been proven to be a symbol 
of war. It is arguably a blessing, although its mismanagement could turn this blessing into a 
curse (Duruigbo, 2004, p. 46; Stuva, 2013). John (2010, p. 4-5) argues that the rentier-state 
theory only considers the short run effect of oil on the rentier-states, without explaining the 
long-run economic transformation in oil-rich economies. This implies that there could be a 
positive result from oil resources, as noted in the analysis of Basedau and Lay (2009, p.761).
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The concept of a rentier state paradigm was developed with respect to Middle Eastern oil- 
producing states, such as Iran and the Gulf Monarchies (Luciani, 1990, p. 65; Luciani, 2005; 
Basedau and Lacher, 2006; Gurses, 2009).  The major characteristic of the rentier state is oil 
rent  distribution. The distribution strategies tend to enrich the  ruling elite and  guarantee 
stability for the political ruling leaders. This indirect effect of rentierism appears to be a 
mechanism for repression by the government and triggers the feasibility of restiveness by 
members of society, particularly the youth (Gray, 2013). 
 
But corruption is not the peculiarity of resource-rich countries alone. It is also a regular factor 
in resource-poor economies. To make this clearer, John (2010, p. 5) compares the economy 
of the mineral-rich countries with those without minerals. He notes that between “1965 and 
1990 the median annual average growth of the non-mineral abundant developing economies 
was 5.4%, which did not out-space the mineral rich economies with 4.3%”. Furthermore, 
Gray (2011, p. 1) asserts that, “in the same period, the median corruption rate of the non- 
mineral  dominant  economies  was  slightly higher  than  the mineral-dominant  economies.” 
However, the fact that the resource-rich countries tended to have grown faster with lesser 
corruption than the oil resource-poor economies in the early 2000s further opposes the rentier 
state theory. Findlay & Lundhal (1999), as cited in John (2010; p. 6), found that between the 
1870s and1914 most oil-rich economics started as rentier economies. For instance, the 
economies of the United States, Australia, the Netherlands, Norway, Canada and Malaysia 
started as rentier economies. Many of the oil-rich countries today were initially mono-culture 
economic states until they diversified their economies by ploughing back the earnings from 
petroleum to develop other segments of the individual country's economy. 
 
Furthermore, the rentier state model is yet to evaluate the positive implication of oil wealth in 
the growth and development of a country’s manufacturing sector. Write and Czeluster (2002,
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p.  1) have  evaluated  how in  the US:  “mineral  abundance was  an endogenous  historical 
phenomenon driven by collective learning, increasing returns, and an accommodating legal 
environment.” In other words, mineral abundance in the US played a strategic role in the 
technological development of the economy. A good case in point is: “the replacement of the 
cable drill by the rotary drill” (Write and Czeluster, 2002, p. 15). This implies that the process 
of extraction, transportation and the geological technologies involved in refining oil resource 
facilitated the development of the US economy (John, 2010, p. 6). Besides, the development 
of  natural  resources  was  found  to  be  instrumental  in  the  technological  advancement  of 
Sweden and Finland in the 19th and 20th centuries (Blomstrom and Kokko, 2007, as quoted 
in John, 2010, p. 6). 
 
The findings of these researchers make it difficult to adopt the rentier state model, as the 
model failed to take into consideration the positive impact oil revenue as the researchers 
depicted above. Furthermore, the possibility of  most oil-dependent economies to make a 
turnaround to an advanced and diversified economy with its oil rent appears a prediction that 
could be achieved in the long run, considering the level of corruption in the oil-dependent 
countries.  With  Indonesia’s  turnaround  from  renterism  to  a  diversified  economy,  it  is 
believed that oil dependency is a permanent feature of any economy. 
 
 
 
There is no doubt that natural resources have been a curse to some oil-bearing societies, as is 
the case in Iraq and Chad. However, the Iraqi invasion of neighbouring “Kuwait in 1990 and 
its subsequent intentional: “protective” oil spillages may have been a curse to the land” 
(Sadiq and McCain, 1993, p.159). In the 1970s, Chad befitted a geo-political playground for 
the US and the French governments to articulate and express their views on resource control. 
This  was  evident  in  the overthrow,  through  a  Coup  d’état  and  the subsequent  death  of 
President Tombalbaye (Humphreys, 1995, p. 508-537). Not only did the Chadians lose a
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president, but also the geopolitical manoeuvres and intrigues came at the cost of continued 
and sustained external involvement in Chad’s national, political and economic affairs. 
 
 
 
Natural resources, however, have been characterised as a “blessing” in some resource- 
endowed countries. Botswana, for example, had less than 100 kilometres of tarred roads in 
the 1960s. Since the discovery of diamonds, in the 1960s, and their exploitation through a 
joint and equal partnership between the government of Botswana and De Beers (through 
Debswana Diamond  Company)  the  country now  has thousands  of kilometres of  modern 
tarred roads. Diamonds contribute more than 33.3% to the country’s US$14.8 GDP in 2010 
(US Department of State, 2011, p.1). 
 
Oil Resources as a Curse 
 
 
 
In addition to the foregoing resource conflict mechanisms, Basedau and Lay (2009, p. 757) 
propounded a “resource curse” hypothesis that suggests that natural resources, particularly 
oil,  create  war.  Basedau  and  Lay  (2009,  p.  757)  argue  that:  “the  extraction  of  natural 
resources has a link to corruption, authoritarianism, economic decline and civil war”. This 
implies that oil  natural resources, on their own, may not have any link to war; but the 
processes involved in its extraction and the administration of its revenue could lead to war. 
This could be one of the reasons why oil is said to provide its owners with finance and a drive 
for armed conflict as well as generating indirect economic and institutional causes of violence 
(Conroy,  2014). The  debate over  the  brunt  of oil  natural resources  looks  at the  context 
conditions and the particular causal mechanisms determining whether or not the resource 
cause strikes actions and in what ramification do resources generate strike actions (Collier 
and Hoeffler, 2005, p. 627).
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Ross (2008, p. 4) contends that the gravest danger of oil resources is its capability to trigger 
conflict, particularly in developing countries. Such oil-rich countries as Iraq, Algeria, 
Colombia, Sudan and Nigeria are said to be twice as likely to undergo rebellion as non-oil- 
bearing countries. Rebellion in non-resource-rich countries might last for only a short while 
because of a lack of money to acquire ammunition, but it could last longer in resource-rich 
countries because the rebels would hardly run out of funds to finance war. In resource-rich 
countries, the instigators of conflict could break pipelines and steal oil, which they can sell in 
the black markets, as has been the case in Nigeria and Iraq (Ross, 2008, p. 4). 
 
Oil  alone  cannot  generate  conflict,  but  it  can  exasperate  latent  tensions,  specifically  in 
countries that were relatively poor prior to the influx of massive oil revenue. Ross (2012, p. 
5) refers to these consequences of the extraction of oil resources as the “oil curse”. According 
to Colgan (2010, p. 11), the negative impact of oil revenue on oil-producing states is not 
homogeneous, as the economic and political impact in a given state varies, depending mostly 
on the country’s political history and leadership. The components of the oil curse include 
violent conflict, slow economic growth, and lack of accountability, transparency: and press 
freedom (Colgan, 2010). 
According to Ross (2012 p.5), the oil curse arises from  the four S’s in the qualities of 
petroleum revenue; these are scale, source, stability and secrecy. The scale refers to the 
proportion  of  revenue  accruable  from  oil;  it  could  be  massive  in  comparison  with  the 
country’s earnings from taxes and agriculture prior to the oil discovery or boom. Where the 
proportion of the revenue is high, the government tends to become authoritative and stifle 
opposing voices (Tsalik, 2003, p. 4). This may have been the case in oil-rich Niger Delta, 
where Ken Saro-Wiwa and his associates were imprisoned and finally executed in 1995 
(Giroux, 2008, p.14). The explosion of money in the Nigerian economy also results in a 
situation where members of the host communities get aggressive and agitate for a larger share
140  
of the huge oil revenues. However, the proportion of oil revenue to total government revenue 
alone does not explain the oil curse, because other larger countries in Europe without large oil 
revenue have experienced democracy and relative peace compared to the oil-rich developing 
countries. 
 
The source of a country’s revenue is important in terms of its effect on the economy and the 
welfare of the citizenry as well  as government  accountability. Most countries fund their 
economies through revenue realized from taxes (Kayaga, 2007). In oil-producing developing 
countries, the reverse appears to be the case. As countries are funded with oil revenues, their 
governments are less accountable to the tax-paying citizenry. Conversely, where countries are 
financed through taxes paid by citizens, their governments are more restricted and thus more 
accountable to the taxpayers (Hawke, 2007; Curristine, 2007; Barbiero and Cournede, 2013). 
 
The instability of oil prices is another contributor to the oil resource curse (Ross, 2012 p.5). 
Fluctuations in world oil prices make government revenues somewhat unstable and difficult 
to predict accurately. The volatile nature of oil prices tends to expose oil-rich countries to 
cycles of oil boom and bust. Thus, the rise and fall of oil prices generates fluctuations in 
government finances and these impacts negatively on the health of the economy and the 
welfare  of  the  people.  The  fluctuation,  therefore,  can  tempt  a  government  to  squander 
revenue and the citizens would begin to agitate, thereby making it more difficult for the 
rebels to come to terms with the government. The problem, however, is that the rebels are not 
sure of the accuracy of the revenue oil generates in order to ascertain how well the state is 
managing oil wealth. For example, Tsalik (2003, p. 6) notes that oil revenue prices instability 
accounts for the unsteadiness of the budget of a rentier economy, since the revenue fluctuates. 
Thus, a decrease in petroleum revenue affects an oil-dependent state budget negatively. For 
instance, the establishment of the Petroleum Trust Fund (PTF) has enabled a country like
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Norway to reinvest the proceeds from petroleum into other sectors of its economy without 
compromising the interests of the host communities where the oil is being exploited. The 
Petroleum Trust Fund (PTF) is a mechanism used for saving the oil revenue and restricts the 
national  budget  to  the  country’s  savings  (Eriksen,  2007,  p.7).  Thus,  by  so  doing,  the 
Norwegian economy is said be unaffected by oil-price reduction or fluctuation. 
 
 
 
Another major factor that aggravates conflict in oil-rich developing countries appears to be 
secrecy (the lack of transparency) in sharing the oil revenue.  Ross (2012, p. 6) observes that: 
"governments often collude with international oil companies to conceal their transactions, 
and use their own national oil companies to hide both revenues and expenditures. When 
Saddam Hussein was Iraq's president (1979-2003), more than half of his government's 
expenditures were channelled through the Iraqi National Oil Company, whose budget was 
secret." This implies that the governments of naturally endowed developing countries appear 
to be collaborating with the oil mining multi-national organisations to hide the oil revenues as 
well as their expenditure. The oil revenue secrecy may have facilitated the Iraqi President 
Saddam Hussein and other oil-fuelled autocrats to squander the oil revenue and fuel their 
desire to remain in power so as to continue to mask their greed and activities. This lack of 
trust tends to contribute to the rebels’ apparent reluctance to drop their arms against the 
government. 
 
 
Is Lack of Oil a Source of Economic Success? 
 
As noted above, not everything about oil is evil, as oil revenue has its benefits; oil resource 
gives some advantage to the oil-rich countries. Humphreys et al. (2007, p.1) assert that: “The 
lack of natural resources has not proven to be a fatal barrier to economic success.” This 
means that the availability or unavailability of natural resources is not a guarantee for a 
country's socio-political and economic progress or stagnation. Some countries have remained
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poor despite their rich oil deposits, while other countries without rich oil deposits seem to 
have been making steady economic progress. Furthermore, Humphreys et al. (2007, p.1) aver 
that most Asian countries with relatively little resources have made considerable success 
through innovation and technological advancement. These countries –notably Hong Kong, 
South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, often referred to as Asia Tigers – show the extent of 
their economic success through technological innovation. The incredible success of the Asian 
Tiger economies, based  on zero natural resources, may have been why researchers have 
concluded that oil-rich countries seem to be operating under a cursed economy (Reed, 2009, 
p.3). 
 
Thus, it can be taken for granted that the governments of the resource-poor countries seem to 
be more prudent than those of the resource-rich countries on the premise that they could 
create and sustain progressive economies without natural resources, because: “men of fertile 
soil  are most  commonly effeminate  and  cowards;  whereas  a barren country makes  men 
temperate by necessity, and by consequence careful, vigilant and industrious" (Humphreys et 
al., 2007, p.1) Therefore, there seems to be a gap in the argument that resource-poor countries 
are most likely to struggle to raise money for their economies as they compete with the 
resource-rich countries in the global market. 
 
As can be gleaned from the foregoing discussion, many countries without valuable natural 
resources  seem  to  be  providing  a  leadership  role  for  countries  with  abundant  natural 
resources in the international market (Tapeh, Hasanzadeh and Feizi, 2014).   It would make 
economic sense for countries with rich deposits of oil to always learn to plough back the 
revenue accruing from oil into the other sectors of their economies.     Sachs and Warner 
(1995), as cited in Humphreys et al. (2007, p.1), argue that many developing countries with
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rich deposits have struggled through one phase of development to another. And they are 
hardly able to meet the recurrent expenditure or the daily costs of running the state. 
 
Often,  if  a  nation,  which  is,  endowed  with  abundant  natural  resources  experiences  a 
remarkable  increase  in  the  economic  sector,  “inequality becomes  a  rising  plague”.  This 
pattern is seen in countries such as Nigeria, Congo DR, and Venezuela where the massive 
resource wealth is shared among a minority, thus making these countries rich countries with 
poor people (Humphreys et al., 2007, p.2). This is not to say that the massive revenues from 
oil have not contributed to an improved standard of living in the oil-producing countries, for 
alongside the perceived improved standard of living, there is rampant corruption daily 
threatening the weak democracy (Schubert, 2010, p.3). 
 
Schubert (2010, pp.11-12) asserts that the practice predominant in the oil-rich developed 
countries, such as Canada and Norway, is a diversification [of the economy]. The oil-rich 
developing countries tend to invest more in war than diversifying the oil revenue by investing 
in  the  other  sectors  of  the  economy,  as  in  the  developed  oil-rich  states  (Lawan,  2008; 
Muhwezi, 2009).   A high variation in the marginal growth and performance in the economies 
of  the  oil-rich  countries  might  be predicated  on  the  way in  which  oil  revenue  is  being 
managed by states. For instance, Nigeria and Indonesia have had the same high dependence 
on oil revenue over a period of 30 years, though the: “per capita income of the Asian nation is 
four times higher than that of Nigeria, [an] ECOWAS member state” (Humphrey’s et al., 
2007, p.1). The economic transformation was due to the ability of the Indonesian government 
to  diversify  its  revenue  source,  thereby  reducing  the  level  of  reliance  on  the  revenue 
generated from oil. This, consequently, liberated the Indonesian state from being a 
monoculture,  to  a  well-diversified,  economy.  Most  state  governments  in  Nigeria  had 
advocated the need to develop other sectors of the Nigerian economy and reduce petro-
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dependence, for the dependence on crude oil revenues and the monthly allocations from oil 
revenue have led to corruption in governance (Watts, 1999; Aghalino, 2009; Evoh, 2009; Idu, 
2011). 
 
 
 
Ross (2012, p.144) notes that those developing countries, which are endowed with crude oil, 
are twice as much prone to having a civil war compared with those countries without oil 
resources, as evidenced by oil-related conflict across the globe. Investment into wars is said 
to have a harmful effect on the seemingly evolving economies of the emerging democratic 
societies. Ross (2012, p.144) describes this phenomenon of misplaced priority as a paradigm 
of easy solutions to complex problems, accounting for the economic failure of some of the 
oil-rich less developed countries.  The argument is that some violent conflicts in the resource- 
rich developing countries are facilitated by the revenue allocation formula that is usually 
adopted by their governments for sharing the revenue accruable from oil. 
 
Oil resources appear to be the reason for the conflict in the Middle East and Africa. This has 
created  the  basis  for  the  slow  economic  growth  for  the  countries  in  these  regions 
(Humphreys, 2007; Schubert, 2010; Ross, 2012).  Colgan (2010, p.1) observes that, despite 
the huge revenue accruable from oil, it has also been noticed that a lot of the crises in the oil- 
rich nations are associated with the politics surrounding the oil. The incessant war in some of 
the oil-rich countries has created a breeding ground for poverty, as the oil money that would 
have been channelled into development projects is used in procuring arms by the government 
to fight members of insurgency groups that challenge the government over its reckless 
spending and corruption. Thus, civil wars and violent conflicts have the potential to weaken 
institutional mechanisms for implementing the provisions of the laws of the land (Ross, 2006, 
p. 266). This tends to slow down the pace of development in society as the citizens struggle 
in their efforts to earn a living.
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3.3.10 Link between CSR and Conflict 
 
 
 
Many studies have linked CSR with conflict (Berman, 2000; Haufler, 2004a; Idemudia, 
 
2010).  The  environmental  unfriendly activities  of  MNOCs  are  contributory to  conflicts, 
whereas their genuine CSR involvement can prevent and quell conflicts.    Banfield et al. 
(2005) observe that conflict-sensitive organisations and their managements symbolize a 
necessary part of a combined effort to achieve a more peaceful world. In other words, the 
CSR  commitment  of  businesses  would  definitely  influence  changes  or  the  outcome  of 
conflicts within the local communities and society, at large. However, businesses cannot stay 
neutral in conflict situations, as the advocates of CSR suggest that organisations seem to have 
focused on the enhancement of a peaceful business environment in their host communities 
(Bennett, 2002; Idemudia, 2010). 
 
Paradoxically, it is still disputable that CSR and conflict have a close nexus, especially in the 
context of conflict de-escalation. Haufler (2004b) argues that there is no adequate empirical 
evidence to decide whether or not the involvement of businesses in CSR could prevent or 
reduce conflict. However, recent studies have been directed towards this direction (Idemudia, 
2008).   The scientific community is hesitant in establishing the scope of sincere corporate 
citizenship on security and its contributions in either triggering or quelling intra-state conflict 
in particular (Worlf et al., 2007, p. 410). It is, therefore, possible to conclude that given the 
expected growing role of businesses in conflict mitigation, there appears to be a necessity to 
examine the situation and scope to which these roles can be fulfilled, hence businesses are 
perceived as effectual vehicles for conflict mitigation (Idemudia, 2010, p. 834). 
 
Concrete CSR reduces the negative impact of business activities on the environment; society 
reserves the right to a healthy and clean environment irrespective of corporate practices.   The 
theory of the right to a liveable environment was established in Blackstone (1988), who notes
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that the right to a clean, safe environment is a human right. Therefore, MNOCs are expected 
to act responsibly to protect this human right. This is, particularly, important nowadays owing 
to the danger of the lack of a liveable ecosystem essential for human existence. Guerrette 
(1986) has also demonstrated the importance of this theory by arguing that it is not possible 
for humans to flourish in an environment that is chemically toxic while at the time 
experiencing freedom or being content with the quality of the air they breathe. Most 
importantly, the right to a liveable environment is enshrined in the constitutions of most 
countries; therefore, this is an inalienable right. In other words, a distortion of this right is 
capable of causing conflict. 
 
In the Niger Delta region, for example, when building a pipeline, the MNOCs would engage 
the communities with another project, which ends as soon the pipeline is completed. This 
implies that projects in the realm of CSR in the region are only peace projects, because the oil 
companies  have  realized  there would  be conflict  otherwise.  On  the  problems  with  CSR 
projects in the Niger Delta, Idemudia (2010, p. 840) argues that the failure of MNOCs in 
CSR involvement was the major triggering factor for the Ken Saro-Wiwa-led protest that 
resulted in massive human rights violations in Nigeria in the 1990s. Frynas (2005) alleged 
that, most businesses get involved in CSR for selfish reasons; such as that of maintaining a 
stable working environment. Apparently MNOCs involvement in CSR with the Niger Delta 
has not been carried out as obligation but haphazardly. Put differently, as a measure of 
managing the regions conflict.
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3.4       Summary 
 
 
This chapter reviewed the relevant literatures on the subject matter of the study. It began with 
the theoretical framework, which provided the basis for analysing the corpus of the literature 
in the realm of CSR and conflict. In this regard, the Marxist social conflict theory, frustration- 
aggression theory, and the stakeholder theory were extensively examined. Other concepts 
analysed, were the evolution and dimensions of CSR; conflict and its dimensions, causes and 
strategies for its resolution; oil conflicts in the Niger Delta and the role of MNOCs managing 
the conflicts. In the next chapter, the study presents the method employed in carrying out this 
study.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 
 
MIXED-METHODS DESCRIPTIVE RESEARCH  DESIGN STUDY AND 
RESEARCH  SETTING 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the research settings and the mixed-methods and descriptive design 
study. The study was designed in such a way as to serve as guide for answering the research 
questions. Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS Inc.), Version 17 was used in 
analysing  the  quantitative  data,  while  the  qualitative  data  were  analysed  using  content 
analysis. As noted earlier, this study adopted a triangulation of data obtained from both 
interviews and questionnaires. This approach was adopted because of the need to have a 
balanced and complete opinion of the participants and thus make the findings more objective. 
 
4.2 The Approach 
 
Saunders  et  al.  (2012,  p.  143)  identifies  two  major  research  approaches  based  on  the 
reasoning the researcher adopts, namely: deductive and inductive. However, Ketokivi and 
Mantere (2010) add abductive research approach to these. Detailed analysis of these three 
research approaches and the justification for their choice for this study are presented below. 
 
4.2.1 Deductive Reasoning 
 
This  type of  research  reasoning begins  from  a  general premise  to  a  specific  conclusion 
(Saunders et al., 2012, p. 143). They further postulated “deductive reasoning progresses from 
a universal rule to a definite conclusion. In deductive reasoning, where the original claims are 
true, the conclusion must also be true”. A calculated specimen of deductive reasoning is this: 
 
If x = 5
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And y = 3 
 
 
 
Then 2x + y =13 
 
 
 
The  example  above  implies  a  logical  inevitability that  2x  plus  y must  be  equal  to  13. 
Syllogism is a Greek word used to represent general proposition in reasoning. It means a 
logical argument that is normally applied in deductive reasoning to arrive at a conclusion 
based on two or more propositions that are presumed to be true (Thagard and Shelly, 1997). 
Put differently, premises lead to logical conclusions. A language form of exemplifying the 
deductive syllogism reasoning is as follows: 
 
There is nothing like drought in East midlands. 
Derby is located in East midlands. 
Therefore, Derbyshire council need not plan for drought management. 
 
Based on the above deductive syllogism, although the inferential process is valid, the 
conclusion is invalid, as Derby was declared a drought-prone area based on its 2011 driest 
record (Allen, 2011). A premise could be true or false based on the truthful nature of the 
original   premises.   Notwithstanding   the   truth   or   falsity  of   the   syllogism   inferential 
proposition, the deductive process could be valid or invalid. In some instances as above, the 
inferential process is valid even though the conclusion is false. 
 
4.2.2 Inductive  Reasoning 
 
Inductive research approach starts its observation from specific and then begins to generalise 
conclusions that are believed to be true based on gathered evidence, but not certainly true 
(Saunders et al., 2012, p. 143). In the inductive approach to research reasoning, propositions 
attempts to provide strong evidence for the validity of a conclusion, which is not necessarily 
an absolute proof of validity or truth. The conclusions in inductive reasoning are not logical
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necessities as in the deductive approach; hence, the conclusion is not always guaranteed. The 
reason is that there is no stipulated mechanism to ascertain that all evidence required to arrive 
at  a particular conclusion  has  been  supplied,  assuring that there is  no  further unnoticed 
evidence that could crop up later to invalidate the conclusion (Thagard and Shelly, 1997). 
Inductive reasoning begins from a specific paradigm and ends up with broad conclusions, for 
example: 
 
My tertiary institution supervisor is lenient. 
 
 
 
My last tertiary institution supervisor is lenient. 
Therefore, all tertiary institution supervisors are lenient. 
Mathematically, a typical inductive reasoning approach can be represented logically from 
specific to general conclusion as follows: 
 
5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 
 
 
 
In the example above, an inductive way of reasoning would present the next figure as 35. 
This appears cogent enough following the line of argument but it does not necessarily mean 
that 35 must be the next figure. Inductive reasoning is believed to be simply true or false but 
it is not a logical necessity though the reasoning may be cogent. This implies that, although 
the  available  evidence  is  either  convincing  or  relevant,  the  conclusions  may  not  be 
necessarily true or false, but they appear complete (Thagard and Shelly, 1997). 
 
4.2.3 Abductive Reasoning 
 
The abductive reasoning approach to research, which is rarely adopted by researchers, begins 
with an incomplete premise and concludes with the most likely explanation of the premise 
(Ketokivi and Mantere, 2010). In this type of reasoning, decision is based on the information
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at hand, which is usually incomplete. This can best be exemplified in the medical sciences or 
the law court. In medical sciences, a doctor could start a malaria treatment based on the 
symptoms the patient's manifests which may not be complete; or a judge may give a court 
ruling based on the available evidence, which, in most times, is incomplete (Thagard and 
Shelly, 1997). 
 
Most  scholars  have  either  carefully  or  unknowingly  ignored  the  abductive  reasoning 
approach  to  research,  basically  focusing  on  the  relevance  of  inductive  and  deductive 
reasoning.  It is, therefore, not surprising that Horn (2009) focused his research work on 
inductive and deductive reasoning, leading to “bottom-up” reasoning,  where a pattern of 
behaviour is drawn from  available instances, and a general  theory developed to provide 
generalizations about the observed behaviour. But in the latter (deductive reasoning), often 
known as “top-down” reasoning, a theory is used as the starting point of the reasoning. This 
is later narrowed down to a hypothesis and observations used to test the hypothesis, from 
which it is confirmed or rejected (Horn, 2009, p. 108). 
 
It is necessary for a researcher to decide and justify which research approach to adopt. This 
research adopted both the inductive and deductive approach. This was because the study 
combined qualitative and quantitative strategies. The quantitative strategy used the deductive 
approach, while the qualitative strategy adopted the inductive approach. Gill and Johnson 
(2002, p. 39) have found a bond between deductive reasoning and 'positivism' as well as the 
inductive  approach  and  'subjectivist'  approach  to  research.  The  'positivist'  believes  in 
universal truths. In this form of reasoning, the researcher is expected to generate research 
objectives  that  discover  the  laws  concerning universal  truths.  The  'subjectivist' does  not 
believe  in  universal  truths  but  in  a  reality  that  whose  construction  humans  generally
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contribute to.  The researchers' objective  here is  to  ascertain  the  methods  through  which 
reality is constructed or to explore an established reality (Horn, 2009, p. 109). 
 
 
4.3The Strategy 
 
As mentioned, the adoption of qualitative and quantitative strategies is a combination of two 
different methods of data collection and analysis (Lehner, 2011). According to Creswell and 
Plano Clark (2011) and Creswell (2011), a mixed methods research design is a rigorous 
pattern used in collecting, analysing, and mixing both quantitative and qualitative methods in 
a single study or a series of studies to resolve and cope with a research problem (Creswell, 
2011, p. 535). Put differently, the mixed-methods approach is employed in any study that 
seeks  to  generate  adequate  data,  especially  when  a  particular  methodology  does  not 
completely address all the research questions. In addition, each of them has a role to play in 
enhancing the  objectivity and  ethical  considerations  that  the  study seeks  to  uphold.  For 
Tuckman (1994), the two methodological approaches are utilised in answering similar or 
related questions.  However, Hammersley (1999) has disputed this with the assertion that the 
nature of the study and the need to address specific questions could make a researcher to 
focus  on  any of  the  approaches:  qualitative  or  quantitative  methodology.  The  approach 
chosen would determine the processes and instruments to be used in gathering data. 
 
According to  Jegede  (2006,  p.  113),  qualitative  studies  are  designed  to  enable both  the 
researcher and readers to comprehend the context of various research questions that the study 
seeks to respond to; and these could be economic, psychological, social or political contexts. 
There are also some cases that demand consideration of other contexts, including cultural, 
and geographical. Qualitative data are generated through primary sources, including direct 
observations, interactions with participants, as well as other secondary sources, like books, 
policy papers,  and  journal  articles  (Ulin  et  al.  2002,  p.  138,  as  cited  in  Jegede,  2006).
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People  also  conduct  key  informant  interviews,  in-depth  interviews,  and  focus  group 
discussions  as  part  of  qualitative  studies.  Qualitative  studies  have  also  benefited  from 
computer revolution. For example, in the past,  researchers  conducted  studies using their 
hands to write as interviews were going on, and later transcribed the text verbatim by hand. 
However, the advent of computer software programmes has enhanced qualitative analysis by 
performing many of the basic data manipulation procedures (Jegede, 2006, p.120). 
 
Another position on data generation has stated  that qualitative data gives an in-depth  and 
workable (or adequate) data that would have been difficult when only quantitative data 
generation is adopted. The results are presented in words or pictures rather than numbers. 
Qualitative data does not seem to appreciate multiple participants when the quantitative 
methodology is in use (Henninger, 2009). The qualitative approach that is mixed in this study 
involved the use of in-depth interviews, observations, and archival materials. According to 
Robson and Foster (1989, p.10), to actualise the aims of interviews, the objectives discussed at 
the briefing need to be translated into interview guide that covers all the discussions. Also, the 
interviewer needs to decide the order in which tasks are given to respondents, arranges them in 
an  orderly manner,  and  also  provides  a  time plan/map.  For  this  work,  the  researcher has 
succeeded   in   adopting   the   aforementioned   factors   that   facilitated   the   success   of 
interviews.  The  data  gathered  from  the  study  are  transcribed  and  analysed  based  on  the 
content  and  context  of  the  study.  Data  transcription  and  analysis  offer  researchers  the 
opportunity to develop cutting-edge studies that would stand the test of time, especially in 
providing answers to scientific or scholarly questions about society, people, or events, as the 
case may be
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For  Henninger  (2009),  quantitative  research  is  synonymous  with  quantities  that  target 
numbers. The results are usually based on numerical analysis and statistics. It is believed that 
the more the number of participants, the better the shape the analysis takes. Henninger further 
argued that a particular strength of quantitative research is that statistical analysis allows for 
generalization to others. It has the advantage of choosing quantitatively a “sample that closely 
resembles  the  population.  Qualitative  research  does  not  seek to  choose samples  that  are 
representative of populations. Quantitative analysis allows researchers to test specific 
hypotheses.  Depending  on  research  findings,  hypotheses  are  either  supported  or  not 
supported|”   (Henninger,   2009,   p.   1).   Quantitative   research   has   been   enhanced   by 
technological revolution, specifically with the emergence of  computers  across the world. 
These computers have software designed to make research a worthwhile exercise. The 
advantage  is  not  only the speed;  accuracy is  also  guaranteed  as  far as  data  analysis  is 
concerned (Henninger, 2009). 
 
 
4.3.1 The Rationale  for the Adopting a Mixed-method  Strategy 
 
There are various reasons put forth by scholars as to why a certain research design is adopted. 
The rationale for adopting a mixed-method in this study is the nature of corporate practices, 
especially corporate social responsibility (CSR) implementation in most host communities. 
Thus, it is adopted because it is an “approach utilizing multiple data sources, multiple 
participants or respondents, and multiple methods to gather multiple perspectives on the same 
topic” (Creswell, 2011, p. 534). 
 
Blaikie (2003, p. 18) asserts that the adoption of “various means of data collection and the 
degree of an empirical phenomenon would facilitate researchers to overcome the problem of 
bias and validity issues”. For this study, the multiplicity of stakeholders demands that a 
combination of data gathering and  analysis be adopted to get complete data. Given that
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qualitative research is designed for explanatory purposes, its combination with quantitative 
method would enable researchers to secure complete and new ideas. In particular, more data 
would be generated to produce reliable information that will not only offer explanation of 
salient variables, but also explain new theories (Jegede, 2006, p. 114). 
 
The  multinational  oil  companies  (MNOCs)  located  in  the  Niger  Delta  is  shown  in  the 
diagram below. 
Fig. 4:1 MAP OF THE NIGER DELTA SHOWING  OIL FIELDS AND PIPELINES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source (s):http://www.waado.org/NigerDelta/Maps/Oilfields.html; accessed July 8, 
 
2014. 
 
The MNOCs operating in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria include the Shell Group of 
 
Companies  (Shell  Petroleum  Developing  Company,  SPDC),  ExxonMobil,  ConocoPhilip,
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Statoil,  Occidental,  BP-AMOCO,  the  ENI group  (Nigerian  Agip  Oil  Company,  NAOC), 
SAIPEM, CNL, Total and Elf, and Addax. Shell is reported to have the largest area of 
operation in Nigeria, which accounts for over half of the oil deposits in Nigeria. SPDC is a 
joint venture operation comprising NNPC (55%), SPDC (30%), Elf Petroleum (10%) and 
NAOC  (5%),  with  SPDC  as  the  operational  partner  of  the  joint  venture  (Shell,  2000; 
Aghalino, 2004). The second oil company, ENI’s Nigeria Agip Oil Company (NAOC) 
produces about 180,000 barrels of oil per day (Eco, 2001). 
 
 
 
4.3.2 The Rationale  for the Choice of the Oil Companies 
 
Many factors were considered in choosing the multinational oil companies for this mixed- 
methods descriptive study, the major ones being their level of involvement and stakeholders 
in the oil industry. According to Hantrais (2007), there are crucial considerations that must be 
made in selecting any sample size or population, including possibility of gaining access, raw 
and adequate data, as well as the quality of data sources. The objective of the research sample 
is critical to the completion and results of the study. To enable the scholar to address all the 
aims of the study, it is suggested that any research sample for a qualitative study is likely to 
be purposive (Stake, 1995; Lincoln and Guba, 1985). 
 
The choice of MNOCs was inspired by their involvement in development as well as 
transformation of the oil industry and host communities, and the development discourse in 
theory and practice. Given that Shell is a leading member of the world business council for 
sustainable development (WBCSD) and that it co-chaired the working group that produced 
WBCSD’s Corporate Social Responsibility Report (Natufe 2001), it cannot be neglected; 
Agip and Chevron occupy a similar status.   These MNOCs operate in various Niger Delta 
communities,  including  Ogoni,  Nembe,  Odioma,  Kula,  Warri,  Twon,  and  Oluashiri.
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4.4 Defining the Study Sample 
 
This mixed-method study sample was selected from multiple sources, including multinational 
oil companies and host communities in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. This approach was 
motivated by the researcher’s experience and background as an indigene of the Niger Delta 
region.  A  researcher’s   familiarity  with   the  context  of  study  enhances  the  research 
investigation and processes (Bereday, 1964). Although familiarity of the researcher with the 
region is unlikely to influence or skew the findings of the study, however, an unbalanced and 
poor choice of sample has negative impact on research discussions and findings (Marshall 
and  Rossman,  2006).  The  three  MNOCs  selected  for  this  study  were  Shell,  Agip,  and 
Chevron. Their profiles are presented in subsequent sections. 
 
4.4.1 Shell 
 
A  review  of  the  history  of  the  oil  industry  in  Nigeria  shows  that  Shell  Petroleum 
Development Company of Nigeria Limited is a product of the 1907 merger of the British 
Shell  Trading  and  Transport  Company  and  the  Netherland’s  Royal  Dutch  Group  of 
Companies. The company obtained its exploration concession from the British colonial 
administration in 1937, with exclusive rights over the whole area of the country, including the 
Southern Cameroons, which was then administered as part of Colonial Nigeria. Owerri, in the 
present Imo State, was its first headquarters. The company commenced the investigation of a 
totally unknown territory after merging with the D’Arcy Exploration activities in the country 
in the early 1930s (Udeke 1995). 
 
With the merger of British Petroleum and Shell D’Arcy in 1946 at the end of the Second 
World  War,  the  name  of  the  company  was  changed  to  Shell  BP.  It  continued  its  oil 
exploration under this new joint ownership of Netherland’s Royal Dutch Group and British 
Petroleum  Corporation.  But  when  oil  was  found  in  commercial  quantity in  Oloibiri  (in
158  
present Bayelsa State) the company had to relocate its headquarters from Owerri to Port 
Harcourt. The movement, which started in 1957 with the construction of its office complex 
and residential area of 400 housing units, was completed in 1959. Port Harcourt’s air link 
with Lagos (then Federal Capital) along with its superior telecommunication links was a 
better  location  than  Owerri.  By  1959  when  her  relocation  to  Port  Harcourt  was  fully 
complete, she had also doubled her oil production figure to 8,000 barrels per day (Udeke, 
1995, p. 21). 
 
 
 
Frynas and Paulo (2007, p. 235) posit that, initially, “Shell BP was given an effective 
monopoly for  oil  exploration  and  production  in  Nigeria”.  Additionally,  according to  the 
Nigerian history, a 1914 colonial administration ordinance postulated that only British oil 
corporations were legitimate to obtain oil licenses in Nigeria. The decree bequeathed Shell 
BP the authority to dominate oil industry in Nigeria. “Shell has a 25.6 % production in the 
Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas Company (NLNG) and at the same time works as the technical 
adviser to the NLNG; while the other partners are NNPC 49%, Elf 15 %, and Agip 10.4 %” 
(Shell, 2000, as cited in Aghalino, 2004, p.2). 
 
4.4.2 Agip 
 
The Nigeria Agip Oil Company (Agenzie Generale Italiana Petreliche –NAOC) was formed 
in   Nigeria   in   1962,   following   an   oil-prospecting   agreement   between   the   Nigerian 
Government and Agip Mineraria SPA of Milan in Italy. Its Nigerian subsidiary is called the 
Nigerian Agip Oil Company (NAOC), which is a member of the Italian government-owned 
E. N. I. group of companies.
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Fig. 4.2:          A Map of the Niger Delta Showing Swamps, Pipelines, Cities, Oil 
 
Fields and Terminals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to Udeke (1995), this agreement was in tandem with Agip’s global policy of 
encouraging its host country’s government participation in the company’s oil exploration and 
production. In 1963, the company was granted oil-prospecting licence (OPL) covering an 
area of 5,313.5 square kilometres in the Niger Delta swamp of Rivers and present Delta 
States. The drilling of its first two wells, Sangakubu 1 and Obama 1 were done also in 1962 
(p. 22). According to Mr. Sam Amur, a pioneer staff of the company, the first two wells were 
exploratory failures. Though demoralised as a result of the initial exploration activities, the 
company finally struck oil on March 1, 1965, in its Ebocha 1 well, which was the third 
exploratory  well  drilled  since  its  commencement  of  exploration.  The  Ebocha  oil  well
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discovery  boosted  the  need  to  explore  for  more  petroleum  in  the  country,  as  it  was  a 
watershed in the company’s exploratory activities. 
 
Following this first discovery, exploratory activities spread to neighbouring communities, 
such as Idu, Mbede, and Omoku, in former Ahoada Local Government Area, as well as parts 
of  Egbema  (Udeke,  1995).  Between  1970  and  1977,  the  company’s  crude  production 
increased  from  its  twenty producing  fields  to  250,000  barrels  per  day.  Furthermore,  its 
operation on behalf of Agip-Philips-NNPC joint venture was supported by a large number of 
production facilities, which included an oil centre, two gas plants, nine flow stations and an 
oil export terminal (Udeke, 1995). The growth of Nigeria’s oil industry cannot be complete 
without mentioning the role played by the Agip even though the company has been struggling 
to  manage  its  broken  relationship  with  some  host  communities  as  a  result  of its  failed 
promises and poor implementation of its corporate social responsibility (CSR). 
 
4.4.3 Chevron 
 
Chevron  Nigeria is  a significant  player in  the petrochemical  industry and  a well-known 
stakeholder in oil production in the country. The company is involved in oil exploration and 
exploitation operations in the Niger Delta. Their other activities include blending, 
manufacturing and marketing across the country. 
 
4.4.4 The Ogoni Community 
 
Historically,  the Ogoni  community belongs  to  the  Benue-Congo  branch  of  Niger-Congo 
along with Efik-Ibibio. The complexity of the language and map of the Niger Delta region 
confirm the complexity of contact and movements of people within the area (Alagoa, 2005, 
p.16). The Ogoni community is located in the present-day Rivers State of Nigeria, and is one 
of  the  oil-producing  communities  that  have  witnessed  series  of  violent  and  nonviolent 
protests in the past. Its anti-oil protests against government’s lack of vision and functional
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plans for equitable distribution of oil wealth in the 1980s (Frynas, 2001, p.29) culminated in 
the hanging of nine Ogoni sons, including the human rights activist Ken Saro Wiwa, who was 
arrested by security forces several times (Ken Saro -Wiwa, 1992) before his death. On the 
Ogoni struggle, Ken Saro Wiwa (1992) states his feelings regarding how the Ogonis were 
ground to dust by the collective effort of MNOCs and the Nigerian military government, 
which he refers to as both murderous and dictatorial. 
 
According to an organisation called Remember Saro Wiwa, when the Iko people (in present 
Akwa Ibom State) held a non-violent protest against Shell in 1987, the infamous Mobile 
Police  Force  (MPF),  locally  known  as  “kill-and-go”  was  deployed  by  the  Nigerian 
government to repress them. Forty houses were destroyed, while 350 people were made 
homeless by the attack. It was not unexpected that the Ogoni leaders signed the Ogoni Bill of 
Rights,  August  1990,  which  demanded  for  “political  control  of  Ogoni  affairs  by Ogoni 
people, control and use of Ogoni economic resources for Ogoni development, adequate and 
direct representation as of right for Ogoni people in all Nigerian national institutions and the 
right to protect the Ogoni environment and ecology from further degradation” (Social Action, 
2009, p. 38). Thereafter, the people were inspired to form a non-aggressive social group 
called Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) (Ako, 2015).  However, the 
non-radicalisation of the Ogoni was, unfortunately, greeted by government’s consistent 
clampdown on various sons and daughters of the community. Ken Saro Wiwa (1992) argues 
that the heightened attacks targeted at Shell and its oil-related activities in the Niger Delta 
were caused by the company’s inability to address the impasse peacefully. 
 
Today, the people celebrate the Ogoni Day on 4th January annually. The self-determination 
agitations by the Ogoni seem to be hampered by government’s lack of interest in addressing 
their demands, especially in the area of abating ecological damage (Ojakorotu, 2009). Some
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of the indigenes of Ogoniland seem to be concerned about government’s lack of interest in 
considering demand for resource control by the oil-bearing states and communities. This 
 
problem appears to be aggravated by corporate practices that have directly affected the rural 
population. For instance, in December 2013, the people of Ogoni staged a protest in Port- 
Harcourt and environs to give the oil companies an ultimatum to implement the report by 
United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) on Ogoni. According to them, there was 
no going back on the 90-day ultimatum given to the MNOCs and the Nigerian government to 
implement the UNEP report on oil pollution in Ogoniland. They claimed that they were 
 
rallying for a sequence of non-violent direct actions that would cripple economic activities in 
the country 
Fig. 4.3: Picture Showing Ken Saro-Wiwa Addressing a Community  Rally 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source (s): Remember Saro Wiwa Coalition; available at 
http://remembersarowiwa.com/background/the-ogoni-struggle; accessed July 8, 2014.
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4.4.5 Nembe Community 
 
Nembe is one of the Ijaw clans, including Ibani (Bonny), Okrika, Kalabari, Brass and Akassa 
(Ayomike, 1990, p.5). Other clans are the Apoi, Furupagha, Olodiama, Egbema, Gbaramatu, 
Gbaran, Tungbo, Zarama, Ekpetiama, Okodia, and TarakiriBoma, among others. Nembe is 
located in the Eastern Delta kingdom. It has been one of the Ijaw towns that can be said to 
have welcomed migrants from Igbematoru area (Alagoa, 1972). The central political problem 
within the Nembe area is the maintenance of balance in the internal affairs so that the two 
sections can combine to be effective in warding off external actions. The people made efforts 
to attract European traders to establish depots on the Brass River at the early years of the 
nineteenth century (Alagoa, 1972, p.128). 
 
However, before the Atlantic trade, for instance, the political structure was basically focused 
on kinship and descent, while the basic ethnic unit was the ibe, also called clan. There were 
notable   villagegods,   including   Amaoruand   Amakiri   (god   of   the   settled   earth),   and 
Amatemesuo (the spirit of the earth). There was, also, a highly organised trading corporation 
known as the canoe house (Etemike, et al. 1997, p.14). The 1895 Nembe-British War created 
the impetus or the trend of expansion, “as many chiefs of both Ogbolomabiri and Bassambri 
sought for refuge in the established Okoroma, Ogbia and Abureni communities or founded 
new communities to resettle their subjects” (Alagoa, 1999, p. 217). Moreover, mutual 
suspicion and contestations among different groups also characterised the era of Atlantic 
slave trade within the area (Alagoa, 1999). 
 
As the city of Nembe grew in strength, it began to acquire leadership over a number of towns 
and villages in a widening neighbourhood. Two types of communities acceded to the 
leadership  and  control  of the city (Alagoa, 1972,  p.128).  These were  the settlements  of 
identical language and culture, such as Okpoama, Twon, and Odioma. There were also the
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mini communities, such as Okoroba and Idema, to the north; and the towns of Egwema, 
Liama, and others on the coastal island west of Twon with cultures and languages different 
from those of Nembe (Alagoa, 2005). 
 
 
 
The Nembe people are well-known farmers and traders, as they have not only established salt 
industry and exchanged fish for other commodities; they are also instrumental to the 
introduction of new crops from other areas like Warri. The Nembe are known to have cordial 
relationship  with  other ethnic  groups  and  their  Ijaw  neighbours.  For  instance,  Okpoama 
traditions  confirm  of  special  relations  between  Mingi  of  Nembe  and  King  Orukari  of 
Okpoama (Alagoa, 1972, p. 128). When traditional rulers establish good relationship, their 
subjects will benefit from it, while the communities involved enjoy positive peace. 
 
The  Nembe-Ibe  king,  the  Mingi  or  Amanyanabo  of  Nembe  (Ogbolomabiri)  was  given 
adequate support by the war-canoe chiefs who control and take care of the members of their 
war-canoe-houses. Each house comprised a group of households or a large household headed 
by  a  chief.  A  canoe  house  was  a  compact  and  well-organised  trading  and  fighting 
corporation, which made membership  free, while the leaders of each  house would meet 
together to form the governing council of the state (Etemike et al., 1997, p. 14-15). The 
fourteen main houses, known as war-canoe-houses in Nembeare Amain, Kulo/Koko, 
Igbeta/Ibuama, Ockiya, Ogbari, Ikata/Oruwari, Yekorogha, Yemainnain/ Karitongha, 
Amange/Ojoko, Gam-Dede, Oru-Bokolo, Peresuo, Bugo, and Iweka (Alagoa, 1972; 2005; 
Jones; 1963). The Ogbia have had very close historical links with the Nembe Ijo from ancient 
times. The tradition of linguistic evidence of Ogbia migration from the east that has similar 
historical links with Nembe Ijo is very strong (Alagoa, 2009, p.396). The oil exploration and 
exploitation activities in Nembe today made the people to demand for what they perceive as 
their right from the MNOCs that operate in their community.
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4.4.6 Odimodi Community 
Odimodi means “pond of fishes” in the Ijaw language. Odimodi is believed to originate from 
Idwuni clan, including the Ofogbene people. Like most oil-producing communities, Odimodi, 
which is in Burutu Local Government Area of Delta State, has a Community Development 
Committee. Odimodi has some neighbours, including Oghulagha community. The diagram 
below captures the geographical location of oil-producing communities in Delta State. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 4.4: Map Showing the Location of Odimodi Community  in the Niger Delta State 
 
 
3.5 Ontological and Epistemological  Considerations 
 
Ontology is the philosophy of seeing, while epistemology is the philosophy of the theory of 
knowledge. Furthermore, “ontology originates from the Greek words ontos which means 
being, and logos, that means study” (Sounders, et al., 2012). Ontology, therefore, is referred
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to as the study of being. Thus, it is believed that a researcher’s ontology is his or her answer 
to questions, especially when it involves the need to inquire, find out the reality, and the 
existence of issues and events (Chauncy, 2012). However, situational analysis or incidents 
requires ontological explanations to offer more insight to circumstances surrounding such 
development  (Chauncy,  2012).  As  for  epistemology,  it  originated  from  Greek  words, 
episteme, which connotes knowledge, and logos, which means study. It is, therefore, known 
as the study of knowledge (Chauncy, 2012, p. 10). 
 
Methodology,  epistemology,  and  ontology  have  one  thing  in  common:     to  advance 
knowledge and bring answers to questions through investigations. All these are utilized in 
responding to the issues that require attention in a scholarly manner. They are used not only 
to strengthen the facts on ground, but also to reshape them and promote the objectivity of the 
researcher. Scholars have argued that ontological and epistemological issues make it possible 
for a researcher to comprehend socio-economic reality as well as to adopt an achievable and 
objective  approach  with  high  ethical  considerations  for  achieving  them  (Hitchcock  and 
Hughes, 1995). 
 
 
In terms of social reality, the people of the Niger Delta communities are aware of their rights 
and know the practices of MNOCs that affect their sources of livelihood and existence. As a 
result, they have increased their demand for more attention to be paid to corporate social 
responsibility  issues.  The  model  below  demonstrates  social  reality  in  an  organisation.
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Fig 4.5: Figure Showing Social Reality in Organization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The social construction of reality in organizations (Gjersvik, 1993b, p.37); available at 
http://www.idi.ntnu.no/grupper/su/publ/html/totland/ch032.htm; accessed, 20, February 2014. 
 
4.6 Research Methods 
In a study such as this, just as in every other research, data collection is crucial. It enriches 
the work and adds value to the objectivity of the researcher. Interviews were conducted to 
gather data from three major multinational oil corporations operating in the Niger Delta 
region on how they formulate and execute their CSR and the outcomes. Questions regarding 
what the companies have done in the area of corporate social responsibility (CSR) were 
asked, particularly their strategies. In addition, the study tried to know why, despite what the 
MNOCs have done to promote corporate citizenship, protests and conflicts litter the Niger 
Delta region. The researcher tried also to ascertain the expectations of the communities from 
the oil companies and what the MNOCs would have done differently. The respondents, 
 
including the leaders of the militants and the youths, were asked why they engage in violent 
conflicts and what they expect from both the government and MNOCs. Government officials
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were also interviewed to know what has been done in the form of interventions to address the 
issues raised by the host communities over the decades. 
 
There are different types of mixed-methods descriptive design studies, but the one employed 
for this study was the convergent similar design (Creswell, 2011, p.540), the reason being 
that, it enables the researcher to collect both qualitative and quantitative data and use the 
results to understand the research problem. One of the advantages of this method is that both 
types of information would acquire equal status in sampling, data collection, and analysis 
(Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, and Turner, 2007). 
 
There are criticisms against the adoption of only the qualitative method, especially in the area 
of validity.   Quantitative   researchers   are   of   the   view   that   it   is   too   subjective   and 
impressionistic, as the result is mostly dependent on the researcher’s view of what is relevant 
to the study, which implies that the process is usually unstructured (Bryman, 2004, p.265). In 
addition,   some   scholars   argue   that   qualitative   researchers   are   usually  enmeshed   in 
“conspiracy in the relative demise of the techniques” required to make any study objective. In 
other words, it is believed that they seem to encourage the idea of buying respondents by the 
yard (Robson and Foster, 1989, p.50).6 This, if not taken seriously, would prevent a study 
 
from achieving the set  objectives. That is why the adoption of the triangulation of both 
qualitative and quantitative methods in this study is pertinent. In Figure 3.6 below captures 
the research methods and why a combination of both qualitative and quantitative methods is 
most suitable for this study. 
 
 
6 The issue of objectivity is very critical in every research because it not only makes the 
study relevant, but also addresses the aim adequately; meeting the targets set, and 
communicates effectively to the audience / readers.  Robson and Foster (1989, p.51) discuss a 
situation where ‘deception is easier to interview one person, than to interview many; to the 
extent that the respondent may come along to the interview feeling happier to be alone than to 
be in a place full of strangers.’
Figure 4.6: The Difference between Quantitative and Qualitative Research 
 
 
Components    of    research 
 
approaches 
Quantitative Qualitative 
Philosophical assumptions Positivist    perspective,    objective 
 
reality,  researcher  is  independent 
of that which is researched 
Postpositivist               perspective, 
 
naturalistic, social, multiple & 
subjective reality where researcher 
interacts  with  that  being 
researched 
Method/Types of Research Experimental,  quasi-experimental, 
 
single subject and descriptive, 
comparative, correlational, ex post 
facto 
Phenomenology,      case      study, 
 
ethnography,    grounded    theory, 
cultural studies 
Purpose/Goal of Research Generalizability,          explanation, 
 
prediction 
Understanding,                   insight, 
 
contextualization                      and 
interpretation 
Questions or Hypothesis Hypothesis  is  informed  guess  or 
 
prediction 
Question is evolving, general and 
 
flexible 
Those Being Researched Randomly       selected       sample, 
 
proportionally    representative    of 
population 
Usually a  small  number  of  non- 
 
representative cases 
Those      Conducting      the 
 
Research 
Etic    (outsider's  point  of  view): 
 
objective,   neutral,   detached   and 
Emic  (insider's  point  of  view): 
 
personal        involvement        and 
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 Impartial partiality 
Data Questionnaires,  survey,  tests  etc., 
 
in   the   form   of   numbers   and 
statistics 
Written   documents   from   field 
 
work,       interviews,       pictures, 
observations, objects etc. 
Data Analysis Deductive      process,      statistical 
 
procedures 
Inductive process: codes, themes, 
 
patterns to theory 
Source: Castellan (2010, p.7). 
 
 
 
 
Following the adoption of a combination of quantitative and qualitative research approaches, 
the tools with which the MNOCs level of CSR and its effect on the people and conflict in the 
Niger Delta region were assessed in the section below.  The essence of this is to enhance an 
understanding of the existing phenomenon (Michael and Myers, 1997, p.5). 
 
4.6.1 Mixed-methods Descriptive Design 
 
 
In this type of study, data is collected in relation to human behaviour, attitudes and 
characteristics  of  a  group  of  people  or  an  individual.  Descriptive  design  can  be  cross- 
sectional (interaction with a group or groups) or/and longitudinal (interaction with an 
individual) study. It can be used to find answers to the research “what is” and “what was” and 
is described as the best form of data collection that aids the explanation of human behaviour 
and existence (Bickman and Rog, 1998). 
 
According to McMillan (1996), triangulation is the use of different methods of gathering data 
or relevant information from different sources (Ikpia, 2005, p.5). In the view of Saunders 
(2012, p.179), collection of data from multiple sources is a necessity in a case study strategy, 
as it helps the researcher in reporting what it is supposed to be reported.  Jegede (2006, p.126)
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asserts that triangulation of methods is usually utilised in generating data and, sometimes, 
seems better than using a single method, as such combined methods corroborate each other. 
This mixed-methods approach gave the researcher the opportunity to investigate CSR and 
MNOCs in their natural settings (Miles and Huberman, 1994; as cited in Iknia, 2005, p.4) for 
an in-depth understanding of the issues under interrogation. 
 
Cohen et al. (2000) and Denzin and Lincoln (2003) argue that the robustness of the data made 
available through the use of multiple sources of data brings to the fore the complexity and 
reality associated with  quality studies,  especially when diverse approaches are employed 
(Stake, 2003). In this study, the instruments used were in-depth interviews and questionnaires 
as well as review of MNOCs’ reports, policy papers, and published works, among others. 
 
4.6.2 Interviews 
 
Interview refers to a situation where a definite eyewitness or participants in an episode is 
quizzed (Ogundipe et al., 2006). It is one of the most reliable sources of data generation 
during research, especially when samples are chosen. According to Henerson, Moris and 
Fitz-Gibbon  (1987,  p.4),  an  interview  can  be  unstructured,  semi-structured  or  structured 
(Ikpia, 2005, p.5). The researcher lists questions to get responses from the target group. The 
flexibility of this method of data generation enhances the comprehensibility of opinions or 
perceptions  expressed  by the  respondents.  This  is  where the  creativity of researchers or 
investigators  really matters  (Maxwell,  2005).    Through  interviews  (whether  an  in-depth, 
semi-structured interview, which allows flexibility to ask questions as interviewee gives some 
adjustments to the content of interview, or key informants interview) respondents are given 
more time and space to explore issues than in a survey. However, what matters in interviews 
are analysis of the specifics, rather than mere generalisations of a large number of people 
(Fawole  et  al.,  2006,  p.9).  For  instance,  this  study is  guided  by the  following research 
questions:
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(i) What are the key causes of restiveness in the Niger Delta and how should these issues be 
managed? 
 
(ii) What are the prevailing CSR strategies of the oil companies in the Niger Delta and how 
successful are they? 
 
(iii)  What  role  has  the  Federal  Government  played  in  the  conflict  resolution  and  how 
successful are the strategies? 
 
Thirty-four (34) respondents were interviewed in this study. Of this number, twelve (12) were 
chosen from  four  different  host  communities;  twelve  (12)  were chosen  from  the  public 
relations departments of the MNOCs; while 10 were chosen from government institutions. A 
breakdown of these figures is shown in chapter four of this work. 
 
The interview responses were analysed using content analysis. It is one of the oldest 
approaches  employed  in  analysing qualitative  data although  the  particular application  of 
content analysis differs depending on the nature of the research and the research objectives 
(Miles  and  Huberman,  1984).  Principally,  content  analysis  is  a systematic  research  tool 
employed to ascertain the existence of words and concepts. Content analysis can be used for 
various  materials,  including  texts  and  spoken  words  (both  video  and  audio  recordings), 
books, reports, emails and newspapers (Horn, 2009, p. 146-147). This study employed 
interview sessions that included the use of audio recordings as well as in-depth review of 
organisations reports and newspapers. 
 
4.6.3 Questionnaires 
 
Questionnaire simply means a data collection form containing a set of questions addressed to 
a  particular  population  for  which  information  is  required  (Osiki,  2006).  The  similarity 
between  interview  and  questionnaire  is  that  both  of  them  have  questions  listed  by the
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researcher to get adequate information from the respondents with the aim of completing a 
study.  Ogundipe et al.  (2006, p.99) posit that questionnaires may contain open-ended or 
close-ended research questions. The subject in close-ended questionnaires does the ranking or 
choice of responses, while the subject is left to explain responses in his or her own words in 
open-ended questionnaires. 
 
As Anon (1997) has noted, when items of questionnaires reflect the Likert-type scale, they 
show agreement or disagreement with the statements in the study (Ogundipe et al., 2006, p. 
99). A Likert-type scale involves a series of items. A five-step option or number (1-5) is 
normally provided to enable the participants to express their opinions. The numbers (1-5) 
represent a range of options (agreement to disagreement): Strongly Agree is 5; Agree is 4; No 
Opinion is 3; Disagree is 2; and Strongly Disagree is 1 (Creswell, 2011). 
 
Whether using an open- or close-ended questionnaire, it is the responsibility of the researcher 
to administer such questionnaires designed for respondents and for the latter to willingly 
respond to the research questions (Ikpia, 2005, p.4; Henerson et al., 1987). Osiki (2006) avers 
that a simple questionnaire may contain one or several purposes calibrated into its sub-themes 
for actual evaluation (p.133). When questionnaires are designed, they must be done in such a 
way that the questions would be easy for the respondents to understand. Using questionnaires 
involves quantitative study, which means that researchers gather information in the form of 
numerals. The outcome of the use of more structured research instruments would mean less 
detail  on  behaviour,  attitudes,  and  motivation  as  well  as  the  objectivity of the  analysis 
(Fawole et al., 2006, p.11). 
 
For this study, fire hundred and fifty (550) copies of a questionnaire were distributed to 
indigenous people in the host communities, staff of multinational oil companies and officials 
in  government  ministries,  departments  and  agencies.  However,  only  five  hundred  (500)
18 - 30 2 
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copies were retrieved at the end of the exercise. A tabular breakdown of this is shown in 
chapter four of this study. 
 
The following considerations must be made before adopting the use of questionnaire: the aim 
of the study or all the objectives that such investigation seeks to achieve; active search and 
review of the literature that relate to the area of focus; the gap that the study seeks to fill; 
current views on the problem of the study; comparative analysis of the available literature 
with the current opinions (Osiki, 2006, p.134). When all the stated factors are considered, the 
researcher is prepared to make use of questionnaires to complete the study. 
 
In this study, analysis of the quantitative data involved the use of the questions generated 
from the research questions and administered to the respondents. Questionnaire on “Conflict 
and the politics of oil in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria: a review of Corporate Social 
Responsibility Strategies of Multinational Oil Companies” was administered. The data were 
analysed using Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS Inc.), Version 17. 
 
Variable Labels 
 
Each of the categorical variables had a limited number of values, which represented a distinct 
label or category: 
 
Gender: 
 
 
Male                           1 
 
 
Female                        2 
 
 
Age distribution: 
 
 
10-17                          1
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31 and above               3 
 
 
Educational  level: 
School certificate        1 
Bachelor                      2 
 
 
Master’s                       3 
 
 
Doctorate                     4 
 
 
Others                          5 
 
 
Other variables, like the place of residence in the Niger Delta senatorial zones, position in 
organization  or  current  job  title,  position  in the community,  and  years  of experience in 
community service, are labelled according to the number of variables. 
 
4.6.4    Frequencies 
 
Results from the analysed data were presented in frequency tables, such as percentage, mean, 
bar chart, and pie chart. This will enable the readers to comprehend the nature of the conflict 
in the Niger Delta region as it concerns CSR delivery by the MNOCs. 
 
4.6.5    Cross-tabulation 
 
Cross-tabulation was used for categorical     measurement in Section 2 of the questionnaire, 
which deals with the key causes of the conflict in the Niger Delta region, its impact on the 
area and efforts by multinational oil companies (MNOCs) and the government to manage the 
conflict. Position in organization and in the community, years of experience in community 
service were cross-tabulated with the key causes of the conflict in the region, impacts and 
strategies adopted to manage the conflict in the Niger Delta. The results were presented in 
frequency tables and bar charts.
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4.6.6 Measurement level 
 
Numeric variables were nominal, ordinal or scale. They were defined using a simple rule 
based on the number of values. String variables were set to nominal and numeric variables. 
 
4.6.7 Missing values 
 
This line appeared only if any user-defined missing values are present. Missing variable was 
represented with 99. 
 
4.6.8 Secondary Sources 
 
The study also consulted exiting data in the form of research papers, books and journal 
articles that were written by scholars and analysts. It also utilized the works of human rights 
activists, staff and management of multinational oil companies (Shell, Chevron, Agip and 
NNPC), reports by government agencies (staff of the Department of Petroleum Resources, 
Federal  Ministry of  Environment,  and  research  institutes),  community leaders,  and  non- 
governmental  organisations.  Information  from  these  sources  were  properly analysed  and 
verified for their authenticity. 
 
The youths and elders of the oil-producing communities utilize the power of the media as a 
channel of making press statements to inform the general public and the global community of 
what they refer to as obnoxious environmental practices of the MNOCs in their villages. Such 
press statements are highly relevant in discussing CSR and oil politics in the Niger Delta 
region. Similarly, in response to allegations against oil companies and their operations, these 
companies also organise media chats, which are documented by national dailies. Institutions 
sometimes require permissions in the form of letters before they could grant researchers 
access to the records of government parastatals,  MNOCs  and ministries and individuals.
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4.6.9 Primary Sources 
 
There are various methods of generating primary data, including semi-structured interviews, 
open-ended interviews, questionnaires and focus group discussions, dyads and triads (Goss, 
1996; Bryman, 2004; Fawole et al., 2006). While focus group involves small group, ‘dyads’ 
refers to in-depth interviews with two or three people that represent a member of a family or 
team that use same products (Fawole et al., 2006, p.10). Content analysis is one of the 
methods  of  analysing primary data,  which  focuses  on  evaluating  and  interpreting visual 
materials (Fawole et al., 2006, p. 17). 
 
 
4.6.10 Limitations of Data Collection Method 
 
The purpose of this section is to describe the limitation for this mixed-methods descriptive 
design study. There are limitations in every academic work and this study is not an exception. 
The researcher was limited in many ways, including limited funding, timeframe, and the 
scope of the study. The researcher needed a lot of stakeholders to balance the data analysis 
but the survey was restricted to only a few oil corporations in the region, instead of all of 
them. Survey was done in this research with the notion that the participants from the few oil 
corporations  possess  the  knowledge  to  supply  the  required  data.  In  addition,  some 
respondents  delayed  in  returning their  copies  of  the  questionnaire,  while  others  did  not 
completely answer the questions. Besides, some of the respondents needed more time to 
complete and return their copies of the questionnaire. Some of the respondents, particularly 
members of Shell, Agip and Chevron as well as government officials, saw the interview as an 
academic exercise and, therefore, did not want to have anything to do with it. 
 
The study was further restricted by the magnitude of documents demanded by some of the oil 
companies  before  allowing  the  researcher  access  to  their  workers.  Again,  some  of  the 
officials of the corporations did not respond to the researcher’s request promptly, and this
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delayed the process. The oil companies’ internal protocol took a lot of time, which affected 
scheduling of interview. Although bureaucratic settings, economic constraints as well as the 
goal of the institutions (government and the oil corporations) were strong challenges, the 
researcher worked very hard to limit the effects of these deficiencies on the result of the 
findings. 
4.7 Ethical Considerations7 
 
Ethical considerations are an integral part of any research process. For Polit and Beck (2004), 
ethical considerations denote the moral standards to be considered by researcher throughout 
the course or stages of research design and methods. This is because, in every study, the 
researcher is expected to protect and respect human rights and dignity, and fair treatment and 
privacy of the participants (Creswell, 2011). That is to say that the “researcher-participants 
relationship” (p.76) should not be taken for granted or exploited in any manner.   Thus, in 
utilizing mixed-methods study design, data gathering process should be “ethical,” (Creswell, 
2011, p. 169); this means respecting the rights of the respondents in the study. 
 
 
 
The word “ethics” originated from the Greek words ethikos (moral) and ethos (character). It 
implies rules of conduct, customs, or values cherished by a group. Ethics represents a moral 
principle that involves the obligations and duties of members of any society (Igben, 2000, 
p.53). Obono et al. (2006) posit that ethics “focuses on the customary ways of acting and 
universal and relative judgments as to the rightness or wrongness of human conduct”. This 
affirms the assertion that ethical issues promote the principle of fairness, truth, objectivity 
and impartiality, thus raising the standard and discipline of scholars and professionals in their 
endeavours   (Igben,   2000).   The   protection   of   human   subjects   and   other   pertinent 
considerations are associated with ethics in every study. For instance, the University of 
 
7 Along with letter of introduction from her director of studies the student had to get letter 
officially to enable her visit MNOCs and other stakeholders before conducting interviews.
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Minnesota’s Centre for Bioethics presents the  ethical principle that  every research must 
observe, thus: 
 
research participants must voluntarily consent to research 
participation, research aims should contribute to the good of 
society,  research  must  be  based  on  sound  theory…  …the 
degree of risk taken with research participants cannot exceed 
anticipated   benefits   of   results,   proper   environment   and 
protection for participants is necessary, experiments can be 
conducted only by scientifically qualified persons.” It is, 
therefore, necessary for the researcher to” avoid relationships 
that could reasonably impair their professional performance or 
could exploit or harm others, inform participants about the 
purpose of the research, expected duration and procedures, 
participants' rights  to  decline to  participate  and  to  withdraw 
from the research once it has started, as well as the anticipated 
consequences of doing so, reasonably foreseeable factors that 
may influence their willingness to participate, such as potential 
risks, discomfort or adverse effects, any prospective research 
benefits, limits of confidentiality, such as data coding, disposal, 
sharing  and  archiving,   and  when  confidentiality  must  be 
broken,   incentives  for   participation,   who   participants   can 
contact with questions (Smith, 2003, p.56). 
 
 
As we have seen, there are some unavoidable ethical issues involved in a mixed-methods 
design study, such as obtaining the required permission to gain access to corporate and
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government offices. The correspondence sent to such offices must clearly state that the study 
is purely academic and that the privacy and rights of the participants would be protected. To 
foreclose any suspicion on the part of the participants and their employers, the letters must 
clearly state that the outcome of the study would not be utilized for political purposes, but for 
academic purposes only. 
 
Thus, the essence of ethical consideration is, among others, to reduce possible human rights’ 
or privacy violation in the process of conducting a study or preserving transcribed text from 
interviews. Marshall (1994, p. 157) argues that there is no clear consensus on ethical rules to 
be followed when conducting research involving human subjects; however, there are some 
generally agreed professional guidelines (Obono et al., 2006, p.281).  According to Obono et 
al. (2006, p.284), ethics in research ensures that moral rules are applied in the collection, 
analysis, reporting and distribution of data and protects the individual’s or group’s right to 
privacy, confidentiality and informed consent. 
 
This study observed all the significant ethical guidelines in the process of conducting this 
mixed-methods descriptive design study as well as transcribing, distributing, preserving and 
analyzing the text of the interviews and analyzing the results. The researcher sought the 
consent of respondents and informed the stakeholders of their rights. Those concerned about 
the anonymity of their responses and positions were assured of the confidentiality of their 
responses. 
 
4.7 Validity 
 
Validity has been described in different ways.   Ravid (2011, p.203-204) claims, “it is the 
extent to which a test measures what it is supposed to measure and the appropriateness of the 
ways it is used and interpreted”. The concept refers to that aspect of research that reflects that 
the research measures which it set out to measure, with a consequent accurate result. Put
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differently,  research  validity is  proven  when  the research  is  able  to  answer its  research 
questions “and often look for the answers in the research of others” (Joppe, 2000, p.1). 
Scholars combine various methodological approaches to enhance the validity of their studies. 
It is proper to note that the issue of validity is a crucial matter as it  enhances efficient 
research, especially when the scholars involved want to adopt a qualitative approach (Patton, 
2001). It is also used in collecting and analysing quantitative data and “correlations of tests 
scores and their prediction of a criterion based on cumulative databases (called meta-analysis- 
validity generalization)” (Creswell, 2011, p.163). Thus, validity in this case has been taken as 
a crucial issue because when a study has valid findings, it is both rigorous and cogent. 
 
There are several major types of validity, including content validity, criterion-related validity, 
construct validity and face validity (Ravid, 2011, p. 203). However, validity is described in 
some cases as an issue of degree instead of absolute one (Cohen et al., 2007). 
 
4.13 Summary 
 
This chapter described the research approaches and method, research design, and data 
collection  procedures  adopted  by the  study.    The  chapter  also  looked  at  the  impact  of 
adopting an appropriate methodology in any academic study, and did an extensive review of 
the research setting. As the chapter has noted, in every research: it is the responsibility of 
those who initiated such study to define the objectives, gather the necessary data to perform 
the analysis and reach plausible, valid findings and conclusions.      This chapter has 
demonstrated that methodological approaches remain paramount to the actualization of study 
objectives. Securing the consent of the participants is also crucial if the researcher is to gather 
relevant data that would make the findings of the study valid. The next chapter presents the 
findings.   It   also   captures   the   discussions   and   conclusions   drawn   from   the   study.
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CHAPTER  FIVE 
 
 
DATA ANALYSIS 
 
 
5.1       Introduction 
 
This  chapter presents  the qualitative and  quantitative analysis  of findings  from  the field 
survey carried out in the Niger Delta as part of the investigation to complete this thesis. As 
noted earlier, the qualitative and quantitative methods of analysis were adopted for this study 
because none of the methods on their own can completely address all the issues raised in the 
research questions. Again, both methods of analysis when used jointly, as was done here, help 
to reduce the issues of bias and validity, thereby enhancing objectivity and ethical 
considerations, which the study seeks to uphold. 
 
In addition to the survey, the researcher’s observations within the period of study further 
enhanced the objectivity of the work because it was found that the problem of gas flaring and 
oil spillages experienced by different communities are some of the sources of the broken 
relationship  between  the MNOCs  and  the  people.  Quantitative  data  were  gathered  from 
respondents in different agencies, companies, and communities, namely:  NOSDRA, NDDC, 
DPR, Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs, University of Port Harcourt, 
Ogoni, Nembe, Odimodi communities, Center for the Niger Delta studies, NOAC, Chevron 
and Shell. They all represent stakeholders in the oil sector, civil society, government agencies 
and the host communities. 
 
This study attempted to establish the extent of involvement of the respective oil companies in 
concrete CSR, and by extension, the implication of the prevalent strategy on contemporary 
Nigerian society where the majority of youths and elders are more interested in what they will 
personally benefit from the government and corporate practices than physical developmental 
projects. At the international level, the majority of institutions, especially the United Nations
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agencies, are more interested in how the MNOCs can carry out their business activities in a 
humane manner in accordance with the global best practices. In this regard, there is a high 
interest  and  expectation  for  the  MNOCs  to  adhere  strictly to  the  stipulated  global  best 
practices   of   exploring   and   exploiting   crude   oil   with   an   interest   in   environmental 
sustainability. This is believed to have the capacity to enhance the relationship between the 
host communities and the MNOCs. Prior to the presentation and analysis of the data being 
collected, the chapter begins with a graphic presentation of the interviews and questionnaires 
distribution and retrieval figures. 
 
INTERVIEW  SCHEDULE 
 
 
S/No Community Fig. Mnocs Fig. Government  Institutions Fig. 
1 ZAAKPON 3 SHELL 4 MNDA 2 
2 BOMU 3 AGIP 4 NDDC 2 
3 NEMBE 3 CHEVRON 4 NOSDRA 2 
4 ODIMODI 3   MoE 2 
5     UNIPORT 1 
6     CENTRE FOR NDS 1 
TOTAL  12  12  10 
 
 
 
TABLE 5.1.2 BREAKTDOWN OF INTERVIEWEES 
QUESTIONNAIRE DISTRIBUTION AND RETRIEVAL
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S/N Comm 
 
unity 
Distribut 
 
Ed 
Retriev 
 
ed 
MNOCs Distribut 
 
ed 
Retriev 
 
ed 
Governm 
 
ent 
institutio 
ns 
Distribut 
 
ed 
Retriev 
 
ed 
1 ZAA 
 
KPON 
100 98 SHELL 30 25 MNDA 25 22 
2 BOM 
 
U 
100 90 AGIP 30 21 NDDC 25 24 
3 NEM 
 
BE 
100 95 CHEVR 
 
ON 
20 12 NOSDR 
 
A 
25 22 
4 ODIM 
 
ODI 
70 67    MoE 25 24 
 TOTA 
 
L 
370 350 TOTAL 80 58 TOTAL 92 92 
Source: Field Survey, 2013 
 
 
TABLE 5.1.3DISTRIBUTIONS  AND RETRIEVAL  RATE OF QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
From the table above, five hundred and fifty (550) questionnaires were distributed to three 
different sets of sample (host communities, MNOCs and government institutions) used for the 
study. Of this figure, five hundred of the questionnaires were correctly filled and successfully 
retrieved from the samples.
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18-30 years 45 and above                   49% 21% 
 
 
 
 
 
31-45 years 
30% 
Demographic Characteristics of Respondents 
 
 
From the available quantitative data, the tables and charts below present the demographic 
characteristics such as age, educational qualifications and place of residence of respondents. 
The others are positions in the organization and current job title, years of experience in the 
position, position in the community and years of experience in community service. Notably, 
to a great extent, demographic characteristics sometimes shape the patterns of the relationship 
between the oil companies and the indigenous people as it can explain how staff can take 
advantage of their positions in the companies to build mutually beneficial relationships. This 
study  benefited  from  the  diverse  demographic  characteristics  of  respondents  in  that  it 
collected data from different age groups and genders as well as from different communities 
and oil companies to get an objective opinion of different inhabitants of the region on the 
rationale behind of the Niger Delta conflicts. 
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Years Frequency Percent 
18-30 years 244 49 
31-45 years 149 30 
45 and above 107 21 
Total 500 100.0 
Source: Field Survey, 2013 
 
 
TABLE 5.1.4 AGE DISTRIBUTIONS OF RESPONDENTS 
 
 
The age aspect of the demographic characteristics of the respondents shows that 49% were 
between 18-30 years of age, 30% represented those between 31-45 years of age and 21% 
from 45 years old and above. This means that those that are 18 – 30 years (49%) are more in 
number when compared with other age groups. Youths between the ages of 18-30 are more 
vulnerable and prone to conflict than others. They are easily recruited in times of violence 
particularly when they are unemployed. With particular reference to this research, the youths 
were readily available not only to provide information but to lead the researcher round to 
those people whom they think matter in the community. In most of these communities it was 
also observed that the youths served as a de facto executive arm of government and giving 
effect to Community Development Committee’s (CDC) resolutions against the MNOCs in 
their area. Their high number in this research, it is hoped, will validate the result of the 
findings.
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ate 
 
 
 
 
 Frequency Percent 
School certificate 137 27 
Bachelor 222 44 
Masters 93 19 
Doctorate 17 4 
Others 31 6 
Total 500 100.0 
Source: Field Survey, 2013 
 
 
TABLE 5.1.5 EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATIONS  OF RESPONDENTS. 
 
 
On the level of education, the data gathered shows that about 27% of the respondents had a 
school certificate, 44% a Bachelor’s degree, 19% had a Master’s Degree with 4% holding a
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doctorate. Six (6) % represented others. Those that have Bachelor’s degrees are more in 
number in this research than other levels of education. In other words, those with Bachelor’s 
degrees and below are more likely to be affected by the conflict than those with Master’s 
Degree and above.  The reason why the respondent's educational background was explored is 
because people with different educational backgrounds have varied perceptions of the causes 
of the conflict and a sense of responsibility towards the MNOCs. This further demonstrates 
that the people's experience and level of awareness affects their level of understanding of 
social issues. It is obvious from the table that those with post-graduate degrees exhibit a high 
level  of  maturity  and   level-headedness  in  their  relationship  with  concomitant   high 
 
expectations from the MNOC separating in the Niger Delta region. 
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Place of residence in Niger Delta Senatorial  Zones 
 
 
 Frequency Percent 
Rivers East 120 24 
Rivers West 160 32 
Rivers South-East 54 11 
Bayelsa Central 52 10 
Bayelsa West 19 4 
Bayelsa East 53 11 
Delta East 42 8 
Total 500 100.0 
Source: Field Survey, 2013 
 
 
24 per cent of the total number of respondents interviewed were resident in Rivers east, 
Rivers west - 32%, Rivers southeast - 11%, Bayelsa central - 10%, Bayelsa west - 4%, 
Bayelsa east - 11% and Delta east - 8%. It is important to state here that the respondent's 
place of residence is instructive for this research as those within the Niger Delta region speak 
from  their  wealth  of  experience  (and  most  times  agony)  about  the  impunity of  the  oil 
companies’ towards the host communities. They are more aware of the impact of oil 
exploration  activities,  (particularly in  relation  to  environmental  degradation)  than  people 
leaving outside the region. This also explains why this study is concentrated on respondents 
living in the three core Niger Delta states of Rivers, Bayelsa and Delta, rather than the other
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six political Niger Delta states created by the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) 
Act of 2000 which we exhaustively discussed in the chapter one (Background to study). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Frequency Percent 
Public Relations Executive 20 34 
Community Relations Manager 4 7 
CSR Manager 6 11 
Marketing Executive 2 3 
Public and Corporate Affairs Manager 3 5 
Community Liaison Officer/Manager 5 9 
Social Welfare Officer/Manager 8 14 
None 10 17 
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Total                                                                 58                               100.0 
 
 
Source: Field Survey, 2013 
 
TABLE 5.1.6 RESPONDENTS POSITION  IN MNOCs 
 
 
A total of 34% of the respondents were public relations executives, 7% - community relations 
managers, 3% - marketing executives, 5% - public and corporate affairs managers, 9% - 
community liaison officers, 14% - social welfare officers and 17% indicated no position/job 
in  any  organization.  As  shown  in  the  above  table,  companies  having  public  relations 
executives in this study reveal that there are qualified workers in the oil sector who already 
have the knowledge of how to encourage the oil companies to act in ways that the rural 
people, whose communities are already at risk of oil induced environmental volatility, would 
understand their efforts rather than complicating matters. Their role is to serve as stabilisers in 
the communication process, ensuring that the people understand the issues at stake and work 
with  the MNOCs  to  address  possible  areas  of  conflict.  The  public  relations  officers  are 
supposed to collaborate with the welfare managers and community relations’ managers in 
order to create a synergy that would climax in a cordial relationship between the people and 
the MNOCs.
  
 
 
 Frequency Percent 
Traditional ruler 38 11 
Opinion leader 100 29 
Community development committee 87 25 
Youths leader 13 4 
Militant leader 4 1 
Women/Women's leader 40 11 
None 67 11 
Total 350 100.0 
Source: Field Survey, 2013 
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TABLE 5.1.7 POSITIONS  IN COMMUNITY 
 
 
Out of 350 respondents from the host community, 11% were traditional rulers, 100% opinion 
leaders, 25% community development committee members, 13% youth leaders, 1% militant 
leaders, 11% women leaders, and 19% had no position. The inclusion of a relatively high 
number of traditional rulers here is due to a number of reasons: They are easily contactable 
and always welcome anyone that has an issue to discuss, especially in regard to solving the 
perennial conflict in the region. The elevated position of traditional rulers gives them the 
privilege of being able to handle issues between the people in their local communities and the 
MNOCs. Often, the traditional rulers want their voices to be heard and to have an input in 
every issue that concerns their people. The traditional rulers perceive this as a form of respect 
for the traditional institutions. 
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 Frequency Percent 
0-5 years 15 26 
6-10 years 10 17 
11-15 years 5 9 
16-20 years 18 31 
21 years and above 10 17 
Total 58 100.0 
Source: Field Survey, 2013 
 
 
TABLE 5.1.8 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE ON JOB WITHIN  MNOCs 
 
 
On their official positions, respondents of 0-5 years were 26%, 6-10 years were 17%, 11-15 
years were 9%, 16-20 years were 31% and 21 years and above were 17% representing 7 
people. The years of experience of the respondents are particularly important in this study 
because it is a good indicator of the type of relations that each of the MNOCs has been able to 
establish with a particular head of community development. Furthermore, in this regard, the 
researcher explored the issue of divide and rule to discover the head of public relations that 
had experienced the worst crises in the community. The number of years spent in a particular 
role  also  suggests  the  possibility  of  subjectivity  and  personal  interest,  whereas,  if  the 
managers   are  regularly  alternated,  the  issue  of  personal  interest  can  be  eradicated.
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Years of experience in the community  service 
 
 
 Frequency Percent 
0-5 years 28 49 
6-10 years 16 28 
11-15 years 6 10 
16-20 years 5 9 
21 years and above 3 4 
Total 58 100.0 
Source: Field Survey, 2013
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TABLE 5.1.9 YAERS OF EXPERIENCE OF MNOCs STAFF IN COMMUNITY 
SERVICE 
 
Respondents with 0-5 years of experience in community service were 49% (28); 6-10 years 
were 28% (11); 11-15 years were 48% (6); 16-20 years were 43% (5) and 21 years and above 
were 4% representing 3 people. It is imperative to highlight the fact that community services 
are  evidently,  service  to  humanity,  and  such  services  facilitate  an  efficient  and  cordial 
working relationship between the MNOCs and the host communities.  The community service 
officers have been employed here to determine from their experience, what the communities’ 
major problems are and what could be done to ameliorate them. They interface with the 
communities, governments and the NGOs; therefore, they have more experience regarding 
the major causes of conflict as the next section deliberates. 
 
What are the key causes and actors of Conflict in the Niger Delta and how are the issues 
managed? 
 
Ostensibly, oil is central to the conflict in the Niger Delta. To this end, the Nigeria Watch 
(2008, p.6) stated, “Oil is, by far, the most disputed resource, followed by land, market and 
cattle grazing.”8 This is due to the way oil inspires different interest groups’ struggle for the 
benefits attached to it even more than the people that not only own the resources but bear the 
environmental degradation accruable from oil mining. 
 
At the initial stage of this study, assumptions were added to the research questions in order to 
authenticate the logical development of the study. The assumptions included: that an increase 
in   funding   for   corporate   social   responsibility,   leads   to   higher   resistance   from   the 
communities; and the more corporate social responsibility projects are based on community 
 
8Nigeria Watch is a database that analyses the patterns and trends of violent deaths in 
Nigeria; the project has been in existence since 2006, with focus on oil, witchcraft, land 
disputes, and car accidents among others.
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needs, the more grievances and social conflicts are likely to be reduced in the near future. 
However, this was found not to be the case. The residents of the regions are resistant to both 
the  MNOCs’  CSR  delivery and  strategy.  Findings  from  the  interview  with  most  of  the 
respondents reveal that, the MNOCs have been involved in corporate philanthropy, as was the 
case prior to the global endorsement of CSR. What this implies is that the MNOCs in the 
Niger Delta do not consider CSR as an obligation (As discussed in chapter one and elaborated 
in chapter two of this study). 
 
MNOC staffs usually reside in the cities while their drilling and seismic activities take place 
in the local host communities who feel the impact of oil drilling waste. The respondents 
argued that since the MNOCs do not experience the negative impact of oil drilling waste they 
are reluctant in responding to their calls for environmental friendly activities including waste 
clean-ups. The respondents further stated that the oil companies exaggerate their investments 
in CSR with the media. In cases where they carry members of the host communities along, 
the respondents lamented that they know how much the project is worth but what they hear 
from the media and the websites of the companies are higher. However, a respondent from 
Nembe in consonance with the literature review of this study believed that Shell has done 
well in their community engagements and CSR within Nembe community. In his words, 
Shell’s  micro-finance and  the  different  trades  provided  have  returned  the  lost  means  of 
livelihood to members of Nembe community. However, another respondent from Nembe 
community  held  a  different  view.  The  respondent  angrily  divulged  that  Shell  has  done 
nothing but give them guns to fight each other. According to the respondent, the company has 
sown seeds of discord among Nembe communities, just like the British merchants divided 
“our” forefathers. A possible reason why notwithstanding the MNOCs investments in CSR, 
the region’s conflict is yet to be abated as host communities tend to link (MNOCs) activities 
to the activities of the historical RNC.
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Furthermore,  residents  of  the  Nembe  community  noted  that  historically,  the  region  has 
recorded a long history of conflicts dating back to 1895 when the community experienced the 
domination and eventual overthrow of British merchants. Additionally, the current dimension 
of the conflict has resulted in different forms of violence and deaths. This has the capacity of 
perpetrating negative perceptions of the oil companies and government officials by the 
communities. One of the effects of oil-related conflicts is militancy, which disrupted 
exploration in the region and subsequently necessitated the introduction of the government 
amnesty programme in 2009. Despite the amnesty initiative, the ‘violent feature’ of the oil 
resource conflict seems to be a recurring challenge confronting both the MNOCs and the 
government (KII, Nembe indigene, 2014). This implies that the conflict situation in the Niger 
Delta has degenerated and resulted in a number of avoidable fatalities due to the inability of 
stakeholders to play their expected roles or implement agreements reached with different 
groups which have some stakes in the oil wealth. The foregoing explains why it is apparent to 
assert that there is a linkage between oil, marginalization and deaths in the communities 
where oil is exploited. To corroborate this fact, Watts (2004, p.51) noted that the 
marginalization and deprivation of the people from oil benefits heightened the struggle for 
resource control, self-determination and the politics of oil. When people are conspicuously 
excluded from the economic benefits that accrue from resources within their environment, 
confrontation and resistance, more often than not, characterise the relationship between the 
resource owner and the exploiter. 
 
In addition to the points analyzed above, Alfred (2013) noted that, of the issues that generate 
conflict in the region, “crude oil is still having a great effect on underdevelopment in the 
communities through the triggering of conflicts and other anti-development tendencies like 
elite-capturing of development projects and programs” (p.125). This is in tandem with the 
view of an Odimodi community leader who in a statement had posited that the oil companies
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and the government are directly and indirectly involved in a matter that requires intervention. 
The community leader believes that the host communities' underdevelopment caused by crude 
oil exploitation needs urgent intervention by the MNOCs through timely public relations that 
must be characterized by friendly communication and the willingness to listen to one another 
(KII, Odimodi indigene in Warri, 2014). This underlines the need for communication among 
the three parties as noted in the stakeholder theory, in resolving the conflict. It also makes it 
obvious that one of the solutions to the key causes of the conflict in the Niger Delta lies with 
the residents, oil companies, and their workers because, the 60/40 relationship/partnership 
with the oil companies has weakened government's implementation of its existing 
environmental policies. 
 
According to a resident of Ogoni, “Our forefathers were ignorant of oil politics, which made 
them allow companies to operate without proper CSR but Ken Saro-Wiwa later made us 
realise that we were losing our resources to the oil companies” (KII, Ogoni indigene in Bori, 
2014). After realising the cost of environmental degradation and the dynamics of oil politics, 
the people became more agitated and began protesting for better CSR from the companies. A 
member of the Community Developments Department of the NDDC also spoke along these 
lines when he said that the source of the Niger Delta conflict is cumulative stemming from 
the effects of long years of oil exploration in the region; farmlands have been affected making 
it difficult  for the  communities to  survive. 9 Oil companies and  government  agencies  are 
blamed for neglecting the environment and people, particularly the Ogoni communities, who 
 
designed a Bill of Rights and demanded for autonomy and self-determination before and after 
the  killing  of  the  Ogoni  nine  (Ken  Saro-Wiwa  and  his  eight  compatriots)  by Abacha’s 
administration in 1995 (Watts, 2004, p.68; Aghalino, 2009, p.283). The incident exacerbated 
 
 
9Interview with a staff of NDDC, May 2014.
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an already strained relationship between the communities, the MNOCs and the government. 
The peak of the restiveness was experienced in 2006-2007 with the advent of politically and 
economically motivated kidnapping in the region (Akhigbe & Koleoso, 2013, p.2). 
 
 
 
From a CSR  perspective, the ongoing crises  in  the region have been linked to resource 
availability and the attendant feeling of exclusion, deprivation and grievance (Mähler, 2010; 
Watts, 2004, p.51). It is well established that stakeholders are crucial contributors and 
beneficiaries in every project or business endeavour, which makes it possible for them to 
identify areas of involvement, roles and expectations especially as far as CSR is concerned. 
This helps to evolve expected socially responsible behaviour from companies and managers 
saddled with the responsibility of regulating the affairs of staff. Additionally, in practice, this 
social responsibility also manifests in the public relations practice of the companies involved. 
However, from the interviews conducted, the majority of respondents felt that the MNOCs 
have not played their role as responsible stakeholders. Respondents listed among other things, 
the neglect of the host communities by both the government and oil companies; the failure of 
the oil companies to manage and minimise grievances through a timely response to 
environmentally related issues. These environmentally, related issues are the results from 
incessant gas flaring and fracking that causes both air and water pollution, poor or delayed 
CSR projects; and, a lack of employment due to the traditional lands appropriated by the oil 
companies. The foregoing has been described as critical to the conflict. Furthermore, 
Ugochukwu and Ertel (2008, p.144) noted that oil spillages are seen as routine occurrences in 
the Niger Delta. They outlined some of the prominent spillages recorded in the Niger Delta 
petroleum industry to include: “the Bomu II blowout, 1970; the Forcados terminal spillage, 
1980; the Funiwa 5 oil well blowout, 1980; the Oyakana pipeline spillage, 1980; the Okoma 
pipeline spillage, 1985; the Oshika pipeline spillage, 1993; and the Goi Trans Niger pipeline
201  
oil spill, 2004.” The Bonga oil spill of 2011 is just a recent incident, which has also affected 
negatively on the relationship between the MNOCs and the local communities. 
 
Over 64 Itsekiri communities such as Ilesami 1and 2, Madangh, Ajibeku, Ajimaki, Ubala-tie, 
Orere, Aje-Edede, Akpakpa-Eyitsede, Oguwan, Ogidigben, Oboro among others were in 
conflict with Shell over the Bonga oil spillage that caused a lot of environmental degradation. 
The same spill made some Ijaw indigenes in Ilaje part of Ondo state to petition against what 
they described as Shell’s insensitivity in May 2014, and made demands for compensation and 
relief materials from the company. The 2011 Bonga oil spill killed some children in the 
shoreline of coastal villages.10 The foregoing is perceived as the reason for civil society's 
criticisms and argument that the environmental despoliation in the Niger Delta region within 
 
the five decades of Shell operations is so pronounced. This is why even neutral individuals 
and organisations, including Gerd Muller, Germany’s Development Minister, have observed 
that (after his recent trip to the region): “If you went to the Niger Delta and saw the standard 
of oil extraction, none of you would use the petrol stations of that oil firm. Apparently, Shell 
prioritised profit over concern for the environment” (Gbemre, 2014, p.9). It further shows that 
the problem that drives conflict in the region is not about natural resource endowment but 
poor abatement measures on environmental degradation usually adopted by the companies in 
response to gas flaring and fracking which results to contamination of water among other 
unfriendly practices (Ugochukwu and Ertel, 2008). The disconnect between MNOCs and the 
host communities has been the crux of the matter in the perennial confrontations that 
characterises their relationship. 
 
Evoh   (2009,   p.50)  noted   that  “oil   pipeline  explosions,  and   gas   flaring  are  major 
environmental threats to the people.” Furthermore, these bright but ‘harsh gas-flares’ are what 
 
10Akeredolu, Leke. 2014. Oil Spill: Ilaje People are dying. The Nation Thursday May 15.
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Watts (2009, p.16) described as “the unforgiving, ruthless, and austere world of oil”. The 
foregoing demonstrates that the conflict in the region is essentially about the environmental 
and economic impact of oil exploration. This is because after production, water and oil waste 
have many toxins and are generally dumped in waste pits on people's lands with traces of 
radioactivity, which brings about health hazards and economic loss. For instance, about 2.5 
billion standard cubic feet (scf) of natural gas is flared annually in Nigeria. This means a loss 
of over $2.5 billion revenue annually. It is estimated that about 68% of all associated gas is 
flared, and this represents 12.5% of all globally flared gas. Furthermore, gas flaring by the 
MNOCs has been confirmed by the respondents to be dangerous to health and a major source 
of blindness11 in the host communities. It was discovered during the interview that it has 
negative impact on health of residents. For example, a respondent stated that: 
 
 
As I’m looking at you now I don’t know your face, I cannot see you, 
as I was coming out somebody held me; although am still vibrant, 
unfortunately, I cannot even send my children to school again; in 
this community, you can hardly find someone that is between 60-80 
years alive due to pollution; see how poor we are, despite having up 
to 6 oil wells, see what they (the companies) did to us; we plant but 
they do  not  germinate,  we now  buy almost  everything including 
yam. Shell and the government do not even compensate us (IDI, 
Ogoni residents, 2014)12. 
 
 
 
11The Researcher observed the state of health of one of the respondents from Ogoni who 
could neither see her nor observe his environment. He attributed the blindness to gas flaring 
and pollution as earlier confirmed by a medical doctor. However, he was able to trace the 
history of oil production to 1958 in Ogoniland. 
 
12 It is very difficult for people to identify and understand these problems without visiting 
the Niger Delta communities.
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Both gas flaring and oil spillages are health hazards and sources of internal displacement in 
host communities, which aggravate the high cost of living. Similarly, the problem has also 
been one of an expectation gap which fuels agitations as the lopsided distribution of oil 
revenues further aggravates the conflict. This is because communities feel dissatisfied when 
they are neglected after oil spillage and waste from the MNOCs have destroyed their 
environments.   A case in point that was repeatedly emphasised by respondents, including a 
member of staff of the Niger Delta Development Commission is the current state of Oloibiri; 
an oil producing community13 where commercial quantities of crude oil were first discovered 
in Nigeria.    Today Oloibiri is desolate after oil exploration and exploitation activities by 
 
MNOCs. The argument is that after drilling and production of oil in most communities, 
especially onshore exploitation, the companies abandon such areas leaving behind a bleak 
picture of hopelessness, unproductively, an unsustainable environment, and mass poverty due 
to degradation caused by oil spillage and associated gas flaring. A respondent described this 
situation as a condition of communities becoming ‘a waste land’. 
 
A High Chief in the Niger Delta, with a good knowledge of CSR related conflict in the region 
argued that: 
 
The whole thing in the Niger Delta is about negligence, the people were 
not interested in the oil issue until Ken Saro Wiwa became the harbinger 
of the oil related information, and enlightened the people on how they 
have  been  short-changed  by the  companies.  When  the  boys  who  are 
unemployed heard this information, they took up arms against the state
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and the companies, which yielded a result in the initial stages (IDI, High 
 
Chief in the Niger Delta, 2014). 
 
 
When the involvement of Shell, Chevron and Agip in conflicts within the Niger Delta is 
compared, one observes that Shell has been more involved in violent conflicts and crises over 
poor CSR delivery than other MNOCs due to several reasons. Firstly, the company has been 
in the oil exploration business since the advent of the first oil production in Nigeria and has 
explored the resource across most parts of the Niger Delta region. Secondly, both Shell and 
Chevron are more vulnerable to attacks because of their active involvement in onshore oil 
fields than other major oil companies. Thirdly, both Shell and Chevron are branded infamous 
by the oil producing communities for greatly undermining global best practices in terms of 
CSR, as well as adherence to environmental laws. Various respondents identified this aspect 
of oversight as part of the problem that made peace elude the region. From NDDC to NGOs 
and even the rural people, the issue of poor environmental ethics remains the crux of the 
matter. Even the Nigeria Watch database 2007 and 2008 reports similarly identified this 
trend. These contributed to the formation of local social movements that culminated in 
government’s repression and death of people such as Ken Saro Wiwa (Olubayo (2014). 
 
Unlike Shell and Chevron, ExxonMobil CSR encouraged a sense of belonging for the local 
people in n their CSR program. This has been documented in Nigeria Watch (2007, p.10), 
where it was noted that: “ExxonMobil was more attentive, in terms of employing locals. 
About 45% of the senior staff and 60% of the junior staff are native to Akwa Ibom, as 
opposed to 20% in the early 1990s; and the geographic location of wells in deep offshore 
waters helps to secure their assets” (Nigeria Watch, 2007, p.10; Umar and Naibbi, 2015). The 
respondents provided that the sense of belongingness provided by ExxonMobil within its host 
communities is the reason why CSR conflict is not as heightened in other Niger Delta oil 
producing communities.
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Generally, MNOCs have been tagged as sponsors of the gun running business that thrives in 
the region. Von Kemedi (2006, p.13) states that: 
 
The oil companies have also contributed significantly to the buildup of 
armed  groups  in  the  delta.  This  is  illustrated  here  by  the  cases  of 
Nembe,  Ogoni  and  Odioma  where  groups  were  either  sponsored  by 
Shell or arose out of discontent with the system that Shell uses to 
maintain control of communities. Examples like these abound all over 
the Niger Delta…. this is grave damage to community spirit and 
governance. 
 
The government security forces taking sides with the oil companies have further worsened the 
breakdown of law and order through confrontational relationships between oil companies and 
the communities. There have been instances of extra-judicial killings in some communities by 
the security operatives. Also, the security agencies have on a number of occasions descended 
on   communities   protesting  against   the  unsustainable   environmental   practices   of  the 
companies (IDI, Staff of the Federal Ministry of Environment, 2013). This type of behaviour 
raises concerns about the sincerity of the government to curb the causes of conflict in the 
region. According to Ogula (2012, p. 12), the lack of "transparency in community-company 
engagements [is] caused by dishonesty” which makes it difficult for stakeholders to manage 
MNOCs’-community relations as desired. 
 
Based on the foregoing, it is crucial for the government and oil companies not only to make 
promises, but also to ensure timely fulfilment of promises made. Some of the failed promises 
to the local people include, provision of portable water, employment opportunities, good 
roads, scholarships and electricity and on the other hand, the government’s eradication of 
corruption and reduction of clash of interest between the chiefs/elders and youths of host
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communities. As the respondents stated, there are numerous causes of the conflict but the 
government can help reduce these by not taking sides with the companies as well as by 
addressing the host communities' problems rather than the opting for the security option of 
militarizing the communities. Again, it is not in the best interest of the country that the 
government establishes agencies to ameliorate the sufferings of the people and at the same 
time, fail to meet up with the demands of such positive interventions by not fulfilling such 
promises. The current practice is that the interventionist agencies are given mandates without 
the subsequent power to implement the policies on the environment and the different aspects 
they have been assigned to specialise in. It then becomes an issue of the Government's failure 
to empower the agencies and this is not surprising because given the 60/40 relationships; the 
government will find it difficult to sanction the MNOCs. Again, the sanctioning of culpable 
companies in the oil spill detection exercise needs adequate government enforcement of its 
environmental laws without injuring the contending groups’ interests. 
 
In Bayelsa state, most of the conflicts revolve around oil spillage and the clashes between the 
JTF (established in 2003) and militants, such attacks are also prevalent in Delta state with 
incidences of pipeline vandalism (Adams, 2014, p.22; Aghalino and Okolie-Osemene, 2014, 
p.41). Most social movements and community youths, capitalise on the poor state of their 
environment to plan attacks against oil companies (Aghalino and Okolie-Osemene, 2014, 
p.41).  Incidentally,  this  is  an  area  that  has  led  to  much  trading  of  blame  between  oil 
companies and host communities. While the former sometimes alleges complicity on the part 
of the oil-bearing communities, the latter alleges negligence on the part of the government 
and the MNOCs for not attending to the demands of `pipeline repairs and late response to 
forestall oil spillages.
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Series1 
No 
23 
5% 
Conflict in Niger Delta                                                          Are you 
aware of 
 
the conflict
 
 
Series1 
Yes 
477 
95% 
over oil in 
the Niger 
Delta?
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Frequency Percent 
Yes 333 95 
No 17 5 
Total 350 100.0 
TABLE 5.1.10AWARENESS OF OIL CONFLICT  IN THE NIGER DELTA 
 
 
Source: Field Survey, 2013 
 
 
On the awareness of the people regarding oil related conflicts in the Niger Delta, 95% said 
they were well informed about the issues that generate conflicts, while only 5% said no. 
 
Similar to the in-depth interviews conducted, findings revealed that the majority of the people 
in the region and all the stakeholders are well informed about the sources and evolution of the 
conflict. The confirmation of the awareness of the existence of a rancorous relationship 
between the host communities and the MNOCs makes the findings, which emerge, at the end 
of the study empirical. This is because, if the respondents were not aware of the existence of a 
ruptured  and  antagonistic  relationship  between  the  oil-bearing  communities  and  the 
 
multinational oil companies, then the essence of the research would have been lost.
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If yes, how would you describe the situation? 
 
 
 Frequency Percent 
Complex 300 73 
Minimal 50 27 
Total 350 100.0 
TABLE 5.1.11STAKEHOLDERS VIEW OF THE CONFLICT 
 
 
Source: Field Survey, 2013 
 
 
73 percent of respondents interviewed agreed that the nature of the Niger Delta  conflict is 
complex, while 27% stated that it is minimal. This complex nature of the conflict is as a result 
of the involvement of different actors, and this has led to some observers seeing the 
relationship between the stakeholders as highly rancorous and must involve neutral actors in 
the international community. It equally shows that the first step necessary to de-escalate the 
situation is for the oil companies to work on their relationship with the aggrieved parties in 
host communities. Again, this can be achieved through a joint problem solving approach that
209  
 
, 
focuses  on  building  communication  channels  to  enhance  people’s  confidence  in  the 
companies and eradicate mutual suspicion. These channels must identify problem roots and 
deal with them. 
 
 
 
 
 
Do you think the conflict origin can be traced  to pre-colonial and colonial periods? 
 
 
 Frequency Percent 
Yes 136 39 
No 193 55 
Indifferent 21 6 
Total 350 100.0 
TABLE 5.1.12 ORIGIN  OF THE NIGER DETAL CONFLICT 
 
 
Source: Field Survey, 2013
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The table above shows that 39% traced the origins of the conflict to the pre-colonial and 
colonial  era,  while  55%  said  no  and  6%  were  indifferent.  This  shows  that  CSR  related 
conflicts between host communities and MNOCs is more of a post-colonial phenomenon. The 
study findings confirm this as an embodiment of truth as commercial oil production in the 
Niger Delta started in 1958, the threshold of Nigeria’s independence. On the other hand, Shell 
(then Shell BP) was licensed to operate in Nigeria in 1937, hence, the interviewees referred to 
the company as a product of British colonialism. To this end, the respondents (39%) who 
alleged that oil-related conflicts started in the colonial era hinge their argument on the fact 
that their forefathers died in the British Akasa raid- (a resistance war fought in 1895 against 
British economic domination of the local people). This could be the reason Shell has recorded 
more conflict than other MNOCs. The host communities apparently disliked Shell from the 
onset. One of the Ogoni traditional rulers echoed that oil companies, particularly Shell; have 
not  changed  from  the  Royal  Niger  Company's  (British  colonial  company)  pattern  of 
imperialist operation. 
 
Furthermore, the interviewees made reference to the obnoxious laws enshrined in the colonial 
Nigerian constitution that denied them of the ownership  of their natural resources. They 
further lamented that oil has become a curse to them, yet their demand for resource control 
has not been heard. If so, why then will Shell continue operating in their land, they ask?  The 
implication of this finding is that, the oil producing communities’ grievances are not limited 
to the current issue of environmental despoliation but extends to the impacts of colonialism in 
the Niger Delta. This same argument has also been canvassed in the background study of this 
thesis (Chapter one), where Etekpe (2007, P. 1-2) averred that the extant to which conflict in 
the Niger Delta region is traceable is due to the rapacious administrative style of the erstwhile 
colonial masters.
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TABLE 5.1.13           Causes of Conflict in the Niger Delta 
 
 
Causes Frequency Percent 
Niger Delta is a minority ethnic 
 
group 
84 24 
They have no representation at the 
 
senate 
73 21 
Oil is a cause 175 50 
The three major ethnic groups 
 
marginalize the Niger Delta 
people 
18 5 
Total 350 100.0 
Source: Field Survey, 2013 
 
 
On  the  causes  of  conflict  in  the  Niger  Delta,  21%  attributed  them  to  the  region  being 
populated by minority ethnic groups; 21% said poor representation at the senate is the cause;
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50% attributed it to oil, 5% argued that the 3 major ethnic groups marginalize the people.  It 
is obvious from the above that the majority of the respondents agree that the cause of the 
problem in the Niger Delta is centred on crude oil production in the region. The respondents 
do not particularly believe that the existence of oil in itself is problematic but rather its 
management. However, this study found that the local people attributed their problem to oil 
revenue sharing and its ownership. They believe that if they were allowed to own and control 
their resources or if the Nigerian government maintained the preceding derivation formula as 
it were when agriculture was the mainstay of the Nigerian economy, the region would not 
have been  restive.  Conversely,  the  majority ethnic  groups  who  have  become  the major 
 
benefactors of the oil mined from the Niger Delta have remained united in the current oil 
revenue sharing formula. “The country will never experience peace, until our request is 
granted”, they lamented. 
 
 
Environmental Impact of Oil Exploration and Exploitation 
 
 
 
Series1 
None 
130 
26% 
 
Series1 
Enormous 
damages 
370 
74%
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 Frequency Percent 
None 28 26 
Enormous damages 322 74 
Total 350 100.0 
TABLE 5.1.14ENVIRONMENTAL  IMPACT  OF OIL EXPLORATION 
 
 
Source: Field Survey, 2013 
 
 
On the environmental impact of oil, 26 % indicated none as a response while 74% said 
enormous damages. The majority of the respondents (74%) accepted that the environmental 
impact of crude oil in the Niger Delta is enormous and devastating. In this regard, the finding 
of this research agrees with the conclusion of the UNEP (2011) report. The ecosystem has 
been destroyed by oil activities. Gas flaring and the oil mining waste products have been 
destructive to the local people's health. In consensus with the UNEP report, this provides that 
the Niger Delta region and particularly the Ogoniland have been grossly polluted. This study 
discovered that the hydrocarbon now available in the groundwater in over 98 oil-mining sites 
has exceeded  the international standard as well as the Nigerian standard. The maximum 
evaluation of liquefied hydrocarbon, in the water line of host communities is over 7,420 μg/l 
in just one local government (Ataba-Otokroma). The respondents argued that, this severely 
depleted the aquatic ecosystem and caused a loss of sustenance to the farmers. 
 
The  petroleum  hydrocarbons  that  the  communities  are exposed  to  (with  regards  to  their 
drinking water and outdoor air as well as the presence OF benzene, to a level 1000 times 
above World Health Organization (WHO) parameter), has generated serious health issues 
within the local communities. According to one of the chiefs and as confirmed by the UNEP
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report, life expectancy of the Niger Delta people has been reduced to the age of 50 as against 
 
the prevalent 70-80 years in other regions. 
 
 
 
 
 
What are the Key Causes of the Niger Delta Conflict? 
 
 
 Frequency Percent 
The Oil Mineral Ordinance 18 22 
Revenue allocation formula 322 66 
The brunt of oil (CSR) 10 12 
Total 350 100.0 
TABLE 5.1.15KEY CAUSES OF THE NIGER DELTA CONFLICT 
 
 
Source: Field Survey, 2013 
 
 
The Table above shows that 22% saw the oil mineral ordinance as the main cause of conflicts 
in Niger Delta, 66% attributed it to revenue allocation formula, and 12% stated brunt of oil as 
the cause of the conflict. If the revenue allocation formula is the driver of the conflict, then 
the government and the multinational oil companies can work out the solution and the way
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forward. The main conclusion derivable from the analysis above is that the disagreements 
over the oil  revenue  allocation  are a significant  contributor to  the  Niger Delta  conflict. 
Members of the oil-bearing communities see the current revenue allocation formula as unjust 
and hence unacceptable to them. The position of the respondents in this section answers the 
first research question as to what are the key causes of restiveness in the Niger Delta; the 
answer apparently is the crude oil revenue allocation formula among others. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What is the oil producing  communities  asking for? 
 
 
 Frequency Percent 
Resource control 175 50 
Adequate derivation formula 59 17 
Adequate corporate responsibilities 11 3 
Adequate empowerment programmes 45 13 
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All 60 17 
Total 350 100.0 
Source: Field Survey, 2013 
 
 
TABLE 5.1.16DEMANDS OF THE OIL PRODUCING  COMMUNITIES 
 
 
50 percent of the respondents saw resource control as the main demand of the people, 17% 
said the adequate derivation formula, only 3% stated adequate CSR, 13% indicated adequate 
empowerment programmes, and only 17% described all the demands in the table as things the 
people want. This study discovered that (notwithstanding the internationalised clamour for 
environmental justice by both the founder of the Niger Delta protest and the current 
environmental activists) environmental degradation, although among the key causes of the 
conflict, is not the major cause of the conflict. Owing to the degenerating environmental 
situation, the region in consonance with UNEP (2011) report is demanding environmental 
clean ups and are is also willing to accept a derivation principle which offers 50% of the 
state's revenue contribution back to the region. The respondents believe that, adoption of the 
foregoing principles will go a long way in quelling the conflict, without, which the conflicts 
will continue. 
 
Most of the confrontations with the oil companies, which led to the involvement of state 
security forces, were by agitations for resource control and adequate CSR and empowerment 
programmes. The uncompromised participation of MNOCs in the infrastructural and human 
capital development of the oil producing communities has always been the desire of the 
majority of respondents. Ogula (2012, p.21) identified this as a common trend in communities 
where there are great expectations from the state and oil companies. However, if the people
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were adequately empowered, the probability of being involved in acts of sabotage would 
normally be reduced. 
 
5.2       The CSR programs and the prevailing CSR strategies  of the oil companies  in the 
 
Niger Delta: the effectiveness of these CSR strategies 
 
 
 
“I  accuse  the  oil companies  of practising  genocide  against  the  Ogoni  people” --- Ken 
 
Saro-Wiwa 
 
One of the respondents quoted the late Niger Delta activist, Ken Saro-Wiwa, in the above 
statement. The respondent further revealed that, Ken Saro Wiwa was killed in 1995 as a result 
of nonviolent protests but his spirit has been resurrected in Asari Dokubo and in fact all the 
Niger Delta people. “They (the government and the MNOCs) killed him so as to silence his 
goodwill for the Niger Delta people but the struggle can only get worse”.   The statement was 
made because of what he and other respondents saw as poor CSR strategy as it concerns 
environmental  ethics.  The oil  producing states  in  Nigeria  produce more revenue  for  the 
federal government than many other states combined and that is why they have continued to 
demand for more CSR14 projects. The death of Saro Wiwa did not discourage this demand but 
 
rather escalated it. 
 
 
Following these disturbances Shell agreed to pay £9.6m out of court settlement in 2009, in 
response to the legal action which accused it of collaborating in the execution of Saro-Wiwa 
and eight other Ogonis. During this period, there were hundreds of other minor court cases 
instituted in Nigeria over oil spills and pollution. In 2010 for example, Shell admitted spilling 
14,000 tonnes of crude oil in the creeks in 2009, double the year before and quadruple that of 
 
2007 (Vaughan, 2011). 
 
 
 
14This was also confirmed by an NDDC staff who stated that billions of Naira is required 
for development of the Niger Delta region.
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Idowu (2014, pp.23-24) emphasised two notable CSR delivery modes in the country. They 
are: (i) internal (corporate philanthropy, direct implementation and use of community-based 
organizations or foundations) and (ii) external which includes intermediary organizations, 
strategic partnerships, foundations and multi-stakeholder schemes. Ogula (2012, p. 4), stated 
that over the  years, internal (Philanthropic) projects like the  award of scholarships, cash 
payments, agricultural projects, the provision of schools and healthcare centres, and road 
construction have undoubtedly characterised the CSR strategies of the companies, but the 
limitation has always been the inadequacy of such projects in the long term (Ogula, 2012, 
p.4). 
 
The partnering aspect of CSR delivery has resulted in the signing of MOUs in the Niger Delta 
especially  between  the  communities,  their  associations  or  development  unions  and  the 
MNOCs. This is where companies like Shell and sometimes Chevron are sceptical about 
embarking on agreements with communities that are highly fragmented, because sometimes- 
different groups come forward to demand similar things from the companies in the name of 
the same community. It therefore, becomes more difficult to identify a genuine group that 
truly  represents  the  entire  community.  These  problems  notwithstanding,  among  other 
MNOCs, Shell’s strategy, has been to create strategic partnership with other stakeholders in 
the oil sector to construct and rehabilitate roads, provide water, healthcare and other needs of 
the communities (Ogula, 2012, p.5). 
 
5.2.1The effectiveness of the CSR strategies of the oil Companies 
 
 
 
In  Nigeria,  Shell,  Agip  and  Chevron  as  major  operators  in  the  petroleum  industry  are 
expected by both communities and government agencies to provide support in developing the 
communities in which they operate. However, the recipients of these projects in the local 
communities question the effectiveness of the MNOCs’ CSR strategies. The stance of the
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respondents can be ascertained by verifying the level of effectiveness of the MNOCs’ CSR 
strategies. For instance, CSR is seen as successful when the target beneficiaries are well taken 
care of, while it is seen as sustainable and effective when the basic needs of communities are 
considered  during the  conceptualization,  design  and  implementation  of these projects.  In 
addition, an effective CSR is expected to target those pressing needs of the people. On the 
other hand, the yardstick for measuring the success of the CSR projects of oil companies 
would not only be from the existing projects but from the level of development, observations 
of the people in host communities, and reports of MNOCs involved. 
 
From the researcher’s observations during the field survey and interviews with the 
communities,  MNOCs  and  the  government,  all  the  major  oil  companies  have  executed 
different forms of CSR projects ranging from power supply to water supply, the training of 
young graduates in skills acquisition, and the rehabilitation of rural roads, which facilitate 
linkages between various communities and intergroup trade relations. However, what was 
lacking from the findings is the effectiveness of these CSR projects in transforming the lives 
of rural people. For instance, one of the respondents interviewed - a University of Port- 
Harcourt scholar – stated that, it is not disputable whether MNOCs are involved in CSR 
delivery but what requires critical investigation is to ascertain whether or not such projects 
are properly executed. 
 
According to Watts (2009), corporate social responsibility projects designed and executed in 
most communities appeared “as a raft of unfinished community projects all of which have 
contributed to resentments among the youths” (p.20).   To corroborate this claim, a recent 
report  showed  that  in  November  2014,  over  100  aggrieved  youths  of  the  Ogboloma 
community in Yenagoa, Bayelsa State, took over the town hall and prevented the earlier 
scheduled inauguration of the Shell Petroleum Development Company – funded projects that
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were executed by the Gbarian – Ubie Cluster Development Board. They alleged that the 
projects were uncompleted, old and that the company’s contribution to community 
development did not reflect the huge oil wealth accruing from the area (Idio, 2014, p.7). On 
the other hand, a staff member of the NDDC stated his believe thus: it is laudable for Shell to 
have  initiated  rural  electrification,  housing  projects,  internal  link  roads,  and  concrete 
walkways  for  the  people.  That is supposedly, based on the principles of concrete CSR 
delivery but noted that the problem here can be linked with elongated planning of projects. A 
situation, where CSR projects are implemented many years after their planning: when the 
people would have desired new projects to justify the huge profit that oil companies generate 
from their communities. 
 
The research  findings  further demonstrate that,  the public awareness  of the CSR  related 
conflict in the Niger Delta communities is not in doubt. The foregoing goes to answer the first 
part of the second research question on the prevailing CSR strategies of the oil companies 
operating in the Niger Delta – public awareness of CSR related conflict in the area confirms 
this.  Nevertheless,  these  CSR  strategies  are unsuccessful  and  that  explains  the  perpetual 
rumblings in the oil-bearing communities. 
 
From the interviews conducted, respondents reaffirmed the disturbing nature of the conflicts, 
which  has  attracted  media  attention  in  recent  times.  There  are  arguments  that  some 
community projects and the Memorandum of Understanding are ‘shrouded in secrecy and 
ambiguity; while the companies are alleged to be cutting deals with local chiefs, some of 
whom  are neither  resident  in  their communities  nor accountable  to  host  communities as 
required’ (Watts, 2009, p.20). Also, a youth activist in the region maintained that: 
 
Divide and rule has been identified as a major source of oil related conflict 
in most communities. The divide and rule practice of MNOCs manifests in
221  
their manner of approaching or meeting the CDC chairmen of some 
communities, and psychologically attacking them with a question on why 
should  they cry more  than  the  bereaved  and  diplomatically convincing 
them to accept a certain amount of money in lieu of CSR projects 
(Respondent, Special Assistant to the Director of an NGO in Rivers State, 
2014). 
 
 
As observed earlier, in examining the success of the CSR projects and its delivery strategies, 
one must ascertain whether such projects are properly executed and if target communities 
benefit from them; and the capacity of such projects in abating oil related lethal violence. 
 
According to Paul Arinze, General Manager of the Nigerian Corporate Affairs, British Gas 
(BG) Exploration and Production Nigeria Limited offered some Nigerians the opportunity to 
work overseas and also made great impact in the development of its employees.15 Just like 
BG, Shell has also gone beyond infrastructural development to mainstream human resource 
development into the company’s CSR delivery initiatives. This aspect of Shell’s CSR strategy 
has made the company outstanding in the oil and gas industry. For instance, in November 
2014, Shell awarded about 20 Nigerians N15 million (75,000 dollars each) in its live wire 
programme, with the aim of enhancing young people’s potentials in the establishment of their 
own businesses.16 When such businesses are developed, the beneficiaries’ self-reliance would 
be guaranteed. On the other hand, in analyzing Shell’s relationship with the people and their 
CSR in Ogoniland, one respondent had this to say: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 Compassnews,  November  1,  2010.Available  at 
http://www.oilandgaspress.com/wp/?p=4765#XiaXcmTSfSufoDgv.99 
 
16Obasi, Sebastine. 2014. 20 Nigerians benefit from Shell’s N15m livewire.
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[o]ur oil has been tapped by Shell, but we do not benefit from the oil, 
and that is why the people desire more from the companies. The general 
MoU states that Shell has not implemented any part of the  GMoU, 
especially in Ogoni (KII, Ogoni indigene in Bori, 2014). 
 
On Shell’s role in Ogoni land, another resident had this to say: 
 
 
There   has   not   been   proper   development   of   the   Ogoni,   and 
unemployment has not been given the required attention to ameliorate 
the sufferings of the masses; even power is supplied by the government 
and not Shell; Ogoni people are not those that break oil pipelines (KII, 
Ogoni indigene in Bori, 2014). 
 
The problems, which Shell has with some communities, are particularly caused by the 
destruction of their farmlands through oil spillage and this in recent times has forced the 
company to restrict its operations to safer sites, especially offshore.17 
 
On the government’s intervention, it is believed that they have been “striving to meet the 
basic human needs but most people are never satisfied” (Staff of the Federal Ministry of 
Environment, KII, 2014). It is also important to note that the aim of the amnesty programme 
(a programme charged with the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of various 
militant groups in the Niger Delta) is said to have been achieved to an extent, given that the 
Niger Delta was a no-go-area prior to the amnesty in 2009. Some respondents cited Warri and 
other towns as safer areas now, although the government is yet to really fulfil its pre-amnesty 
promises to the communities especially to those youths that were disgruntled. 
 
 
 
 
 
17Interview with a staff of the Federal Ministry of Environment, Abuja.
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During the fieldwork an environmental rights activist disputed the Ministry of Environment’s 
 
average rating of companies’ performance with the following argument: 
 
 
Doing well by the companies is not a way to look at the issues 
at stake; the fact of the matter is that there are laid down rules 
and regulations that guide the operations of the oil companies 
for them  to  work  with.  Why the  companies  have tended  to 
enjoy the  laxity in  their operations  is  the  joint  venture they 
enjoy with the federal government; and why the government is 
willing to defend the companies at all cost is  to ensure that 
revenue is not affected: to keep the oil flowing with the aim of 
raising the revenue profile of the government without concern 
for the communities, given that they are not part of the existing 
joint venture partnership. The fundamental thing is that Nigeria 
is a mono economy as revenue generated from oil is the main 
source of income. When the issue of development is raised, the 
companies quickly respond that the money goes back to the 
government in the form of tax (IDI, 2013). 
 
In summary, even though the communities are aware of the CSR projects of the MNOCs, the 
findings of this research shows that as far as CSR is concerned, none of the communities are 
satisfied  with  the  efforts  so  far,  especially in  the  areas  of  economic  empowerment  and 
environmental sustainability.
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5.2.2    Corporate Social Responsibilities  (CSR) programmes  /projects by Multi-national 
 
Oil Companies  (MNCs) and its impact on conflict resolution in the Niger Delta 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Frequency Percent 
Yes 50 81 
No 8 19 
Total 58 100.0 
TABLE 4:16  HOST   COMMUNITIES   AWARENESS   OF   CORPORATE    SOCIAL 
 
RESPONSIBILITY POLICY  BY MNOCs 
 
 
Source; (Field Survey, 2014) 
 
Sometimes, the level of awareness about certain programmes depends largely on the value 
placed on the issues at stake by individuals on the one hand, and the role of the stakeholders 
involved in the planning of the programmes on the other. On the awareness of CSR of
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companies, the table above shows that 50 respondents representing 81% answered yes to the 
questions to indicate their awareness of the CSR, while about 8 (19%) said no. Since most of 
the respondents are aware of CSR programs within their companies, it was easy to access 
such organizations’ activities and engagements in CRS related programmes, policies and 
membership of international bodies that promote CSR. 
 
TABLE 5.16 
 
Membership  of organizations  that  promote  good governance, standard operation and 
policy options with respect to CSR 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Field Survey, 2013 
 
 
From the bar chart above, it was observed concerning the questions on organizations that in 
promoting good  governance  and the standard  of operation and policy options, that 45%
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responded yes, while 4% said no, whereas 36% are indifferent to question on the membership 
of organizations that promote good governance. 23% said yes, 26% said no while 34% were 
indifferent on meeting UN standard of CSR. 20% said yes and 32% responded no, to the 
question on whether the company they work with is meeting the global mining standard in 
line with the UNEP report. 12% said yes, 38% said no while 30% remained indifferent on 
their awareness of GMoU between the companies and the communities. 
 
The quantitative responses above demonstrates that it is necessary to identify some of the 
issues that have a nexus with CSR management as far as public relations are concerned; they 
are, health and safety, energy conservation, public policy, environmental pollution, 
involvement in public, social donations and community relations (Ndu & Agbonifoh, 2014). 
All these cannot  be enhanced by mere public declarations of MNOCs on being actively 
involved in CSR delivery in their host communities. And it is condemnable when the 
companies pay little or no attention to issues arising from their public relations style or the 
channels of communication that facilitate corporate activities. 
 
It is argued that the extra-judicial killing of renowned environmental rights activist, Ken 
Saro-Wiwa, led to the introduction of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoUs) in Nigeria 
to regulate the relationship between the MNOCs and the host communities and to enable both 
partner in accelerating development of the region. This made CSR project delivery by Shell, 
Chevron, and Agip among other MNOCS to be executed utilising a community-friendly form 
of GMoUs (Alfred, 2013, p.124). This does not mean the development initiatives of the 
MNOCs stops at the CSR projects. In fact, there are also other supports that they give to the 
communities outside the GMoUs. 
 
MoUs   are   expected   to   address   issues   of   relevance,   namely:   social   amenities   and 
infrastructure; skills acquisition by host communities, portable drinking water, electricity,
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good  and  durable  roads  and  bridges;  the  development  and  improvement  of  schools, 
 
universities, hospitals and suitable health care centres, the donation of books and money to 
schools  and  health  centres;  prevention  of  pollution  of  the  air,  water  and  land  in  the 
 
communities among other environmental and development issues (Nwaeke, 2015). The extent 
to which MNOCs have faithfully implemented these various components of typical MoUs 
was tested in the next question and the result that emerged was quite revealing. 
 
 
 
 
CSR Programmes/projects by MNCs 
 
 
 Frequency Percent 
Infrastructural development 21 6 
Provision of health facilities 14 4 
Employment and empowerment 24 7 
Provision of scholarships and other educational development 77 22 
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Peace building and conflict awareness programmes 56 16 
Philanthropy and charity 18 5 
All 63 18 
None 77 22 
Total 350 100.0 
TABLE 5.17  HOST  COMMUNITIES  PERCEPTION  OF  THE  FOCUS  OF  MNOCs 
 
CSR PROJECTS 
Source: Field Survey, 2013 
In the above table concerning host communities’ awareness of CSR projects and programs of 
the MNOCs, 21 (6%) responded that the companies have been focusing on infrastructural 
development, 21 (4%) represents the provision of health facilities, 24 (7%) supported 
employment and empowerment, 77 (22%) represent the company’s capacity in the provision 
of scholarships and other educational development, 56 (16%) peace building and conflict 
awareness programmes, 18 (5%) philanthropy and charity. 63 (18%) identified all the project, 
as being executed by the companies, while 77 (22%) responded none to the question. Having 
outlined in the preceding section what the components of a typical MNOC’s CSR programme 
should encompass, the table above sought to know from respondents whether the MNOCs 
have truly engaged in providing these benefits to their host communities. The result as we can 
see from the table shows that the companies have engaged in different forms of CSR projects, 
(as only 22% denied knowledge of any CSR project in their community); however as argued 
in the opening paragraphs of this section, the problem with these projects is that they are 
perceived as ineffective and hence of no relevance to the local people.
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Beneficiaries of MNOCs CSR 
 
 
Benefactors Frequency Percent 
Youths 130 37 
Women 67 19 
Men 39 18 
Traditional rulers 39 11 
All 21 6 
Indifferent 30 9 
Total 350 100.0 
TABLE 5.18  PRIME  BENEFICIARIES OF CSR PROJECTS 
 
 
Source: Field Survey, 2013 
 
 
The majority of the respondents numbering 130 (37%) agreed that the Niger Delta youths 
have been the highest beneficiaries of the MNOCs’ CSR, 67 (19%) said women, 63 (18%) 
said men, 39 (11%) said traditional rulers have been benefiting more, 21 people (6%) 
responded that all categories have been benefiting from the CSR packages, only 30 people 
representing 9% were indifferent. 
 
This means that most of the CSR projects have been focused more on the younger generation. 
Emphasis on youth development projects by MNOCs is expected to have reduced tension in 
the host communities because, youths being the most volatile group in any community, any
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concentration on their area of need is expected to have doused tension in the oil bearing 
communities. Nevertheless, in spite of this widespread distribution of the beneficiaries of 
MNOCs CSR programme, the rumblings from host communities have not abated. 
 
Assessment of CSR Development Impact 
 
 
 
 
 
Programme Assessment Frequency Percent 
Satisfactory 123 35 
Moderate 35 10 
not satisfactory 192 55 
Total 192 100 
TABLE 5.19  ASSESSMENT OF CSR IMPACT  ON HOST COMMUNITIES 
 
 
Source (Field Survey, 2013) 
 
In    the  field  survey on  the  assessment  of  CSR  development  impact,  about  123  people 
representing 35 % of the respondents stated that it is satisfactory, while 35 (10%) described it
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as moderate. 192 people representing 55% described it as not satisfactory. This finding that 
the CSR projects are not satisfactory is in tandem with the laws that govern the relationship 
between oil producing communities, MNOCs and the federal government as outlined by the 
Niger  Delta  Technical  Committee  (2008).  The  finding  from  this  question  also  goes  to 
reinforce the second hypothesis that the more CSR projects are haphazardly implemented the 
more social conflict will continue to aggravate in the region as the host communities will see 
such projects as unsatisfactory. 
 
MNOCs Public Relations for the Host community 
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TABLE 5.20  MNOCs PUBLIC RELATIONS  FOR HOST COMMUNITIES 
Source: Field Survey, 2013 
The above chart shows the MNOCs public relations for the host communities. A total of 40% 
agreed on the provision of social amenities, while 59% disagreed. Only 1% was missing. Also 
only a total of 49% agreed on the creation of employment while 59% disagreed. 48% agreed 
on financial assistance aspect of public relations for host communities while 52%disagreed.
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The apparently higher number of respondents who disagreed with the three categories where 
the MNOCs have expectedly been engaged in CSR demonstrates that the MNOCs operating 
in the Niger-Delta have not been able to build a better image as responsible corporate citizens 
in the eyes of the average oil company staff. As stake holders in the oil exploration and 
 
exploitation project, there is need to build bridges of mutual trust and empathy for maximum 
attainment of their common goal. 
 
MNOCs Community  Relations 
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TABLE 5.21  MNOCs COMMUNITY RELATIONS 
Source: Field Survey, 2013 
The community relations of the companies showed that only 37% were in agreement that the 
companies educate the host communities on company policies; 63% disagreed. 46% agreed 
that MNOCs usually ascertain the opinion of communities on the Niger Delta conflict, while 
64% disagreed. 41 percent agreed that the companies usually identify areas of need and 54%
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roach and court 
m 
maintained that the companies do not find out areas of need before embarking on CSR 
 
projects. 
 
 
During the field research, it was apparent that this lack of consultation before embarking on 
CSR projects delivery fuelled resentments and contributed to the many issues which led to 
conflict in the Niger Delta. 
 
MNOCs Conflict Resolution Approaches 
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TABLE 5.22 HOST COMMUNITIES’ PERCEPTION OF MNOCs CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION APPROACHES 
Source: Field Survey, 2013 
 
 
Results from the field investigation indicate that, 37% of the total respondents are in support 
of a conventional approach in resolving conflicts. Regarding the use of a community forum,
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32% mostly agreed, 60% agreed while only 8% disagreed on the use of rural community 
forum  in managing conflicts. Again, while  61% disagreed on  the need to combine both 
conventional and arbitration system only 39% agreed on such initiative. The conventional 
approach  to  conflict  resolution  refers  to  the  use  of  the  formal  court  system;  while  the 
arbitration system, as noted earlier in chapter two of this work (Section 2.3:7 of the literature 
review) refers to the use of an alternative dispute resolution mechanism to resolve the Niger 
Delta conflict. From table 4.22 above, it is obvious that many respondents (63%) do not 
favour the use of the conventional court system to resolve injustice meted out on the Niger 
Delta people by the duo of MNOCs and the Nigerian government. 
 
This may not be unconnected with the slow and sometime ineffective nature of the Nigerian 
court system. Not surprisingly, a total of 92% would rather prefer the rural community forum 
for oil conflict resolution; at least at the town centre (and most probably before the traditional 
chief priests)  it  would  be  impossible  to  compromise justice.  Going further, 61%  of  the 
respondents disagreed on a combination of the conventional court system and the arbitration 
system, ostensibly due to its perceived inefficacious nature as MNOCs with their global 
power and influence can circumvent or manipulate the process. The apparent lack of faith in 
the conventional approach and the arbitration system, and the expected reluctance of the 
MNOCs to subject themselves to the rural-community forum, may explain the resort by host 
communities to aggressive behaviour to drive home their frustration from the activities of the 
former (MNOCs).
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Press Coverage on the Niger Delta Crisis 
 
350 
 
 
300 
 
 
250 
 
 
 
55%                                                57% 
 
 
 
 
51%
200 
 
 
150 
 
 
100 
 
 
50 
 
 
 
25% 
 
 
 
 
 
20% 
 
34% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9% 
 
 
 
 
 
20% 
 
 
29%
0 
Adequate Newspaper Coverage      Radio and Television report on 
conflicts 
 
 
Medium of Expression
 
Most Agree       Agree       Disagree 
 
 
 
TABLE 5.23  HOST    COMMUNITIES   PERCEPTION    OF    PRESS    COVERAGE 
OFTHE  NIGER DELTA CRISIS 
 
Source: Field Survey, 2013 
 
 
On the adequacy of press coverage of the Niger Delta crisis, about 55% disagreed that there is 
adequate newspaper coverage, 20% agreed, while only 25% most agreed on the adequacy of 
newspaper coverage in the Niger Delta. 57% disagreed on radio and television reports of the 
conflicts, 34% agreed while 9% most agreed. 29% agreed that the people of the Niger Delta 
have a medium for expressing their views, while 20% most agree. 51% did not agree that 
there is a medium to express them-selves. This belief by 51% of the respondents that there is 
no medium for expressing their grievances against the MNOCs may explain the resort by 
some  members  of  the  host  communities  to  the use  of  violence  to  draw  oil  companies' 
 
attention to perceived shortcomings in their relationship. When people who are marginalized 
feel that the avenue for expressing their displeasure over their problem has been blocked by
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the oppressor, the result has always been violence because there is no feeling more difficult to 
suppress than a feeling of frustration; needless to say that this feeling of frustration by the 
host communities goes to fuel the restiveness in the region. 
 
 
 
 
 
Do You Think Your Company  Has Been More Involved in CSR or Crisis Management? 
 
 
 Frequency Percent 
More In CRS 38 65 
More In Crisis Management 15 26 
Indifferent 5 9 
Total 350 100 
TABLE 5.24  STAFF PERCEPTION OF CSR PROJECT 
 
 
Source: Field Survey, 2013 
 
 
On whether the MNOCs have been more involved in the delivery of CSR projects or crisis 
management, 38 staff representing 65% of the respondents saw the MNOCs as more involved
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in CSR delivery. 15 (26%) believed the company has been more focused on crisis 
management, while 5 (9%) were indifferent. This further confirms on face value how much 
the companies have been involved in CSR projects, and that the welfare of their host 
communities has been part of their goals. Interestingly, just like the response in our Table 
4.17 shows, involvement in CSR projects by MNOCs does not convert to commitment to the 
realization of its positive effects on host communities. This is because some of these CSR 
projects are either left uncompleted or abandoned soon after delivery; some are not even the 
people’s immediate need, while some are constructed to buy time from the host community. 
In the face of all these, even the most genuine CSR project converts more or less to a crisis 
management project. 
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Challenges of CRS 
 
 
 Frequency Percent 
Poor budget 7 12 
Youth restiveness 26 45 
Communal conflict 14 24 
Traditional belief 6 10 
All 5 9 
Total 58 100.0 
TABLE 5.25    CHALLENGES  OF SUCCESSFUL  CSR PROJECT  IMPLEMENTATON BY MNOCs 
 
 
Source: Field Survey, 2013 
 
 
From the table and chart above, it is obvious from the perception of the staff of MNOCs that 
youth restiveness is a major challenge facing the CSR initiatives of the MNOCs. This 
represents (45%) 26 of the respondents. Similarly, 14 (24%) respondents believe that 
communal conflict is the problem and explain the reason for this in the delay in CSR delivery. 
Also, 7 (12%) of the people argued that poor budget is the challenge facing CSR. 6 (10%) 
identified traditional belief, while only 5 (9%) maintained that all factors are responsible for 
the perennial challenges experienced in the process of implementing CSR. From our analysis 
above, youth restiveness and communal conflict have combined to pose the greatest challenge 
to a successful delivery of CSR projects by the MNOCs in the Niger Delta region. This 
situation will come as a surprise to no one, because as the earlier analysis has shown, most of
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these  CSR  projects  are  either  too  little,  left  uncompleted,  ill-maintained  or  out  rightly 
executed in bad faith. In this kind of context restive youths or community members acting 
collectively may resist any attempt to be foisted with inept CSR projects or programmes. 
Again, it is also obvious that traditional believe shave some kind of nexus with the issue of oil 
and cultural crisis as studies by Aghalino had shown: 
The link between unsustainable petroleum exploitation in the Niger 
Delta and the destruction of the indigenous homeland and culture of 
the people is undeniable. Traditional lands have been sacrificed on the 
altar of irresponsible oil policies.   The point of interest is that the 
 
environmental degradation occasioned by oil pollution and gas flaring 
is instrumental to the cultural crisis in the region (2011, p.5). 
 
This cultural crisis has aggravated the problem of economic dependence in various families. 
How effective are the Oil Companies  CSR strategies? 
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Effectiveness of CSR 
 
 
 Frequency Percent 
Effective 106 30.2 
Ineffective 126 36.2 
Moderate 84 24.4 
Indifferent 34 9.2 
Total 350 100.0 
Source: Field Survey, 2013 
 
 
TABLE 5.26 
 
 
On the effectiveness of CSR, a total of 106 out of the respondents (30.2%) found CSR to be 
effective; 126 (36.2%) found it to be ineffective; 122 (24.4%) found it to be moderate; while 
34 (9.2%) were indifferent. This finding makes it pertinent for the oil companies to still 
contribute to the special Niger Delta Infrastructural Intervention Fund, increase their 
commitment   to   the   cleaning   up   of   polluted   communities   and   pay,   without   delay, 
compensations for the lands degraded by oil spills as earlier recommended by the Technical 
Committee  on  the  Niger  Delta    (2008,  p.74).  This  also  relates  to  what  Udeke  (1995), 
described as an urgent need, to address the economic implication of the petroleum pollution 
of farmlands as it does not end with just damage to crops alone but further affects soil fertility 
and  crop  yields.  The  respondents  further  lamented  that  the  destruction  of  land  affects
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indigenous economic, social, religious, cultural and political ways of life of the communities. 
“Oil spillage has eroded our traditional form of worship. It has washed off "our gods" and 
their prosperous harvest placed in our farmlands without replacement”. 
 
These findings support the assertions of scholars who argue that environmental degradation 
caused  by oil  spills  and  flaring  of  gas  leads  to  forced  migration  of  game  animals  and 
destruction of farmlands culminating in the unemployment and cultural crises in the region 
(Udeke,  1995;  Aghalino,  2011;  Aghalino  2009,  Oseloka,  2010;  Report  on  the Technical 
Committee on the Niger Delta, 2008). 
 
5.3       The  Role  of  the  Federal   Government   in  the  CSR  Related   Conflict  and  the 
Success of the Strategies 
 
The government’s involvement in oil exploration and exploitation makes it necessary for it to 
be  actively involved  in  the  resolution  and  management  of  oil  related  conflicts  between 
different stakeholders.  To this end, the Federal Government of Nigeria has played a number 
of roles in both the resolution and management of oil related conflicts in the Niger Delta. It 
has achieved these by strengthening the legal framework needed to regulate the activities of 
the  MNOCs,  through  third  party  intervention,  the  establishment  of  committees  and  the 
creation of commissions to accelerate the development of the area. 
 
Specifically,   several   meetings   have   been   held   between   government   officials   and 
representatives of militant groups and sometimes directly with the militants themselves. A 
case in point is the series of meetings held with the militants (sometimes referred to as ‘the 
boys in the creeks’ meeting with stakeholders) in July and August 2007. The meeting was 
attended by the then Vice President, Goodluck Jonathan, Senator David Brigidi, key actors in 
the Warri creeks, and some representatives of the oil states’ Peace and Rehabilitation 
Committees (Watts, 2009, p.21). The meetings offered the opportunity for them to discuss 
possible ways of brokering peace, the demilitarization of the Niger Delta and as a corollary, a
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truce between the Joint Task Force and the militants. The National Assembly's (Nigeria’s 
central legislature) House Committee on Environment also provides a platform for mediating 
between stakeholders in the Nigerian oil industry. This can be achieved by organizing public 
hearings on oil and environmental related matters. 
 
Other efforts by the government to resolve conflicts between the host communities and the 
MNOCs include the establishment of the National Oil Spill Contingency Plan (NOSCP) and 
the National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA) in 2004. The Federal 
Ministry of Environment in compliance with the International Convention on Oil Pollution 
Preparedness Response and Cooperation (OPPRC) initiated NOSDRA (Ugochukwu & Ertel, 
2008, p.145). This intervention by the Federal Government, which has enormous legislative 
significance, is intended to help in regulating the activities of the international oil companies 
in  the  country. 18  NOSDRA  evaluates  and  determines  the  causes  of  spills  and  respond 
appropriately; it also allows NGOs, CBOs and communities to send representatives to ensure 
transparency during oil  spill  investigations.  Further,  on  the  issue  of  oil  spillage,  a  staff 
member of NOSDRA stated that: 
 
We criminalise negative actions of operators in the oil industry, 
and possibly sanction companies found culpable in oil spills, 
just  like  we  recommended  Shell  to  be  sanctioned  with  five 
billion dollars in December 2011 for the Bonga oil spillage of 
over 40,000 barrels of crude oil into the Atlantic Ocean due to 
equipment failure of loading vessel. However, our laws do not 
give us the power to enforce the recommendation, which we 
 
 
18  One notable problem with such laws is that some of them have not guaranteed strict 
enforcement and sanctions. A staff of Environmental Rights Action in an interview with the 
researcher                                     also                                     noted                                     this.
243  
sent to the Federal Government. We are doing the right thing to 
accommodate the needs of the people. The Federal Government 
also  did  the  right  to  set  up  these  agencies.  The  federal 
legislature has to review our laws and make changes for the 
laws to be effective (IDI, 2013). 
 
Furthermore,  on  the  issue  of  gas  flaring,  a  Department  in  the  Federal  Ministry of  the 
 
Environment addresses the issue of gas flaring.19 
 
 
It is however, highly conspicuous that the enforcement of laws 
is always an issue in Nigeria, especially in the oil and gas sector 
and   that   is   why   the   issues   of   oil   spill,   environmental 
degradation and gas flaring have not been nipped in the bud as 
expected. This is where constitutional review and strengthening 
of the criminal justice system is pertinent to accommodate any 
lapses   in   environmental   laws,   because   one   thing   is   to 
criminalize certain unethical practices, another is to enforce the 
laws by ensuring compliance by the sanctioned companies. 
 
From the above elucidations, it is clear that there are legal mechanisms in place to regulate 
the relationship between MNOCs and the host communities. However, the implementation of 
the laws is the problem. For instance, in the investigation of the incidents of oil spills of the 
MNOCs,  it  is  interesting to  point  out  that  the  Nigerian  government  largely depends  on 
MNOCs such as Shell to provide the technical expertise and/or to authenticate issues of spills 
(IDI, Environmental Rights Action, 2013). How then do you enforce sanctions on a company 
that  provides  you  with  the requisite technical  expertise  to  investigate  an  oil  spill?  This 
19Senior officer in the Environmental Impact Assessment Department of the FME, 2014.
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demonstrates  a  conflict  of  interest  and  it  is  a  limitation  on  the  part  of  government  to 
effectively represent the interests of the host communities (Hutchful, 1983; Epelle 2004, 
p.19). 
 
The effectiveness of the federal Government's intervention strategies in the oil industry would 
have been strengthened within the framework of the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) (now 
Petroleum Industry Bill Governance (PIBG)) if it had been passed into law as the Petroleum 
Industry Act (PIA). The PIB aims to increase local content in the oil sector; introduce a 
participatory approach of the people in the industry and; give indigenous people more sense 
of belonging.  The PIB, which is about 223 pages long, has as one of its objectives to develop 
indigenous  manpower   and  encourage  the  use  of  local  resources   and  services,  thus 
contributing to economic empowerment. It would also address what Evoh (2009, p.48) calls 
‘unsustainable patterns of resource exploitation and community relations that contributed to 
the destruction of the foundations of traditional economy in the Niger-Delta, as well as end 
decades of lethal ecological war’. 
 
Most peace-building workers in NGOs believe that the Federal Government has indirectly 
fuelled the conflict by not attending to the people’s immediate needs. Such needs include the 
passage of the PIB, which they believe would have helped to economically empower the 
indigenous people,  and  hence reduce the problem of unemployment.  For them, the non- 
passage of this bill explains why there is a high rate of anti-social activities in most oil 
producing communities. According to a respondent, “Etche is a major contributor to the 
global economy, but nothing is happening there, the oil companies come and go without 
developing the community. The oil companies are not respecting us, they tap our resources 
and go; there is no recognition of the landlords” (IDI, Comrade in the Niger Delta, 2014).
245  
From the above statement by an interviewee it is no surprise that joblessness has heightened 
the host communities' frustration especially amongst graduates. The majority of able bodied 
young men are seen all over the Niger Delta cities riding 'keke napep' (a tricycle transport 
vehicle) in order to raise money needed to meet some of their basic human needs. This trend 
further discourages most youths from acquiring higher education. The crisis in the Niger 
Delta is worsened by the failure of the Federal Government to directly empower the people. 
 
However, the believe of some residents of the host communities have been countered by a 
staff member of NDDC who when interviewed maintained that: 
 
The satisfaction of basic human needs has not been achieved as 
expected, because the NDDC budget is over 200 billion in a 
year,  but  the  development  needs  of the  communities  are far 
beyond the contribution of the FG and the oil companies. Thus 
satisfying the basic needs of the people becomes a problem. 
Comparative analysis of all agencies that existed before now 
shows that NDDC has done very well, having focused on 
manpower development. There is hardly any community you 
will visit today and see pipe-borne water, good roads and 
electricity without mentioning NDDC. Many businesses would 
collapse  if  NDDC  stops  operating  in  the  Niger  Delta  (IDI, 
NDDC Staff, 2014). 
 
Most youths in the region hold an opposite view. They believe that government officials do 
not get to the grassroots to identify the basic needs of the people.  They also believe there is 
corruption and impunity in the NDDC and the duplication of the NDDC roles by the Ministry 
of Niger Delta reduces each agency’s responsibility, and therefore should be able to undertake
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the needs of the region.20 From the interviews conducted, it was observed that employment 
generation and everything that gives priority to empowerment of the youths and women are 
the main basic needs that should never be downplayed by the government and MNOCs. The 
implication of this finding validates the third hypothesis that if MNOCs and government 
embark on programmes  and  projects that stimulate the local economy (like employment 
 
generation and youth empowerment), then incidences of social conflicts in oil bearing 
communities will lessen. 
 
5.3.1    The  Extent  of the  Federal  Government's  Efforts  in Resolving  Conflicts  in the 
 
Niger-Delta 
 
 
 
What Programmes have Been Implemented  by the Federal Government  to Manage the 
 
Conflict in the Region? 
 
 Frequency Per cent 
Indifferent 13 14 
Some 70 77 
 
 
 
 
         20Interview with the Niger Delta youths, 2014.
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A lot 9 9 
Total 92 100.0 
Source: Field Survey, 2013 
 
 
TABLE 5.27  EFFORTS   OF   FEDERAL    GOVERNMENT   IN   RESOLVING    THE 
NIGER DELTA CONFLICT 
 
The aim of this section is to assess Federal Government’s efforts in resolving the conflicts in 
the Niger Delta. From the data gathered, 14% of the respondents were indifferent to the 
questions raised on this issue while 77% disclosed that the government made some efforts to 
manage the conflicts in the region. Only 9% stated that the government has made a lot of 
efforts to address the region’s perennial conflicts, thereby promoting development. Some of 
the programs designed and implemented by government to manage the conflict include:  the 
establishment of the  Niger Delta Development  Board, OMPADEC, NDDC, the National 
Directorate of Employment, Amnesty and the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs among others. 
With exception of the amnesty initiative of 2009, most of the programs introduced by the 
government have been largely unsuccessful. The amnesty initiative recorded some measure of 
success because most of the militants after disarmament have been empowered with paid 
jobs, contracts or prevocational jobs.
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What Role do You Think the Government  has Played so far in Resolving the Conflict? 
 
 
 Frequency Per cent 
Local dialogue 7 8 
Policy, legal and regulatory framework 
 
such as NDDC, PTF, etc 
21 23 
Participatory planning 12 13 
Infrastructural development 24 26 
Capacity building 9 10 
All 16 17 
None 3 3 
Total 92 100.0 
Source: Field Survey, 2013 
 
 
Table 5.28      VIEWS OF RESPONDENTS ON THE SPECIFIC  ROLE TO BE 
ADOPTED BY THE FEDERAL  GOVERNMENT TO RESOLVE  THE CONFLICTS 
BETWEEN  MNOCs AND HOST COMMUNITIES.
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8 per cent of the respondent’s interviewed indicated that government should adopt local 
dialogue as a strategy for resolving conflicts between MNOCs and host communities. 
(Ugochukwu & Ertel, 2008, p.145) 23 per cent of the respondents were of the view that 
government should facilitate the relationship between MNOCs and host communities through 
policy and institutional initiatives such as the NDDC and the Petroleum Trust Fund. About 
13% indicated that the government should utilise participatory planning strategies, 26 per cent 
felt that government should focus on infrastructural development, 10 per cent indicated that 
the government’s role should be on facilitating capacity building for the host communities, 
and only 17% stated that government should play all the roles. Data gathered showed that 3% 
indicated none as a response to the question; however, since this number of respondents is 
negligible, the import of their opinion is empirically insignificant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Frequency                   Per cent
Yes                                                         55                           61 
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No 34 37 
Indifferent 2 2 
Total 92 100.0 
Source: Field Survey, 2013 
 
 
TABLE 5.29  GOVERNMENT  INVOLVEMENTS IN THE NIGER DELTA CRISIS 
 
 
On the government’s involvement in escalating the Niger Delta conflict, 61 per cent of the 
respondents said that the government is responsible for the conflict, 37 per cent respondents 
said no, while 2 per cent were indifferent. The findings indicate that the perception among the 
host communities is that the government is culpable in escalating the conflict in the region 
and as such, this makes the Government’s role in resolving the conflict in the region even 
more difficult. The fact that the Federal Government collaborates with Shell as joint-venture 
partners undermines its role as peace broker in the conflict. 
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ARE PROMISES  TURNED INTO FORMAL  GOVERNMENT POLICIES  AND 
 
RESOLUTIONS REQUIRING  TIME-BOUND  DELIVERY  AND ACTION? 
 
 Frequency Per cent 
Yes 126 36 
No 179 51 
Indifferent 45 13 
Total 350 100.0 
Source: Field Survey, 2013 
 
 
TABLE 5.30  HOST     COMMUNITIES     PERCEPTION     OF     GOVERNMENT’S 
 
COMMITMENT TO PROMISES  AND DELIVERY 
 
 
On government’s commitment to the implementation of policies, 36% of respondents from 
host communities stated that the government delivers at the right time, while 51% argued that 
she does not, only 13% were indifferent. Again, the majority of the people interviewed on this 
important issue in the area perceived some shortcomings in the government’s role; somehow, 
the government must find a way of showing or convincing the concerned communities of its 
seriousness and goodwill, noted a respondent.
252  
 
 
 
 
Are there any outstanding promises to the people of the Niger Delta region that have not 
 
been delivered? 
 
 
 Frequency Per cent 
Yes 238 68 
No 74 21 
Indifferent 38 11 
Total 350 100.0 
TABLE 5.31  HOST COMMUNITIES PERCEPTION OF OUTSTANDING 
 
GOVERNMENT PROMISES 
Source: Field Survey, 2013 
On the perception of the respondents on the commitment of government to make good on 
promises it has made, 68 per cent stated that government had outstanding promises yet to be 
fulfilled, while 21 per cent said that government did not have any outstanding promises. 11
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per cent were indifferent. The responses here are in tandem with the responses in the last 
question where 51 per cent of the respondents said government has not been forth right in 
converting its promised policies into tangible programmes and projects that will better their 
lot. It also goes to answer the third research question on what role the government has played 
in resolving the oil conflict in the Niger Delta and how successful the strategies employed 
have been. The answer is obvious: though government has enunciated regulatory legislation 
and established interventionist agencies to mediate in and resolve the conflict, yet the result 
has been quite appalling. 
 
 
 
 
 
What action is the Federal Government  taking to ensure that these outstanding 
deliverables are implemented? 
 
 Frequency Per cent 
A lot 23 25 
Few 49 53 
None 20 22 
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Total                                                        92                              100.0 
 
 
TABLE 4.32  GOVERNMENT COMMITMENTS TO DELIVER  ON PROMISES 
Source: Field Survey, 2013 
On the present efforts by government to fulfil its promises, about 25 per cent of respondents 
 
from government agencies said a lot is being done, 53 per cent said little, while 22 per cent 
said  nothing.  This  perception  explains  the  impatience  of  the  local  communities  with 
government  and  their  resort  to  kidnapping  and  other  anti-social  means  to  voice  their 
frustration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Why is it that the conflict and kidnapping has continued  after amnesty? 
 
 
Frequency                 Per cent 
 
 
Poor planning and implementation of                                        67                          19
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Policies   
Misunderstandings among key players 70 20 
Sabotage 39 11 
Illiteracy 35 10 
Low awareness 59 17 
Not keeping to promises 80 22.8 
Total 350 100.0 
TABLE 5.33  REASONS FOR KIDNAPPING IN THE REGION 
 
 
Source: Field Survey, 2013 
 
 
On  the  reasons  that  made conflicts  persist  in  the region,  19%  of respondents  from  host 
communities felt  poor planning and  implementation  of policies  was to  blame, 20%  said 
misunderstandings among key players was the reason, 11% indicated sabotage, 10% said 
illiteracy, 17% identified low awareness and 22.8% identified failure to keep to promises. 
This means that not keeping to promises is regarded as a significant cause of conflict in the 
region, and this position is in tandem with analysis in the preceding table.
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Consequences  of the conflict on host communities  in the Niger Delta 
 
 
 
 
 
Consequences 
 
 
 Frequency Per cent 
Destruction of properties 53 15 
Oil spillage 28 8 
More poverty 30 9 
Unemployment 77 22 
Corruption 42 12 
Source: Field Survey, 2013
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Environmental degradation 42 12 
Displacement 25 7 
All 53 15 
Total 350 100.0 
Source: Field Survey, 2013 
 
 
TABLE 5.34  CONSEQUENCES OF CONFLICT  ON HOST COMMUNITIES 
 
The data generated showed that about 15% saw the destruction of properties as the 
consequences of the Niger Delta conflicts on host communities, 8% indicated oil spillage, 
while 9% said increasing poverty. Also, unemployment recorded 22% of the response, 12% 
for corruption, and 12% for environmental degradation, 7% displacement and 15% saw all the 
listed problems as the consequences of conflict on the people. This means that host 
communities have been affected in various negative ways by the endemic conflict in the 
Niger Delta region. 
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Do you think any member of the host community  has died in the cause of the conflict? 
 
 
 Frequency Per cent 
Yes 336 96 
Indifferent 14 4 
Total 350 100.0 
TABLE 5.35  CONFLICT  RELATED  DETAILS IN HOST COMMUNITIES 
 
 
Source: Field Survey, 2013 
 
On the rate of conflict-induced deaths, about 96% of respondents from the host communities 
agreed that there have been oil-related fatalities in the region, meaning that many people have 
died as a result of oil/CSR related conflicts. It was observed during the interviews with 
residents of Ogoni land that they identified the oil companies and security operatives as actors 
that cause the death of those that protested against their unhealthy practices in their land. 
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Does the conflict in any way affect the traditional  institution  and culture in the region? 
 
 
 Frequency Per cent 
Yes 235 67 
No 84 24 
Indifferent 31 9 
Total 350 100.0 
Table 5.36 EFFECT  OF CONFLICT  ON TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
 
 
Source Field Survey, 2014 
 
 
On the effects of the conflict on traditional institutions, 67 per cent agreed it has negative 
effects, 24 per cent said it had no effect, while 9% were indifferent. The result of the analysis 
here is in line with the findings in Table 4.36 where respondents confirmed the assertion of 
Aghalino (2011, p. 5) that the oil-related problems in the Niger Delta have taken their toll on 
traditional institutions in the region as some traditional lands have been desecrated by the 
cavalier activities of the MNOCs while some traditional rulers have also lost the respect and 
loyalty of their subjects due to their inordinate romance with the oil companies. 
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How would you describe the supply of electricity in your area? 
 
 
 Frequency Per cent 
Stable 147 42 
Erratic 182 52 
Indifferent 21 6 
Total 350 100.0 
TABLE 5.37  ELECTRICITY SUPPPLY IN HOST COMMUNITIES 
 
 
Source: Field Survey, 2013 
 
 
On the availability of electricity, 42% of those interviewed described it as stable, 52% stated 
that  it  is  erratic,  and  6%  were  indifferent.  Most  of  the  Niger  Delta  communities  were 
promised a stable power supply by the state governments, oil companies and the NDDC but 
many of these promises are yet to materialise. Even those that claimed to have installed gas 
turbines  to  generate  electricity could  not  sustain  such  projects  due to  managerial  issues 
including corruption, which the responds described as a regular part of revenues set aside for 
public utilities in Nigeria. Another notable problem is  that some  youths and community 
leaders are engulfed in disputes over royalties and project monitoring contracts awarded by 
the oil companies in the host communities, and this has most time torn the communities apart 
leading to a vicious circle of conflicts.
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Do you think  the host communities  have good transport, health,  education,  housing and 
employment  facilities? 
 
 Frequency Per cent 
Yes 144 41 
No 178 51 
Indifferent 28 8 
Total 350 100.0 
TABLE 5.38  AVAILABILITY OF SOCIAL AMENITIES  IN HOST COMMUNITIES 
 
 
Source: Field Survey, 2013 
 
 
The  above  table  shows  that  only  41  per  cent  agreed  that  the  Government  gave  the 
communities  good  transport,  health,  education,  housing  and  employment,  51  per  cent 
indicated no, while 8 per cent were indifferent. 
The respondents argued that gaining good employment is more relevant than other basic 
 
needs in the long run because when people have well-paid jobs, they can easily take care of
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 Frequency 
Yes 224 
 
family members without having to live at the mercy of oil companies or government. With 
 
well-paid jobs, such people can also provide for their other needs like health care, education, 
transport  and  water.  The  implication  of  all  these  is  that  it  confirms  this  study  fourth 
 
hypothesis  that  the  more  CSR  projects  are  based  on  community  needs  like  gainful 
employment  opportunities,  educational,  health  and  other  social  infrastructure,  the  more 
grievance/social conflicts are likely to reduce in the near future. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the part  of the host communities,  has there  been any case of fund  mismanagement 
by the liaison officers, leaders and traditional rulers? 
 
 
 
Per cent 
 
 
64
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No 108 31 
Indifferent 18 5 
Total 350 100.0 
TABLE 5.39 
 
 
Source: Field Survey, 2013 
 
 
On the issue of funds mismanagement by the liaison officers, 64 per cent responded that some 
officials mismanaged funds, 31% said no and 5% were indifferent. The issue of indifference 
has to do with respondents being unsure about situations or events in communities. It also 
played out during an interview with a resident and elder in Odimodi in Delta State who 
declined to comment on whether some traditional leaders collected bribes from the oil 
companies or not. 
 
From the foregoing, it is obvious that the sources and evolution of the Niger Delta conflict are 
known  to  the  extent  that,  the  majority of  the  people  who  are  well  informed  about  the 
conflict’s major drivers  blame it on the MNOCs  CSR  programmes.  In pursuance of the 
promotion  of  peace  in  the  region  the  CSR  strategy  of  the  MNOC’s  can  escalate  and 
deescalate conflicts. The respondents believe that an effective CSR strategy can reduce the 
Niger Delta restiveness in the following ways: it promotes the feeling of belongingness and 
discourage youths from restiveness and anti-social behaviours; creates cordial relationship 
between community unions and oil companies; and creating a platform for the companies and 
the community leaders to discuss and identify areas of human needs and possible projects for 
effective impacts. 
 
The study discovered that there are some limitations in the peace-building process in the 
region                                      and                                      these                                      include:
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(i)  Most CSR programmes of the MNOCs, especially youth development and scholarship 
offers, have not contributed to reducing youth restiveness and insecurity in benefiting 
communities. This is due to the ineffective nature of such CSR projects. Other sources 
of threats to peaceful coexistence in the region include disputes over the location of 
projects  and  delays  in  the completion  of  projects  and  improper  representation  of 
communities by some of the community representatives. This is a situation where 
community leaders/youth leaders side-line their people in signing of deals with 
companies means that such CSR  projects would not gain the required acceptance 
and/or recognition amongst the people.  It  was  also discovered  from  primary data 
generated that the quest for “actualisation of the Niger Delta goals” did not relax even 
with the emergence of Goodluck Jonathan, an indigenous person of the Niger Delta, 
as the president of Nigeria. 
 
(ii)  Since the inception of oil exploration and exploitation, the people of the Niger Delta 
have  sought  to  relate  with  the  oil  companies  and  government  based  on  direct 
ownership of the wealth however, various MoUs signed between the communities and 
the MNOCs have shown that the principle of collective bargaining has not been given 
required consideration before and after agreements with the companies. Most times 
the problem is that MNOCs prefer signing secret agreement with a few selected chiefs 
or elders who they think will protect their interest. 
 
(iii) This occasional secrecy in signing of MoUs between the companies and communities 
makes  accountability  very  difficult  and  less  significant;  the  MoUs  can  only  be 
effective when there is a cordial and open relationship between the people and the oil 
companies; 
(iv)  After sanctioning offending oil companies, there are legal limitations for government 
agencies  to  enforce  their  recommendations  and  being  a  stakeholder  in  the  joint
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venture with the MNOCs, government’s intervention in instances like this is usually 
slow. 
(v)  While the militant youths in the oil bearing communities believe the MNOCs and the 
Nigerian state has been paying lip service to their demand for resource control and 
environmental justice. The oil companies feel they have done enough as corporate 
citizens to their host communities, and that having paid taxes to the government, the 
latter should use the taxes to provide socio-economic amenities to their citizens. . 
 
(vi) The government believes it is doing their best for the oil bearing communities and that 
with the setting up of such interventionist agencies like the NDDC, Ministry of Niger 
Delta Affairs, NOSDRA and the amnesty programme the issue of the long standing 
neglect of the region will be addressed. 
(vii)  The government’s joint-venture partnership  with the MNOCs and,  worse still, its 
rentier status, has hamstrung its ability to rein in the latter in cases of brazen faulting 
of Nigerian environmental laws. 
 
5.4       Summary 
 
This chapter dealt with the presentation, analysis and discussion of the data collected from the 
field survey. The data generated were presented in tables, percentages, bar charts and pie 
charts and the conclusion reached used to answer the research questions and test hypotheses. 
The next chapter will summarise the findings of the thesis, present recommendations that will 
be used to improve MNOCs’ CSR delivery in oil-bearing communities in the Niger Delta.
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CHAPTER  SIX 
 
 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This  study has  critically  investigated  whether  or  not  the  current  CSR  strategies  of  the 
MNOCs operating in the Niger Delta have contributed to the perennial conflicts in the region. 
Chapter one provides the background information on the perceived exploitation of the Niger 
Delta people from the pre-colonial palm oil period to the current era of oil exploration as well 
as the attendant resistance by both the pre-colonial traditional institution heroes and modern 
militants in the region.  The conflict in the region became aggravated in the 1990s when the 
host communities, became more conscious of the wealth accruable from the oil beneath their 
land,  and  felt  deprived  of their resources  largely due to  the previous  colonial  laws and 
ordinances. The inability of the MNOCs, operating in the Niger Delta region, to stick to 
MoUs signed with host communities, and the government's inability to discipline the MNOCs 
on their environmental abuses, contributed to the escalation of the conflicts. All these factors 
are underlined by the Government’s failure to reinvest the tax paid by the MNOCs into the 
region: together they exacerbate the host communities’ current impoverishment and 
underdevelopment. 
 
Chapter two provided the political history of Nigeria and its implications in this study. It 
analysed the impact of the then British administration on ethnicity. The study discovered that 
the 1939 division of Nigeria into Northern, Western and Eastern regions by the then British 
administration triggered an ethnic conflict. As a result, minority groups started seeking for 
belongingness into governance cum ruling class and a state of their own, where they couldn’t 
fit into any of the three major tribes, in Nigeria. Consequently, the Mid-Western region was 
created in 1963 to accommodate minority agitation. However, this was found in the course of
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this research as the foundation of tribalism in Nigerian politics. The chapter culminates with 
an attempt to fill the gaps in literature: this forms the basis for this study. 
 
Chapter three examined the relevant literatures relating to oil conflict and the MNOCs’ CSR 
approach in the region. Based on the evaluation of the social conflict theory, frustration and 
aggression theory, and stakeholder's theory, the study adopts the stakeholder's theory as its 
framework  of  analysis.  This chapter conceptualised the  term  "conflict"  by  analysing  its 
different connotations, management, and resolution as well as arguments for and against it. 
The conflictual relationship between the communities, the MNOCs and the Government, was 
examined to establish the major causes of the conflict. The relationship between ineffective 
CSR and conflicts in the Niger Delta region was also investigated. 
 
Chapter four discussed the mixed-methods descriptive design study or triangulation of both 
qualitative and quantitative approaches. The study adopted questionnaires and interviews as 
its primary data gathering techniques.  The research sample consisted of the public relations 
departments of the selected oil companies (Shell, Chevron and Agip), selected host 
communities  in  the  Niger  Delta  (Ogoni,  Nembe  and  Odimodi),  and  the  Government 
parastatal bodies and regulatory agencies. The latter include: NOSDRA, NDDC, DPR, 
Ministry  of  Environment,  Ministry  of  Niger  Delta  Affairs,  University  of  Port  Harcourt 
scholars and Centre for Niger Delta studies. Data collected was analysed in chapter five of 
this study. 
 
Chapter five analysed the mixed methodology employed in this research. SPSS was used to 
analyse the quantitative data gathered in order to demonstrate the degree of agreement and 
disagreement. Tables and figures were used to tabulate these patterns whilst content analysis 
was used to analyse the qualitative data. The study finds the method adopted particularly 
significant and unique because, the study used interviews, and questionnaires. In this case,
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the researcher allowed the triangulation of both interviews and questionnaires, which was 
used  in  exploring  the links  between  CSR  and  conflict  in  the  region  from  an  empirical 
perspective to provide the study final outcome. Additionally, the findings of the empirical 
study were used to  confirm or dispel the common assumptions about the persistence of 
conflicts in the Niger Delta, despite CSR efforts of the MNOCs. This approach exposed 
issues from the perspective of the stakeholders, focusing on whether or not there are CSR 
initiatives being carried out by MNOCs in the region, which ordinarily would not have been 
possible. 
Chapter  six  is  the  final  chapter  of  this  study.  It  contains  the  summary  as  well  as  the 
conclusion of the whole thesis. In addition, chapter six presents the study recommendations 
and opportunities for further studies in line with the findings as provided by the mixed 
method descriptive research study. 
 
6.2   Study Summary  of Findings 
 
Following the research questions and hypotheses advanced at the beginning of the study, 
below are the summaries of the thesis findings: 
1.   The  continuing  conflict  in  the  Niger  Delta  region,  in  spite  of  attempts  by  the 
government and the MNOCs to mediate and pacify the people, is caused not only by a 
lack of concrete CSR projects by the latter but by the environmentally unfriendly 
means employed by the MNOCs in their exploration and exploitation of crude oil. 
Consequently, if the MNOCs are to have a mutually beneficial relationship with oil- 
bearing communities, they should begin to re-think their CSR strategies, public 
relations and community relations practices in the region. 
 
 
 
2.   The majority of the respondents (75%) are well aware of the perennial conflicts and 
their key causes in the Niger Delta. Although a number of the respondents maintained
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that  the  conflict  situation  is  minimal,  the  findings  of  the  study  demonstrate  the 
complex nature of the Niger Delta conflicts.     Thus: while, many protests and 
confrontations  in  the  region  are  centered  on  environmental  degradation, 
marginalization and deprivation, the major cause of the conflicts is primarily, the 
resource allocation problem. 
 
The study further reveals that the cavalier exploration and exploitation activities of oil 
companies have made the land and rivers lose their resources: thus rendering the oil- 
bearing communities predominantly jobless and poor. Although the MNOCs mostly 
blame  the  oil  spillage  on  sabotage,  their  collective  activities,  which  include  gas 
flaring, have resulted in environmental pollution. The soils are polluted with 
hydrocarbons up to a depth of 5 meters in 49 observed places in the Niger Delta. The 
view held by most host community chieftains and environmental rights activists, is 
that where people remain adequately empowered, there is a high probability of being 
involved in acts of sabotage. 
 
3.   The study also discovered that three key actors are involved in the oil conflict in the 
Niger Delta region of Nigeria: (i) members of host communities (youths, militants and 
traditional institutions); (ii) multinational oil companies and their staff; and (iii) 
government ministries, departments, agencies and their officials. 
 
4.   Regarding CSR programs and projects, the public relations department of the selected 
oil  companies  maintained  that  they  have  been  engaged  in  CSR  delivery  and 
community development. Towards, this direction, the staff of the Federal Ministry of 
Environment  was  in  agreement  with  the  MNOCs  involvement  in  CSR  projects 
although they could not statistically confirm the degree of the oil companies' 
involvement. Contrary to this view, however, the respondents from Ogoni, reports
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that even though the oil companies may have been involved in some CSR oriented 
projects,  these  cannot  be  considered  concrete  because,  their  delivery process  are 
flawed:  hence, they are not sustainable. 
 
The study further found that, members of the Nembe and Odimodi communities are 
also in agreement that the major CSR strategy of the MNOCs is one of ‘divide and 
rule’. The Nembe youths reported that Shell particularly has turned members of the 
community against each other: that the MNOCs secretly reward the militants and 
most outspoken individuals in order to create in-fighting’s amongst the communities. 
The companies prefer this system to the implementation of best (international) mining 
practices or implementation of the memorandum of understanding, signed with 
members  of  host  communities.  Moreover,  this  select  group  is  armed  in  order  to 
protect the pipelines and suppress community members who resist company policies. 
As demonstrated in Chapter five, the respondents state that when the companies have 
repair jobs to do on their pipelines, the CSR projects are quickly manned under the 
state of crisis management to distract or engage the host communities.      The 
respondents  stated  that  this  type  of  strategy  accounts  for  the  wide  range  of 
uncompleted   projects   in   the   host   communities.   Members   of   the   oil-bearing 
communities further reported that in order to avoid CSR involvement, some oil 
companies have decided to go offshore to reduce contacts with the people. 
 
5.   The research findings demonstrate that the Federal Government of Nigeria has played 
a number of roles in the resolution and management of the ongoing conflict. As 
shown in Chapter five, the respondents identify the Government’s amnesty program 
as the only initiative, which has had a substantial detonating effect on the conflict. 
However, the sustainability of this strategy is questionable as the amnesty program is
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expected to end in December 2015. One would wonder what would happen to its 
benefactors (ex-militants). In addition, they highlight that although the Government’s 
conciliatory  committees,  interventionist  agencies,  and  commissions  such  as  the 
NDDC and Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs were set up to accelerate the development 
of the area, the respondents protest that because of corruption nothing substantial has 
been achieved. However, the Federal Government of Nigeria must begin to adjust the 
obsolete laws and strengthen its regulatory agencies within the oil industry in order to 
checkmate the negative practices of the MNOCs – though the rentier nature of the 
Nigerian state may make this a herculean task. 
 
6.   The study has established that the government’s apparent initiatives in controlling the 
MNOCs has failed based on, the rentier status of the Nigerian state that makes it 
mandatory for the state to be dependent on oil revenue. Another reason for the failed 
initiatives is the joint-venture partnership between the Nigerian Government and the 
MNOCs, which, stipulates that the Government bear 60% of whatever cost or benefit 
that, emerges from oil exploitation in the country. 
 
To avert, or at best abate, the oil-related conflict in the Niger Delta, the Government 
must adjust its revenue allocation formula to the 1963 level when it was based on 
100% derivation. The oil-bearing communities feel that the present 13% derivation 
formula is slammed on them because they are a minority ethnic group. 
 
7.   Finally,   the   study   has   been   able   to   establish   a   linkage   between   concrete 
implementation  of  GMoUs  entered  into  with  host  communities  and  the  resultant 
cordial relationship with the MNOCs. This is believed, to a great extent will go a long 
way  in  making  the  MNOCs  good  corporate  citizens  in  their  areas  of  operation.
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6.3 Recommendations 
 
The following recommendations are made based on the foregoing conclusions: 
 
i.  MNOCs should be sensitized with regards to the importance of adhering to the 
signed General Memorandum of Understandings (GMoUs) with host communities 
since deviation from this is normally what triggers most of the CSR conflicts in 
the Niger Delta region. They must also ensure that their CSR projects are timely, 
relevant and  aimed at  meeting the  genuine socio-economic needs of the local 
people. 
ii.          MNOCs should embark on environmentally friendly processes of oil exploration 
and maintenance as well as replacement of antiquated oil pipelines, some of which 
have not been changed since oil was discovered in commercial quantity in 1958. 
They  should  as  a  matter  of  obligation  guard  against  staff  negligence  and 
equipment failures that result to oil spillage. 
iii.       The host communities should be included in the joint venture agreement with the 
MNOCs rather than the existing 60/40 partnership between the government and 
the oil companies. A percentage should be set aside for the host communities. It is 
believed   that   the   Petroleum   Industry   Bill   (PIB)   now   Petroleum   Industry 
Governance Bill (PIGB), which was not passed by the last National Assembly 
(2011-2015),  would  have  addressed  this  problem.  The  PIB  was  said  to  have 
reserved 10% share of the oil business for the host communities. If this is done 
however, the latter will now see themselves as stakeholders in the oil exploration 
and exploitation process and will play their part in protecting and preserving the 
mutually beneficial oil business. It will also help in reducing their demands for 
resource                                                                                                             control.
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iv.  Attempts should be made be to identify the traditional economy of the oil producing 
communities and revive them; they should be arranged in clusters depending on 
what they produce. These cluster communities should then be provided with agro- 
allied cottage industries with funds and technical supports provided by the 
government  and  the  oil  companies  whilst  the  communities  themselves  would 
manage its funds. The Government should, as a matter of urgency, review upwardly 
its revenue allocation formula from the present 13% to the 1963 (50%) derivation 
formula level. 
v. The Government and the MNOCs should employ a sustainable development model 
that will examine the local people’s needs for not just electricity but constant 
electricity,  the  provision  of  accessible healthcare, the  construction  of  good  road 
networks and the availability of drinking water. 
vi. Instead of gas flaring that is dangerous to both human health and the ecosystem, the 
Government should remove its proviso that allows MNOCs to flair gas with a fine. 
In place of gas flaring, the gas, which is now being flared with all its attendant 
negative effects on the Niger Delta environment, should be conserved. In this way, 
the flared gas could be converted into a liquefied form and sold for domestic use and 
export. 
vii.     Most  respondents  were  bothered  about  what  they  called  “the  reformation  of  the 
Nigerian national question”. This implies reinstating Nigeria to true fiscal federalism. 
The country’s federating states will have the alleged long awaited autonomy. The 
respondents  believe that  true fiscal  federalism  will  offer both  the local  and  state 
governments’ autonomy including the right to control their oil mineral resources and 
its accruing revenue and then pay taxes to the central government. Members of the 
three selected communities are unanimous in their belief that true fiscal federalism
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will proffer a solution to the Niger Delta conflicts and resource allocation will no 
longer pose any threat to the Nigerian state. 
ix.        The Government may want to separate the responsibilities of the Niger Delta 
developmental commissions with that of the state government. This will prevent the 
duplication of duties as well as monitor both the state government and the 
developmental   commissions.   The  constitutional  division  between   the   Nigerian 
Federal  Government  roads  and  State  Government  roads  exemplifies  this.  The 
practical implication is a sense of responsibility. For instance, when a particular road 
is bad, the residents are able to tell whose responsibility it is to repair the road. It also 
helps in proper planning and the awarding of projects, thereby, avoiding a situation 
where one project will be awarded by the state and a developmental commission at 
the same time. 
 
6.4   Opportunities for further  studies 
 
Owing to  the  complex nature of the conflicts  in the  Niger Delta region  of Nigeria,  the 
findings of this study revealed the importance of further research. Prominent among such 
areas is the dwindling nature of the amnesty program that is in effect expected to come to a 
close by the end of 2015. Whereas the current study focused on the implications of the CSR 
strategies adopted by the MNOCs in the ongoing conflict, further studies can be focused on 
the importance of the continuation of the amnesty programme by evaluating its utility in 
resolving the oil conflict in the Niger Delta. 
 
Further studies can also be conducted on the impact of religion and ethnicity on the perennial 
conflict  in  the  Niger Delta.  This  is  because  within  the  historical  Niger  Delta  there  are 
incidences of inter-community conflicts, where tribes fight each other for selfish gain. At the
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federal level, there have been opposition to resource control agitation from the major ethnic 
groups in the country against the will of the minority groups. 
 
The findings of this research revealed that on different occasions, a number of the region’s 
leaders, both politicians and the traditional institutions, have focused on enriching themselves 
to the detriment of the communities. A future study can examine the implication of the 
region’s corrupt leaders on the local economies and its consequent underdevelopment. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
From the foregoing, this study concludes that the CSR strategies adopted by the selected 
MNOCs are not adequate in managing and resolving the ongoing conflicts in the Niger Delta. 
This can be linked to the double standard strategy applied by the MNOCs, which is not an 
effectual drive for a sustainable CSR commitment. The study contends that; Shell’s CSR 
strategy in developed countries such as the United Kingdom is different from its strategy in 
developing countries. A typical example is the North Sea leakage where, Shell’s inability to 
plug a leak in the North Sea resulted in the resignation of its station Chief Executive. In 
comparism with the Niger Delta oil spillages, the leak in the North Sea was measured at 200 
tonnes per day whereas; that of Ogoni (not the entire Niger Delta) was measured at 1400 
tonnes per day. The North Sea was quickly cleaned up whereas, notwithstanding UNEPs 
(2011) report on the need to clean up Ogoniland, Shell is yet to carry out the recommended 
clean up of Ogoniland. The North Sea example is a definite demonstration of commitment to 
CSR and sustainable development in developed countries, which is unavailable in the Niger 
Delta and developing countries in general. Shell’s double standards in the Niger Delta were 
found to be contributory to the region’s youth’s anger as most respondents narrated during 
the                         study                         primary                         data                         collection.
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Residents of the Niger Delta who responded to the questionnaires and those that granted the 
researcher interview sessions demonstrated concerns over the MNOCs fracking activities. 
The seismic (oil company’s  geological survey activities carried out in the process of oil 
deposit’s search) activity known, as fracking is another means of pollution in the Niger Delta 
that cannot be ignored, a respondent insisted. Fracking involves the heavy use of ground 
water in combination of chemicals in prompting gas to travel through fractures. This process 
results in scarcity of water for other uses such as agriculture and for drinking. If any leakage 
occurs in the process of fracking, the molten that emerge are toxic, corrosive and radioactive 
therefore, contaminates both the ground water and the entire environment. Consequently, 
respondents from the host communities employed the MNOCs to adopt other processes of 
seismic activities that are less harmful to humans and the environment. 
 
The study further concludes that the more the increase in funding of CSR projects, the higher 
the resistance from host communities. This is in line with the first hypothesis outlined in 
Chapter one: the study gathered from the respondents that most CSR projects of MNOCs are 
haphazardly implemented and not directed towards empowering the people or stimulating the 
local economy. For instance, the host communities were being given Christmas gifts that they 
consider  paltry,  vis-á-vis  the  revenue  the  region  generates.  These  gifts  in  the  form  of 
perishable goods are not sustainable nor do they replace the loss of arable lands due to 
MNOCs’ gas flaring, fracking and mining waste. 
 
 
 
The lessons drawn from this research could serve as a model for other countries either in their 
initial  stage  of  oil  production  or  if  they  harbour  the  intention  to  mine  oil  resources. 
Developing  countries,  particularly African  countries  such  as  Uganda,  Kenya  and  Ghana 
where  oil  has  been  discovered  in  commercial  quantities  may,  unlike  their  Nigerian
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counterparts, want to implement oil-mining policies that will not anger the oil producing 
communities. 
 
The 60/40 partnership between the Nigerian government and the MNCOs with no percentage 
share left  for  the  oil  bearing  communities  was  found  to  be  a  source  of  conflict  as  the 
communities felt neglected. The perception is that despite their importance and huge 
contributions to the Nigerian economy. This architect of the Nigerian resource conflicts: can 
be avoided by other countries intending to mine oil. Additionally, the 60/40 sharing formula 
makes it  difficult for the government to implement its environmental policies as the oil 
companies recommends, the Nigerian Government takes the lead in the cleaning up process 
since  the  Government  takes  the  lion  share  of  the  oil  business  profit.  Thus,  developing 
countries intending to go into oil production may want to adopt the Indonesian model of 
diversification.  Indonesia and  Nigeria  had  the same  per capita  income  in  the  1970s  but 
Indonesia applied good management of oil revenue and diversified its economy by investing 
in other sectors of their economy. This accounts for its level of development in comparism 
with Nigeria. A shift from oil and, an implementation of different form of tax systems can be 
contributory to Nigerian economic growth. Agriculture, maritime and other sectors of the 
Nigerian  economy  can  be  developed  to  reduce  Nigerian  rentirism  or  even  abate  it.
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Appendixes 
 
 
Appendix 1 
 
SEME-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW LEAD QUESTIONS WITH NOSDRA, NDDC, DPR, 
MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT, MINISTRY OF NIGER DELTA AFFAIRS, 
UNIVERSITY OF PORT HARCOURT, OGONI, NEMBE, ODIMODI COMMUNITIES, 
CENTER FOR NIGER DELTA STUDIES, NOAC, CHEVRON AND SHELL 
 
INTRODUCTION: 
 
 
Date ------------------------------------ 
 
 
Name of Interviewer ------------------------------------------------------- 
Name of Interviewee----------------------------------- 
Position in the community----------------------------- 
Position in MNOC/Govt Agency------------------- 
Years of Experience---------------------------------- 
Interview with prominent community members----------------- 
 
 
 
 
 
Interview Lead Questions: 
 
 
 
 
 
(i) What are the key causes and actors of restiveness in the Niger Delta and how should these 
issues be managed? 
 
(ii) What are the prevailing CSR strategies of the oil companies in the Niger Delta and how 
successful are they? 
 
(iii)  What role has the Federal Government played in the conflict resolution and how 
successful are the strategies?
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Appendix 2 
 
 
CONFLICT  IN THE NIGER DELTA AND CORPERATE  SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY OF MULTINATIONAL OIL COMPANIES: AN ASSESSMENT 
 
 
University of Derby 
 
The questionnaire below contributes to a research work at the University of Derby leading to a PhD by 
Beloveth O. Nwankwo. 
 
All answers will be treated in strict confidence and responses will be aggregated for analysis so that individual 
responses are not traceable to particular respondents. 
 
Research Questions 
 
1.                           Bio Data 
 
Please tick (×) in the options bellow as appropriate; 
 
a.    Gender;  Male [  ] Female [ ] 
 
 
b.    Age distribution;  10 – 17 years [ ] 18 - 30 years [ ] 31 and above [ ] 
 
c.    Educational  qualification; School certificate [ ] Bachelor [ ], Masters [ ], Doctorate [ ], other s[ ] 
 
d.    Place of resident in the Niger Delta Senatorial zones; (1)Rivers East [ ] Rivers West [ ] Rivers 
South-East (2) [ ] Bayelsa Central [ ] Bayelsa West [ ] Bayelsa East [ ] (3) Delta East[ ] Delta Central [ 
] Delta West [ ] 
 
d. (i) Name of Community (in Rivers State, Bayelsa or Delta State) …………………………………… 
 
 
e.   Position in organization/ Current  job title 
a.    Public Relations Executive 
b.    Community Relations Manager 
c.    CSR Manager 
d.    Marketing Executive 
e.    Public and Corporate Affairs Manager 
f.    Community Liaison Officer/Manager 
g.    Social Welfare Officer/Manager 
 
f    Position In The Community 
h.    Traditional ruler 
i.     Opinion Leader 
j.     Community development committee (CDC) (specify position) 
k.    Youths Leader (Specify) 
l.     Militant (specify rank/position) 
m.   Women/women’s leader (specify position) 
 
g.                 Number of years of experience in the position 
a.    0 -5 years 
b.    6 – 10 years 
c.    11 – 15 years 
d.    16 – 20 years 
e.    21 years plus 
h.                 Number of years experience in community  service
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a.    0 -5 years 
b.    6 – 10 years c.    
11 – 15 years 
d.    16 – 20 years 
e.    21 years plus 
 
 
 
2.         Causes of Conflict 
 
 
Questionnaire 
 
(1) What are the key causes of the oil conflict in the Niger-Delta region of Nigeria? 
a.    Why was the Nigerian revenue sharing system changed from derivation principle to the principle 
of need and even development since the discovery of oil in commercial quantity the Niger Delta? 
i.   Because the Niger Delta is a minority ethnic group 
ii.   Had no representation at the senate 
iii.   Oil is a cause 
iv.   The three major ethnic groups marginalise the Niger Delta people 
b.    What is the key cause of the conflict? 
(i)          The oil mineral ordinance 
(ii)          Revenue allocation formula 
(iii)        The brunt of oil (CSR) 
 
c.    What major environmental impact has oil exploration and exploitation had in Niger Delta region 
since 1958 to this current period (2013)? 
i.   None 
ii.   enormous damages 
iii.   Fair 
d.    Does the on-going conflict have any link to environmental degradation of Niger Delta region by 
the oil companies? 
i.   Yes 
ii.   No 
iii.   Indifferent 
e.    Has economic development in the region changed since the discovery, exploration and exploitation 
of oil? 
i.   Yes 
ii.   No 
iii.   Indifferent 
(2) What  are  the  public  relations  strategies  employed  by the  oil companies  in managing  and 
resolving the conflicts? 
a.    Have the oil companies implemented any public relations campaigns in the local and national 
media, both print and electronic, aimed at addressing the conflict in the region? 
i.   Yes 
ii.   No 
iii.   Indifferent 
b.    What has been the impact of the public relations strategies in mitigating the conflict in the region? 
i.   Low 
ii.   Medium 
iii.   High 
c.    What is the perception of the local people regarding the public relations campaigns of the oil 
companies? 
i.   Poor 
ii.   Good 
iii.   Excellent 
d.    Is there more that could be done in terms of public relations in the region by the oil companies in 
order to improve the conflict situation? 
i.   Yes 
ii.   No
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iii.   Indifferent 
(3) What is the environmental Impact  of oil exploration and exploitation  by the companies 
 
i.   Destruction of the ecosystem 
 
ii. Water contamination 
iii. Air pollution 
 
(4) What is the role played Federal Government in the resolution of the conflicts in the Niger-Delta? 
 
a.    What programmes has the federal government implemented to manage the conflict in the region? 
i.   None 
ii.   Some 
iii.   A lot (please specify) 
b.    Are  promises  turned  into  formal  government policies  and  resolutions  requiring  time-bound 
delivery and action? 
i.   Yes 
ii.   No 
iii.   Indifferent 
c.     Are there any outstanding ‘promises’ to the people of the Niger Delta region that have not been 
delivered? 
i.   Yes 
ii.   No 
iii.   Indifferent 
d.    What action is the Federal government taking to ensure that these outstanding deliverables are 
implemented? 
i.   A lot 
ii.   None 
iii.   Not none 
 
 
5.  Multinational oil company (MNOC) 
 
 
a. What  CSR programmes /projects  are executed by SPDC, Chevron,  NAOC and what conflict 
resolution impacts do they make? 
 
 
Are you aware of any corporate social responsibility policy in your company? If yes, can you kindly give 
examples of these? 
i.       In your opinion, how effective would you rate these policies ...................................................... 
ii.       Would  you  repeat  some  of  these  policies in  any  other  organisation faced  with  similar 
circumstances? 
iii. Would you avoid implementing some of the policies? If so, why? ............................................. 
iv.       What are these projects? ............................................................................................................... 
v.        What is your assessment of their developmental impact? ............................................................ 
vi.       Are the projects what the communities demand or what your company think they deserve? 
vii.       What is your host community's perception of your CSR strategy? 
viii.        In the case of double standards, would you think your company adopts the CSR strategy 
internationally? Given the case of the North Sea oil and the Niger Delta CSR issues, do you 
think the standards are the same? 
ix.       Is  your  organisation a  member  of  any  group  that  attempts  to  promote  good  corporate 
governance (e.g. the United Nations Environmental Management Group)? If yes, has your 
organisation met the standard of the United Nations in terms of corporate social responsibility 
policy? 
x.       What do you expect your organisation would have done differently to quell the conflict? 
 
b.    What is the impact of efficient/inefficient  corporate citizenship of MNOCs on the oil conflict 
in the Niger-Delta region of Nigeria?
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1)                 How long has your organisation been in existence within the Niger Delta region? 
i.  In your opinion, is your organisation now a corporate citizen of the Niger Delta? How have 
your organisation demonstrated its corporate citizenship? 
ii.  In accordance with the latest UNEP report, do you think your company has met the global 
mining standard for oil transnational companies? 
iii.       Would  you  say  your  company is  aware  of  the  Global Memorandum of  Understanding 
(GMOU) for transnational companies? 
iv.       If yes, using the GMOU as a benchmark, do you think your company has adopted both the 
GMOU and the host community MOU? 
v.       Do you think your company has been more involved in CSR or crises management? If yes, 
why has the CSR conflict continued? 
vi.       How would you describe CSR? Who are the benefactors? 
vii.       What is the link between the conflict and CSR? 
 
c. What  is the role played  by the Federal  Government  in the resolution of the conflicts in the 
Niger-Delta? 
 
i.            Are you aware of the conflict over oil in the Niger Delta? 
 
ii.  If yes, how would you describe the situation? Do you think the conflict        origin can 
be traced to pre-colonial and colonial period? 
iii.       Do you agree that the Nigerian federal government has a contribution in fuelling the conflict? 
iv.       In your opinion what is the oil producing communities asking for? 
v.        Why is it that the conflict and kidnapping has continued after amnesty? 
vi.         What role do you think the government has played so far in resolving it? How would you 
describe the extent the government has gone in resolving the conflict? 
vii.      Do you think the conflict may have been aggravated by any government's oil related policies? 
viii.       What is the most recent conflict resolution strategy that the government has adopted? And has 
the policy affected the conflict dimension? 
ix.       What would you have suggested they do differently to quell the conflict? 
x.        Do you think the Niger Delta host communities/militants are interested in the derivation 
principle? Has there been any other approach to this principle from the time when agriculture 
was the main stay of the economy? If yes why? 
 
 
d. What are the consequences of the conflict on host communities  in the Niger Delta? 
 
i.            Has the host communities economy been affected by the restiveness in the region? 
Do you think any member of the host communities has died in the cause of the conflict? If 
yes, please give examples on how they died and name the communities 
Has the host communities suffered neglect from the oil companies and the government? 
ii.           Do you think there has been human right violation? If yes, please give examples 
iii.          Does the conflict in any way affect the traditional institution and culture in the region? 
iv.          Has there been portable drinking water for the host communities? 
v.            How would you describe the electricity system? Epileptic or stable? Please give examples. 
vi.          Do you think the host communities have good transport, health, education, housing and 
employment? 
vii.         On the part of the host communities has there been any case of fund mismanagement by the 
liaison officers, leaders and traditional leaders? 
viii.        What role has women played in the conflict so far? 
ix.          Looking at the issue on hand, what would you expect from the communities?
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e.      The company’s public relations policy for the host community; 
Public relations:
 
 
 
To provide social amenities 
To create employment 
To give financial assistance to a self- 
employed person 
 
Community  relations: 
 
 
 
To educate the host community on the 
company’s policies 
To ascertain the view of the community 
regarding the conflict in the Niger Delta 
To find out the areas of needs 
 
Conflict resolution: 
 
 
 
Conventional approach (court system) 
Rural community forum (town center) 
A merger of the conventional and court 
system 
 
Press coverage on the Niger Delta crisis: 
Most 
agree 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Most 
agree 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Most 
agree 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Most 
agree 
 
Agree                  Disagree 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Agree                  Disagree 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Agree                  Disagree 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Agree                 Disagree
 
Is there adequate newspaper coverage on Niger 
conflict? 
Do radio and television report the views of the 
Niger Delta people on the conflict? 
Do the Niger Delta people have a medium for 
expressing their view

 
